University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2018

Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers
Zachary S. Price
UC Hastings College of the Law, pricez@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Zachary S. Price, Funding Restrictions and Separation of Powers, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 357 (2018).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1664

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Price_Galley (Do Not Delete)

3/7/2018 9:38 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

________________________________________________________________________
VOLUME 71

MARCH 2018

NUMBER 2

________________________________________________________________________

ARTICLES
Funding Restrictions and Separation
of Powers
Zachary S. Price*
Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. A
crucial check on executive overreaching, it may provide authority to stop
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developed widely divergent views on the scope of this authority. During
the Obama Administration, sharp conflicts over this issue arose in areas
of acute policy conflict, including climate change, prisoner transfers,
proposed closure of detention facilities at the Guantanamo Naval Base,
and federal marijuana enforcement. Many planned initiatives of the
Trump
Administration—from
immigration
enforcement,
to
renegotiation of trade deals, to military operations against Islamic
terrorists or other foreign adversaries—could present analogous
questions. Despite the issue’s contemporary salience, however, existing
scholarship provides no satisfactory understanding of Congress’s power
to control the other two branches through appropriations constraints.
This Article offers a systematic account of funding constraints as
a separation-of-powers problem. Employing a methodology focused on
text, structure, original intent, and the broad contours of historical
practice, the Article argues that properly analyzing the problem requires
disaggregating executive powers. Congress may not control some
executive authorities, such as the veto, pardon, and appointment powers,
through restricted or conditional appropriations. These powers are
“resource-independent” because the president may exercise them
personally, and because allowing Congress to control or materially
influence their exercise would elide separation-of-powers distinctions
essential to the constitutional structure. In contrast, certain other
executive powers, most importantly war powers and law enforcement,
are “resource-dependent”—they exist only insofar as Congress provides
resources for their exercise. As to such powers, Congress properly holds
near-plenary authority to restrict or condition use of available resources.
Hard cases arise in two areas: selective support of resourceindependent powers and funding constraints on conduct of diplomacy.
In these areas, an antimanipulation principle, modeled loosely on
analogous federalism cases, provides the appropriate framework for
balancing congressional and executive authority: conditions should be
invalid only in narrow circumstances when the condition would unduly
manipulate judgments that are properly the president’s alone.
Under this framework, the separation of powers shields
presidents from congressional control with respect to powers that exist
principally to provide a check on Congress. At the same time, the
framework preserves a vital congressional check on the most normatively
important executive powers—namely, those that involve bringing the
government’s coercive and destructive capacities to bear through law
enforcement and warfare.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress’s “power of the purse”—its authority to deny access to
public funds—is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. A
central mechanism through which English parliaments clawed liberty
from reluctant monarchs, it remains a crucial check on executive
overreaching. It may provide power to stop a president in his tracks.
And yet, two centuries after the founding, the scope of this
congressional power and its relationship with constitutional executive
authorities remains both contested and inadequately theorized.
The executive branch, in both Republican and Democratic
administrations, routinely disregards funding limits that infringe upon
asserted executive authorities. 1 For its part, Congress asserts the
opposite view by routinely enacting such appropriations restrictions.
During the Obama Administration, the issue arose repeatedly in areas
of acute policy conflict, including climate change, prisoner transfers,
proposed closure of detention facilities at the Guantanamo Naval Base,
and federal marijuana enforcement. 2 President Trump’s first signing
statement staked out a broad view of his powers, 3 and many of his
administration’s planned initiatives—including enhanced immigration
and drug enforcement, renegotiation of trade deals, and military
operations against Islamic terrorists or other foreign adversaries—
could present the issue in acute form. Questions about the power of the
purse, indeed, have arisen repeatedly across American history, but as
our politics grow more polarized and erratic, and interbranch relations
more conflictual, the problem seems poised to grow worse. Developing
a grounded account of executive and congressional authority with
respect to funding conditions could scarcely be more urgent.

1.
2.
3.

For examples, see infra Section I.B.2.
For description of these and other examples, see infra Section I.B.
Presidential Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2017, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 312 (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/05/
statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-hr-244-law
[https://perma.cc/G8EU-JRX6]
[hereinafter Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act].
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This Article offers a systematic analysis of funding constraints
as a separation-of-powers problem. 4 Employing an interpretive
methodology focused on text, structure, original intent, and the broad
contours of historical practice, I dispute both Congress’s bromides about
a plenary power of the purse and the executive branch’s frequent claim
that Congress holds no greater power with respect to appropriations
than it does in passing ordinary legislation. In fact, the Constitution is
best understood to protect some minimum degree of discretion in the
exercise of constitutional executive authorities, but determining the
scope of such preclusive discretion requires disaggregating executive
authorities and attending to the nature of congressional authority over
resources with respect to different areas of executive responsibility.
Some executive powers, I argue, are resource-independent. The
president may exercise these powers without regard to any direct
conditions or limits Congress imposes upon them. Paradigmatic
examples in this category are the president’s powers to veto legislation,
appoint and remove officers, grant clemency to criminal offenders, and
exercise supervisory command over the military. These authorities are
in principle personal and costless: the president could exercise them
even if Congress provided no public resources beyond the president’s
salary. What is more, in most cases such powers exist at least in part to
provide either a check on Congress or a constitutionally required degree
of presidential control over executive functions. Allowing Congress to
control these powers, whether through funding restrictions or by other
means, would thus elide key separation-of-powers limits on Congress
itself. As the Attorney General once put it, such funding controls would
“require operation of the Government in a way forbidden by the
Constitution.” 5 Accordingly, presidents may disregard appropriations
provisions that purport to prevent particular exercises of these powers
or that condition availability of funds on these powers being exercised
in a particular way.
At the other extreme, some executive powers are resourcedependent. These powers may be exercised only insofar as Congress
provides resources for their exercise—and Congress accordingly holds
near-complete discretion to impose whatever limits and conditions it
chooses with respect to use of those resources. The two key powers in
this category are law enforcement and use of military force. Presidents,
to be sure, hold the constitutional responsibility to “take Care that the
4.
See infra Section I.B.3 for discussion of prior scholarship. The two leading articles to date
are J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162; and Kate Stith,
Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988).
5.
Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61
(1933).
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Laws be faithfully executed,” and Article II makes the president
Commander in Chief of the military. Yet neither of these powers
properly entails authority to disregard substantive limits on available
resources for their exercise. For compelling textual, structural,
historical, and normative reasons, Congress may deny funds for specific
anticipated military operations or activities, limit the location or
disposition of particular forces, bar funds for specific law enforcement
activities, or even prevent particular prosecutions. To be concrete, then,
Congress could deny the president resources to conduct any military
strike against a specified country or indeed any use of nuclear weapons
at all without advance legislative approval, and by the same token it
could deny resources to conduct mass deportations, a marijuana
dragnet, or other law enforcement efforts. Presidents hold no valid
constitutional authority to disregard such limits on their authority.
Between these two poles, hard cases arise in two areas. The first
involves selective support for the president’s resource-independent
powers. If Congress appropriates funds for presidential advisers and
other support staff (as of course it routinely does), to what degree may
it limit use of these resources? Could Congress, for example, provide
advisers to vet pardons for bankers but not drug dealers, or to formulate
resource-extraction legislation but not measures to reduce climate
change? The second hard case involves conduct of diplomacy. Although
diplomacy in practice is resource-intensive and might best be classified
as a resource-dependent power as a matter of first principles, presidents
have long claimed authority to exercise plenary control over the nation’s
diplomatic communications with foreign sovereigns. Given this
entrenched practice, the key question becomes how far either the
president or Congress may go. Can Congress preclude use of publicly
paid diplomats for communications with particular foreign sovereigns
or international bodies (as indeed it has routinely attempted to do), or
may presidents disregard such limits and employ State Department
officials and other federal personnel as they see fit?
Categorical answers to these questions are elusive, for the
simple reason that they involve balancing congressional and executive
authority—Congress’s discretion over resources on the one hand, and
the president’s authority to make certain judgments independent of
Congress on the other. In this context, accordingly, an
antimanipulation principle should determine the extent of Congress’s
appropriations power over the executive branch. Under this principle,
while Congress holds broad authority to structure the executive branch
by limiting advisers and diplomats to particular topics or activities,
Congress nonetheless may not impose narrow outcome-based
limitations on its support for key advisers or diplomats, nor may it deny
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the president access to the officials best positioned, by virtue of their
other responsibilities, to provide relevant guidance or support on a
particular narrow matter. Such limitations are invalid because they
risk manipulating particular narrow judgments that properly belong to
the president alone, and because they do so in a manner that clouds
both congressional and executive responsibility for resulting policies. As
I explain below, this antimanipulation principle not only tracks
important (but largely unrecognized) features of historical practice, 6
but also draws support by analogy from the anticoercion inquiry the
Supreme Court has applied in related federalism contexts. 7
While some past accounts have suggested that the president’s
authority to defy funding constraints is greater overseas than at home, 8
my analysis identifies a different boundary—the boundary marked by
resource-dependence, rather than the water’s edge. Because the
Constitution guarantees to presidents certain minimum authorities
that enable the system of checks and balances to function, Congress
cannot leverage its appropriations power to collapse these separationof-powers limits on Congress itself. For example, to the extent the
Constitution requires direct presidential supervision of the military, or
grants presidential authority to issue pardons with certain
consequences, giving effect to funding restrictions that bring about
different results cannot be consistent with the Constitution. Yet this
logic does not carry over to all executive authorities. In particular,
because warmaking and law enforcement are powers the president can
exercise only insofar as Congress provides resources for doing so, the
Constitution will rarely provide valid grounds for defying limits on
those resources’ use. Distinguishing between resource-independent
powers and resource-dependent powers thus yields the normatively
compelling result that the government’s coercive and destructive
capacities—its powers to kill, maim, deport, and imprison—remain
subject to control not only by the president, but also by the people’s
representatives in Congress. (For charts depicting my key conclusions,
see Figures 1 and 2 below in Sections III.A and IV.A, respectively.)

6.
See infra Sections III.C, IV.E.3.
7.
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 580–88 (2012) (“Congress
has no authority to order the States to regulate according to its instructions . . . [because] the
States must have a genuine choice . . . .”).
8.
See, e.g., Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to
Federally Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 310 (1969) (opinion by future Chief Justice
William Rehnquist drawing this distinction); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY
OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS: AN ESSAY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 143 (2002) (distinguishing
between funding conditions affecting foreign affairs and those “[i]n the domestic sphere”).
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Some might also dismiss appropriations battles as simple
matters of politics or convention rather than law. Yet neither courts nor
the executive branch have analyzed them as such. 9 At any rate, even if
in the past political self-restraint might have kept us from reaching
bare questions of legality, the bitter politics of our moment are steadily
shredding such buffers of convention, causing legal disputes over
separation of powers to arise with increasing frequency. To facilitate
analysis of future questions regarding appropriations authority, I hope
to show here that a relatively conventional approach to constitutional
interpretation—centered on text and structure, but also taking account
of the broad contours of past precedent and practice—can in fact yield
a principled and normatively satisfactory framework.
As a final preliminary caveat, I should note that because this
Article aims to provide a general overview, my analysis necessarily
paints with a broad brush. I cannot account for every historical
example; nor can I resolve every disputed question about Article II’s
meaning. 10 I do hope, however, to develop a theory that not only makes
sense of the Constitution’s basic text and structure, but also accounts
for deep working assumptions reflected in entrenched constitutional
practice. In analyzing past practice, I therefore concentrate less on
narrow precedents than on deeply embedded assumptions—those akin
to what Thomas Merrill (commenting on Henry Monaghan) has called
“type II constitutional common law,” meaning principles developed
through “evolved practice” that are so entrenched as to now be “binding
on all governmental branches.” 11 As I will explain, such embedded
working assumptions about constitutional meaning—the deep currents

9.
See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946) (“We therefore cannot
conclude . . . that since Congress under the Constitution has complete control over appropriations,
a challenge to [an appropriations provision’s] constitutionality does not present a justiciable
question in the courts, but is merely a political issue over which Congress has final say.”);
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op. O.L.C.
__ (2009) (ms. at 1) (finding that by “purporting to bar the State Department from using [certain]
funds . . . [the Foreign Appropriations Act] unconstitutionally infringes on the President’s
authority to conduct the Nation’s diplomacy”).
10. I strive throughout to remain as agnostic as possible about the actual content of executive
authorities, so as to concentrate on questions regarding how those authorities (however defined)
related to Congress’s distinct authority over appropriations. I also hold aside questions about
executive privilege and executive control of information; I focus instead on more primary questions
about exercise of government power.
11. Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453
(2010) (discussing Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1 (1993)). Another classic exemplar of my basic approach here is Edward Corwin, whose insights
loom large over many aspects of the analysis. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE &
POWERS, 1787–1984 (5th rev. ed. 1984); see also H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE WAR 191–93 (2016) (identifying a “mainstream”
approach to constitutional interpretation and distinguishing it from competing recent theories).
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beneath surface froth—resolve key textual ambiguities about
Congress’s appropriations power while nonetheless providing critical
purchase on more immediate trends. 12
My argument proceeds as follows. Part I provides background on
Congress’s power of the purse, identifies the puzzle this power
generates with respect to executive power, and discusses limitations in
past scholarly accounts. Part II helps frame the puzzle’s solution by
highlighting the deep working assumption that congressional
appropriations are ultimately matters of discretion, even if Congress
conventionally exercises its power to support the executive branch. Part
III analyzes resource-independent powers. After defining the category,
this Part addresses ways in which Congress may and may not limit
those powers’ exercise through limited or conditional appropriations.
Part IV turns to resource-independent powers. Following general
background discussion, it addresses questions regarding war powers,
law enforcement, and diplomacy in turn. A brief conclusion then
summarizes my analysis and reflects on why maintaining principled
limits on executive authority to disregard appropriations constraints is
essential in our troubled era of partisan animosity and political
disruption.
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
A. Congress’s Power of the Purse and the Puzzle It Generates
What is Congress’s “power of the purse”? This pithy phrase
captures the vital constitutional principle—once described by Edward
Corwin as “the most important single curb” on presidential
authority13—that the people’s representatives in Congress control both
public revenue and public expenditure.
12. My categorization of executive powers might draw some support from Justice Jackson’s
famous three-part framework from Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–
55 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Jackson distinguished between executive powers exercised
with congressional support, powers exercised with neither affirmative congressional approval nor
affirmative prohibition, and powers exercised in defiance of congressional restraints (his famous
“lowest ebb” category of executive power). On some level, all the examples addressed here fall at
Jackson’s lowest ebb—all involve funding restrictions imposed by Congress and potentially defied
by the president. At the same time, my ultimate categorization roughly tracks Jackson’s taxonomy.
On my account, resource-dependent powers require congressional support, resource-independent
powers do not, and certain hard cases, particularly diplomacy and presidential advising, fall in an
intermediate grey area of contestation. Jackson’s framework nevertheless does not form a
centerpiece of my analysis, for the simple reason that it offers no helpful guidance in determining
which executive authorities belong in which category. For general criticism of Jackson’s approach,
see Michael W. McConnell, The President Who Would Not Be King (Jan. 2018) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
13. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 134 (13th ed. 1975).
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On the revenue side, the Constitution expressly grants Congress
authority to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” and
“to borrow Money on the credit of the United States.” 14 The Constitution
also directs that all revenue-raising legislation must originate in the
House of Representatives, 15 the house of Congress closest to the people
(at least in the Framers’ imagination). On the expenditure side,
Congress holds express authority “to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States,” to “raise
and support Armies,” and to “provide and maintain a Navy,” 16 although
no army appropriation may exceed two years in duration 17 and
Congress must provide for a regular accounting of public
expenditures. 18 These powers, moreover, are exclusive. The
Appropriations Clause, Congress’s bedrock power-of-the-purse
provision, directs: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” 19
By the Constitution’s plain terms, then, money can flow neither
in nor out of the public purse without advance congressional approval. 20
The Constitution thus ensures that Congress, with its distributed
representation and resulting capacity for bargained trade-offs, holds
ultimate authority over both collection and distribution of public
resources. 21
Historically, the appropriations power has served another
purpose too: it has provided an ongoing check on the other branches.
This function implicates a deep constitutional history. From medieval
times, the English Parliament’s assent was required to grant
extraordinary revenues to the King. 22 Though largely notional and
uncontroversial in the Middle Ages, this authority gained greater
significance as parliament became less pliable and the fiscal demands
of warfare and other functions outstripped the Crown’s capacity to “live

14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
15. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
16. Id. art. I, § 8.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (interpreting the Appropriations
Clause to require that “[h]owever much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar
of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned”).
21. For discussion of risks associated with giving executive agencies control over their own
funding, see Christopher C. DeMuth, Sr. & Michael S. Greve, Agency Finance in the Age of
Executive Government, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 555 (2017); and Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and
Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights, 66 DUKE L.J. 1677 (2017).
22. JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS 45–46 (2017).
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of his own” from personal revenues. 23 Accordingly, from the tumultuous
seventeenth-century Civil Wars to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and
the development of the fiscal-military state in the eighteenth century,
the English Crown’s dependence on parliamentary appropriations
provided a central mechanism for degrading royal authority and
enforcing legal constraints on executive power. 24 In the colonies,
likewise, local legislative control over taxes and appropriations
provided an important means of restraining otherwise unaccountable
royal governors. 25 Indeed, royal efforts to cut governors loose from local
purse strings provided one important impetus for the Revolution. 26
Today, Congress’s power of the purse remains a vital mechanism
of accountability for the executive branch. By virtue of broad statutory
delegations and accreted executive practice, modern presidents hold
vast powers of initiative: they may often regulate (or deregulate), set
enforcement priorities, conduct foreign policy, and even launch military
campaigns as they see fit. Even when Congress disapproves of such
actions, it holds limited capacity to undo them through ordinary
substantive legislation. The president, after all, may veto any such
legislation, and normally the president’s copartisans in Congress can be
counted on to prevent the two-thirds majority required in both houses
for a veto override. 27
Congress’s appropriations power potentially reverses this
dynamic. Through the ingenious practice, begun with the very first
Congress, of appropriating funds only one year at a time, Congress has
ensured that presidents must always come back every year seeking

23. Id. at 46–47.
24. For general accounts of this history, see, for example, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVENHANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 1–17 (1994); and CHAFETZ,
supra note 22, at 45–53. See also JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE
ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783, at 144–46 (1988) (describing how English parliaments after the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 ensured the Crown’s “fiscal dependency” so as to guarantee continuing
parliamentary control over government policy).
25. See, e.g., BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 18–26 (discussing colonial
assemblies’ assertions of financial control over royal governors); JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR
POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES, 1689–1776, at 7–8
(1963) (describing assemblies’ efforts “in imitation of the seventeenth-century House of Commons
to impose their sole authority over every phase of raising and distributing public revenue”).
26. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 32 (2002) (“Revenue from the
Townshend duties [controversial new taxes resisted by colonists in the buildup to the Revolution]
was earmarked for the salaries of royal officials in the colonies so that they would be independent
of the colonial legislatures.”).
27. For general discussion of the dynamics discussed in this paragraph, see WILLIAM G.
HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION (2003);
and Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 132 (1999).
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money just to keep the government’s lights on. 28 Key federal statutes,
moreover, back up Congress’s constitutional authority. Under the socalled Miscellaneous Receipts Act, all funds received by the federal
government generally must be deposited in the Treasury. 29 A second
statute, the Purpose Act, specifies that appropriations are available
only for the specific “objects for which [they] were made.” 30 Finally, the
Anti-Deficiency Act generally makes it unlawful—indeed, sometimes
criminal—for any federal official to expend or even obligate funds
without a prior appropriation adequate for the expenditure. 31
As a result of this legal structure, the president’s ability to
advance his own agenda is constantly beholden to Congress’s
willingness to fund it, and Congress accordingly holds ongoing leverage
over executive policy. 32 What is more, while recent presidents,
particularly Clinton and Obama, succeeded in laying blame for
appropriations lapses (popularly known as “shutdowns”) on their
congressional adversaries, Josh Chafetz has correctly observed that this
dynamic is contingent. 33 Under other circumstances, the president
might well incur serious political costs for precipitating a funding
shutdown with presidential vetoes.
The appropriations process is frequently ugly and political, full
of horse-trades, special-interest giveaways, and massive omnibus bills
assembled in secret. It is often rushed; it avoids open vetting of
proposals by committees with substantive expertise; and it gives chairs
and ranking members of appropriations committees and subcommittees

28. Congress derived its practice of annual appropriations from prior practice in the English
parliament and colonial legislatures. For discussion of this history and the structural importance
of annual appropriations, see CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 52–53, 61–66, 68–70. See also EVARTS
BOUTELL GREENE, THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN THE ENGLISH COLONIES OF NORTH AMERICA 122
(reprt. 1906) (“[B]y the close of the colonial era, the general rule consisted in making detailed
appropriations for short periods of time.”).
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3302 (2012).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2012); see also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (providing that a law may be
understood to appropriate funds or allow their obligation “only if the law specifically states that
an appropriation is made or that such a contract may be made”); 1 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 4-6 to 4-7 (3d ed. 2004)
(characterizing the Purpose Act as “prohibit[ing] charging authorized items to the wrong
appropriation” or “unauthorized items to any appropriation,” because “[a]nything less would
render congressional control [of appropriations] largely meaningless”).
31. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341–42, 1350. The U.S. Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel has
described the Anti-Deficiency Act as “one of several means by which Congress has sought to
enforce” requirements of the Appropriations Clause. Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a
Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap Within an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 33 (2001). For
further discussion of the Act and its history, see infra Section IV.B.
32. See HOWELL, supra note 27, at 121–22 (noting that dependence on appropriations may
reduce the president’s “powers of unilateral action”).
33. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 69–72.
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disproportionate influence. 34 To paraphrase Bismarck’s famous
metaphor, appropriations legislation is sausagemaking at its finest—
and best not observed up close. Nevertheless, in a world of broad
delegations and expansive executive authority, Congress’s power of the
purse is the single feature of our system that most effectively
guarantees an ongoing political constraint on the president’s authority
to set policy unilaterally. One might say that if it did not exist we would
have had to invent it. 35
When it comes to constitutional executive authorities, however,
Congress’s power of the purse generates an important separation-ofpowers puzzle. While our Constitution assigns Congress the power of
appropriation, it also assigns the president specific powers and
responsibilities. Among them are the obligation to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,” the power to appoint “officers of the
United States,” and the prerogatives to serve as “Commander in Chief,”
“make treaties” (with Senate approval), and grant “Pardons and
Reprieves.” 36 All these powers and responsibilities require resources to
be discharged effectively. How do they fit together with Congress’s
power of the purse? Can Congress use its authority over funding to
control the president’s exercise of his own powers? Or do funding
constraints on executive action sometimes constitute unconstitutional
conditions that the president may disregard?
B. The Puzzle’s Undertheorization
The executive branch has developed its own particular answer
to the puzzle: it has claimed authority to disregard funding constraints
on presumed executive prerogatives. 37 If uncabined, this theory of
34. For these reasons, Neal Devins argued three decades ago that appropriations provisions
were poor vehicles for substantive policymaking. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government
Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 457–58 (discussing “institutional
reasons” why “the appropriations process may not be conducive to sound substantive
policymaking”). For more recent critical accounts of the appropriations process, see, for example,
Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84–90 (2006)
(discussing dynamics of appropriations riders and noting they may often “fly below the political
radar, placed in the bill by a few connected members of Congress”); and Richard J. Lazarus,
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J.
619, 635–37 (2006) (discussing opportunities to force through unpopular measures in
appropriations riders).
35. For some general figures on use of appropriations riders, see Jason A. MacDonald,
Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 766, 768 (2010) (counting, on average, roughly three hundred provisions banning
enforcement of specified regulations each year between 1993 and 2002).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3.
37. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations
Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 1) (concluding that the State Department “may disregard”
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executive power threatens to undo the very constraints the
appropriations process places upon presidents. And we have reason to
fear presidents will be aggressive in asserting it. Although the question
of funding control over the executive branch has arisen repeatedly
across American history, presidents may well have particularly strong
incentives to defy such restrictions in our current era of partisan
distrust, legislative paralysis, and presidential administration. At the
least, questions about presidential spending authority arose repeatedly
in areas of acute policy conflict during the Obama presidency, 38 and
President Trump’s first signing statement claimed constitutional
authority to disregard multiple provisions in a funding statute. 39 The
Framers nonetheless seem not to have held any clear view on this
question, nor does past scholarship provide any convincing framework
for answering it.
1. Ambiguity at the Founding
To begin with the Framers, the Constitution’s drafters and
ratifiers seem not to have squarely resolved, or even adequately
considered, the problem of funding constraints on the U.S. president.
To be sure, in keeping with the deep constitutional history highlighted
earlier, the Framers recognized legislative control over appropriations
as a vital check on the other branches. In Federalist No. 58, James
Madison even called Congress’s power of the purse “the most complete
and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of
every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary
measure.” 40 “[T]he purse,” Madison elaborated, was
that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution,
an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its

unconstitutional limitation on appropriations for certain diplomatic activities); Constitutionality
of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61 (1933) (“Congress may not,
by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the functions of Government
in a manner not authorized by the Constitution.”); Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen.
462, 469–70 (1860) (explaining that the president would be “entirely justified in treating this
condition (if it be a condition) [in an appropriations statute] as if the paper on which it is written
were blank”). For additional examples, see infra Section I.B.2.
38. See infra Section I.B.2.
39. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3.
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, at 297–98 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). In this
passage, Madison, in fact, associated the purse not just with Congress, but, more specifically, with
the House of Representatives, which he noted “cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the
supplies requisite for the support of government.” Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All
Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may
propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.”).
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activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the
overgrown prerogatives of the other branches of the government. 41

Unsurprisingly, the choice to vest appropriations control in Congress
occasioned significant debate at neither the constitutional convention
itself nor the subsequent state ratifying conventions. 42
And yet the very centrality of appropriations control to AngloAmerican constitutional thinking may have blinded the Framers to the
difficulty of mapping these expectations onto the new constitutional
system they were establishing. 43 In England, with its unwritten
constitution developed organically through ordinary legislation over
time, parliamentary control of appropriations served as a means of
leverage to degrade royal authority over time. Parliament, in other
words, could alter the constitutional framework by extracting
constitutional concessions from the Crown in exchange for grants of
assistance—in particular grants of assistance for the expensive military
adventures that kings persistently insisted on waging. 44 To the extent
the U.S. Constitution aims instead to fix in place a system of separated

41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 40, at 297–98 (James Madison).
42. See, e.g., BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 29 (“There is no record of any debate
about the Appropriations Clause . . . .”); Sidak, supra note 4, at 1171–73 (discussing the clause’s
drafting history and concluding it “provides little insight”).
43. As Gerhard Casper observed in his study of appropriations practice in the early Republic,
“[t]he unquestioned rule was that of legislative supremacy [over appropriations],” but “in the
postrevolutionary American context [the rule was] not necessarily obvious.” GERHARD CASPER,
SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 74 (1997). The delegates at the
Constitutional Convention did debate (and eliminate) a proposal to require origination of all
appropriations in the House of Representatives. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1171–72; cf. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (final adopted version of the Origination Clause) (providing that “[a]ll Bills for
raising Revenue,” rather than appropriations, “shall originate in the House of Representatives;
but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills”). Although some
delegates expressed concern that the House might abuse its origination power to extract
substantive concessions from the Senate, the delegates seem not to have questioned Congress’s
overall authority over appropriations, much less to have considered in depth the relationship
between appropriations and constitutional executive authorities in general. See Sidak, supra note
4, at 1172 (arguing that the debates provide no affirmative support for the view that the Framers
meant “to give Congress in effect a veto over the Executive in its performance of any of its
constitutionally assigned functions,” but acknowledging that “[t]his history from the
Constitutional Convention provides little insight into the meaning of the appropriations clause”);
see also BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 27–29 (discussing debates at the
Constitutional Convention over Senate power to amend money bills and observing that “no one
during the debates suggested prohibiting . . . riders” on appropriations bills altogether); GORDON
S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 555–56 (new ed. 1998) (also
discussing debates over origination of “money bills” at the Constitutional Convention). For general
discussion of the Origination Clause and its history, including debates at the Constitutional
Convention, see Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 666–72 (2014).
44. See BREWER, supra note 24 (linking the development of limited domestic government in
England to parliamentary control over military resources); CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 45–52
(describing this evolution).
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powers, such leveraged adjustment of congressional and executive
powers could itself defy the constitutional framework. In short,
although the Framers evidently presumed that Congress’s
appropriations power would function as a check on the executive—or at
the very least as a means of stopping a would-be tyrant in his tracks—
they seem not to have had any clear understanding of how far Congress
could go in curbing the executive. 45
In a telling indication of this blind spot, Alexander Hamilton in
Federalist No. 73 discussed presidential compensation at length
without ever seeming to consider the parallel problem of funding for the
executive branch as a whole. As Hamilton observed, the Constitution
specifically prohibits any increase or decrease in compensation during
a president’s term. 46 Observing that in general “a power over a man’s
support is a power over his will” and indifference to financial
inducements is a “stern virtue” that grows in “few soils,” Hamilton
extolled this salary guarantee as a key protection for executive “vigor”
and independence. 47 “The legislature,” Hamilton wrote,
with a discretionary power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could
render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to make him. They
might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses, to surrender
at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. 48

Yet for all his concern to prevent “intimidation or seduction of the
Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements
of the legislative body,” 49 Hamilton seemed not to consider whether
discretionary control over other executive branch officials’ salaries
could have comparable effects on presidential independence.
In fact, as discussed further below, the ink on the Constitution
was barely dry before the scope of congressional appropriations power
emerged as a point of contention. One member of Congress captured the
essential nature of the problem. In England, Representative William
Vans Murray observed on the House floor in 1796, “supplies and
grievances have been for centuries a measure of compromise and the
mode by which the Commons have accumulated powers and checks
against a throne”; hence, “we see the powers of the Commons growing

45. This question may also largely disappear (or at least present itself in different forms) in
modern parliamentary systems, which may often lack any prescribed constitutional separation
between the legislature and executive.
46. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 40, at 370 (Alexander Hamilton).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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by absorption from the prerogative of the Crown.” 50 In the United
States, in contrast, “we see in the powers of this House [of
Representatives], not the spoils of contest, not the trophies of repeated
victory over the other branches of the Government, but a specific
quantum of trust placed in our hands to be exercised for the people
agreeably to the Constitution.” 51
Though Murray’s specific position in this debate lost the day (as
we shall see 52), his broader point captures the essential puzzle the
Framers left open. In our system, unlike Britain’s, “we find certain
definite portions of power accurately meted out by the people in a
written instrument to the respective branches of Government.” 53 To the
extent that is true, use of funding denials to cut back on legitimate
prerogatives of other branches might well distort the constitutional
scheme rather than give effect to it.
2. Current High Stakes
At any rate, presidents have claimed authority since at least
1860 to disregard some funding constraints on their executive
authorities. 54 In one example, President Andrew Johnson questioned
the constitutionality of appropriations riders requiring approval of all
military orders by the Army’s top general (then Ulysses Grant). 55 In
another, President Woodrow Wilson objected, apparently on
constitutional grounds, to an appropriations rider barring use of Justice
Department funds for particular prosecutions. 56 In modern times,
Congress helped force an end to the Vietnam War by halting
appropriations, but President Ford nonetheless ordered use of military
50. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 684, 699 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Vans Murray). For
background on Murray, then a Federalist congressman from Maryland, see STANLEY ELKINS &
ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM: THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1788–1800, at 675–
76 (1993).
51. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 699.
52. See infra Part II.
53. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 698.
54. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860); see STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM
WASHINGTON TO BUSH 158 (2008) (identifying rider at issue in this case as Congress’s first effort
to limit presidential control over the executive branch through appropriations).
55. President Andrew Johnson, Message to the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 1867), in 8
A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3670 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897) [hereinafter COMPILATION MPP]; see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1023–
24 (2008) (discussing President Johnson’s “constitutional doubts” about this provision).
56. President Woodrow Wilson, Statement on Signing the Sundry Civil Bill (June 23, 1913),
in 27 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 558 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1978) (calling the provision
“unjustifiable in character and principle”).
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force during the war’s messy conclusion in violation of these
restrictions. 57 During the Carter Administration, Congress attempted
to halt an initiative to pardon Vietnam-era draft evaders by denying
federal funding to implement it. 58 In the 1980s, the so-called Boland
Amendment barred any use of federal funds to support the Contras, an
anti-Communist rebel force in Nicaragua. In the notorious Iran-Contra
scandal, however, Reagan Administration officials developed ingenious
means of circumventing this restriction. 59
Several examples from just the past few years illustrate how
congressional and executive views on this issue have diverged—and
how acute the resulting difficulties have become:
 Guantanamo Prisoner Transfers: Congress obstructed
President Obama’s stated desire to close the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility through funding
restrictions. These restrictions precluded either
transferring detainees to foreign custody without making
certain prior determinations and providing substantial
advance notice to Congress, or transferring them at all to
the United States proper. 60 Although President Obama,
in compliance with the riders, brought no Guantanamo
detainees to the United States and generally complied
with the conditions for overseas transfers, he asserted
repeatedly in signing statements that “[u]nder certain
circumstances” these provisions “would violate

57. See infra Section IV.C.1. For discussion of appropriations measures relating to the
Vietnam conflict, see BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 119–22, 154–57; Barron &
Lederman, supra note 55, at 1064–70, 1071–74; and Louis Fisher, Presidential Independence &
the Power of the Purse, 3 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 107 (1997).
58. For a description of this conflict, see CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF
“UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS: REVIVING THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 111–12 (1998).
59. For general background on the Iran-Contra controversy, see, for example, BANKS &
RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 137–44; HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND: HOW
PRESIDENTS INTERPRET THE CONSTITUTION 366–73 (2015); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 240–45 (6th ed., rev. 2014); and HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 11–37 (1990).
60. See, e.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, §§ 8110–11, 128 Stat.
5, 131. Similar provisions appeared in annual defense authorization bills. See, e.g., Carl Levin &
Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-291, §§ 1032–33, 128 Stat. 3292, 3491–92 (2014). Although distinguishing between legal
authorization and monetary appropriations is generally a key principle of appropriations law, see
generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-464SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW ch. 2, at 1–4 (4th ed., 2016 rev.), annual defense authorization bills
effectively make available military resources on an annual basis, much as defense appropriations
bills do. They thus may raise analogous concerns to those addressed here.
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constitutional separation of powers principles.” 61 In
addition, as part of a secret deal to release a U.S. soldier
held by the Taliban, the Administration transferred
several prisoners overseas without providing the
required advance notice, an action the Government
Accountability Office decried as unlawful. 62 Echoing
President Obama, President Trump’s first signing
statement indicated that restrictions on Guantanamo
prisoner transfers could infringe upon his “constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief.” 63
 Conduct of Diplomacy: Congress routinely bars use of
funds, either across the board or for particular offices, for
certain diplomatic purposes. Recurrent riders, for
example, have conditioned State Department funding on
the United States not sending official representatives to
United Nations (“UN”) bodies chaired by certain state
sponsors of terrorism. 64 Another rider first enacted in
2011 prohibited any funds for the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (“NASA”) or the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy (“OSTP”) from

61. Presidential Statement on Signing the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 945 (Dec.
19, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/statement-presidenthr-3979 [https://perma.cc/CTK9-CMD7] [hereinafter Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA].
In a key passage, Obama asserted:
The executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees who
remain, to determine when and where to prosecute them, based on the facts and
circumstances of each case and our national security interests, and when and where to
transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane treatment policy.
Under certain circumstances, the provisions concerning detainee transfers in both bills
[the Fiscal Year 2015 defense authorization and appropriations statutes] would violate
constitutional separation of powers principles. In the event that the restrictions on the
transfer of detainees operate in a manner that violates constitutional separation of
powers principles, my administration will implement them in a manner that avoids the
constitutional conflict.
Id.; see also, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 843 (Nov. 25, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2016/12/23/statement-president-signing-national-defense-authorization-act-fiscal
[https://perma.cc/TD7Z-C5KQ] (reiterating similar objection).
62. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, B-326013, Department of Defense—Compliance with
Statutory Notification Requirement (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665390.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QSK-5WVR] [hereinafter GAO Letter on Department of Defense Compliance]
(discussing transfer and deeming it unlawful).
63. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3.
64. See, e.g., Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations
Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 2–3) (collecting statutes).
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being used for certain diplomatic activities with China, 65
even though the United States had long designated the
head of OSTP as the U.S. point of contact for a scientific
cooperation agreement. 66 Presidents of both parties have
objected to such limitations and at times disregarded
them. 67
 White House Advisers: Congress attempted to influence
President Obama’s agenda through restrictions on
personnel within the White House itself. Beginning in
2011, Congress forbid use of funds appropriated for the
Executive Office of the President to pay salaries for
several specified positions, most notably the “Assistant to
the President for Energy and Climate Change,”
colloquially known as the “Climate Change Czar.” 68
Although President Obama evidently complied with the
provision’s literal terms by shifting covered personnel
and functions to other White House positions, 69 he
claimed authority in a signing statement to disregard it.
“Legislative efforts that significantly impede the
President’s ability to exercise his supervisory and
coordinating authorities or to obtain the views of the

65. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 531, 129 Stat. 2242, 2330
(2015); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 532,
128 Stat. 2130, 2216 (2014); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub.
L. No. 113-6, § 535, 127 Stat. 198, 277; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 539, 125 Stat. 552, 639 (2011); Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1340, 125 Stat. 38, 123.
66. Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 1–2).
67. President Trump’s first signing statement reiterated this view. See Trump Statement on
2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3 (objecting to provisions that “could, in certain
circumstances, interfere with the exercise of my constitutional authorities to negotiate
international agreements”). For executive branch opinions defending the practice of disregarding
such congressional limitations, see, for example, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 36); Constitutionality of
Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at
12); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 52 (1990). For
examples of actual executive defiance, see infra note 350.
68. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 622, 129 Stat. at 2468; Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, § 622, 128 Stat. at 2377; Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 621, 128 Stat. 5, 228; Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 626, 125 Stat. 786, 927 (2011); Department of Defense and FullYear Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, § 2262, 125 Stat. at 198.
69. Robin Bravender, Budget Deal Axes “Czars” Already Gone, POLITICO (Apr. 12, 2011, 9:36
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2011/04/budget-deal-axes-czars-already-gone-053001 (last
updated Apr. 13, 2011, 9:52 AM) [https://perma.cc/T8UF-YAH6].
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appropriate senior advisers,” Obama asserted, “violate
the separation of powers by undermining the President’s
ability to exercise his constitutional responsibilities and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 70
Addressing a similar provision, President Trump’s first
signing statement reiterated President Obama’s
objection nearly verbatim. 71
 Marijuana Enforcement: Another recurrent rider has
barred use of Justice Department funds “to prevent
[certain listed states] from implementing their own laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.” 72 Although this rider
to some degree codified the Obama Administration’s own
stated enforcement policy with respect to federal
marijuana crimes, 73 the Justice Department adopted a
narrow interpretation of the rider. 74 It also pursued
prosecution or civil forfeiture in cases arguably within
the rider’s terms. 75 The Ninth Circuit recently rejected
this interpretation and upheld judicial authority to
enforce the rider’s terms against the government by
barring particular prosecutions. 76 President Trump
70. President Barack Obama, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense and FullYear Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 1 PUB. PAPERS 386 (Apr. 15, 2011).
71. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3.
72. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 542, 129 Stat. at 2332–33; see also, e.g.,
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, § 538, 128 Stat. at 2310 (including
a similar restriction); TSA Office of Inspection Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-53,
§ 103, 129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015) (extending force of § 538 with respect to continuing
appropriations).
73. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys 1–2 (Aug.
29,
2013),
https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3CFH-WLXF]; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., to All
U.S. Attorneys 2 (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justicememo.pdf [https://perma.cc/34XB-6D4R].
74. See Memorandum from Patty Merkamp Stemler, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Div.,
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice,
to
All
Fed.
Prosecutors
1–2
(Feb.
27,
2015),
https://www.scribd.com/doc/273620932/Depart-of-Justice-Says-Medical-Marijuana-Law-Doesn-tImpact-Prosecutions [https://perma.cc/7RZR-EHRM] (narrowly interpreting appropriations rider
to allow continued enforcement against private individuals or entities as opposed to state
personnel).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Gentile, No. 1:12-CR-0360-DAD-BAM, 2016 WL 3549252, at
*1–2 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2016) (prosecution charging defendant with marijuana conspiracy);
United States v. Chavez, No. 2:15-CR-210-KJN, 2016 WL 916324, at *1–2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2016)
(prosecution charging defendant with marijuana possession); United States v. Marin All. for Med.
Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (suit pursuing permanent injunction
against marijuana business in California).
76. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2016).

Price_Galley (Do Not Delete)

378

3/7/2018 9:38 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:357

nevertheless indicated in his first signing statement that
the provision could infringe upon his constitutional
authority to enforce federal laws. 77
These examples illustrate how potent Congress’s control over
appropriations may be as a means of controlling the executive branch.
Yet by the same token the examples illustrate why an uncabined
unconstitutional-conditions theory is worrisome in executive hands.
Through historic practice, presidents have claimed authority to trump
(as it were) funding constraints on their own action. But the
Constitution’s provisions on executive power in Article II are
notoriously ambiguous in key respects. If presidents may claim
unfettered authority to disregard appropriations restrictions on those
powers’ exercise, then through unchecked, self-serving interpretations
they might recreate just the same sort of limitless prerogative that
Representative Murray associated with the kings of old—yet without
even an effective power of the purse to check it. 78
3. Limitations of Past Scholarship
Developing a grounded account of funding constraints on the
executive is thus imperative, yet the question has received insufficient
attention outside Congress and the executive branch. In general, the
problem of “unconstitutional conditions” on government funding is
among the most difficult in constitutional law. In a constitutional
system organized around negative liberties and other restraints on
government power, the problem of resources—the money necessary to
make those liberties and restraints effective—is a persistent blind spot
in constitutional theory. 79 The separation-of-powers question addressed
here is no exception.

77. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3 (indicating that
the President “will treat this provision consistently with my constitutional responsibility to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed”).
78. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 699–700 (1796).
79. For a recent argument that unrecognized unconstitutional-conditions problems are
pervasive in constitutional law, see Adam B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional
Conditions Questions Everywhere: The Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and
Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61 (2013). For a sampling of other key treatments, see, for example,
Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 41 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term—
Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV.
4 (1988); Philip Hamburger, Unconstitutional Conditions: The Irrelevance of Consent, 98 VA. L.
REV. 479 (2012); Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 989 (1995); and Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
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Relevant judicial authority is sparse and contradictory. The
Supreme Court has held both that appropriations restrictions may be
unconstitutional on the same grounds as ordinary legislation 80 and that
funding denials may check the other branches in ways ordinary
legislation cannot. 81 As for scholarship, what little work addresses the
question has been dominated by two conflicting articles formulated in
the wake of Iran-Contra, each with opposite limitations. 82
On the one hand, Kate Stith argued in a landmark 1988 article
that executive officials may never expend funds, nor indeed engage in
any activity, without a prior supporting appropriation. 83 On Stith’s
account, “all monies received from whatever source by any part of the
government are public funds”; no public funds may be expended without
legislative authorization; and no government activity is possible
without public funds. 84 As Stith recognized, this framework would
render the president entirely dependent on Congress, even when
exercising textually assigned executive functions such as the pardon

80. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (observing, in decision
invalidating appropriations rider as unconstitutional bill of attainder, that “[t]he fact that the
punishment is inflicted through the instrumentality of an Act specifically cutting off the pay of
certain named individuals found guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or effective than if it
had been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal”); United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871) (invalidating appropriations provision that “impair[ed]” the effect of a
presidential pardon).
81. See, e.g., Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 425 (1990) (“Any exercise of a
power granted by the Constitution to one of the other branches of Government is limited by a valid
reservation of congressional control over funds in the Treasury.”); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937) (“The [Appropriations Clause] . . . means simply that no money
can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.”); Reeside
v. Walker, 52 U.S. 272, 291 (1850) (“However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time,
not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not thus previously sanctioned. Any other
course would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous discretion.”).
82. Apart from the two key Reagan-era articles highlighted here, a number of classic works
have grappled briefly with appropriations controls over the president. See, e.g., CORWIN, supra
note 11, at 149–61; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 113–
15, 118–21 (2d ed. 1996); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POWER: THE ORIGINS 70–74, 170–73 (1976). I draw from these scholars’ work throughout my
analysis.
83. Stith, supra note 4.
84. Id. at 1345. Stith interpreted the Constitution to establish two interlocking principles,
the “Principle of the Public Fisc” and the “Principle of Appropriations Control,” according to which
all funds received by the federal government are public funds and no such funds may be expended
without legislative authorization. Id. at 1345 (emphasis removed). Together, Stith’s two principles
enforce a requirement that all federal government activity—that is, “all actions undertaken by and
in the name of the United States government,” id. at 1348—may occur only with prior legislative
authorization. Id. at 1345 (“Agencies and officials of the federal government may not spend monies
from any source, private or public, without legislative permission to do so.”); id. at 1357 (“[T]here
may be no spending in the name of the United States except pursuant to legislative
appropriation.”).
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power or the authority to negotiate treaties. 85 Stith handled this
difficulty by intuiting a congressional obligation to fund such executive
responsibilities. “Congress itself,” she wrote, “would violate the
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President to
receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties.” 86 She further
acknowledged that “[i]n the areas of foreign affairs and federal
prosecution, it is generally conceded that Congress cannot closely
circumscribe agency powers and the strategies of government policy,
much less the particulars of government action.” 87 Despite recognizing
these limits, however, Stith’s framework left the executive powerless to
enforce them. “Spending in the absence of appropriations,” she argued,
“is ultra vires.” 88
Stith’s leading contemporary critic, Gregory Sidak, reached
Implicitly
defending
the
Reagan
opposite
conclusions. 89
Administration’s Iran-Contra maneuvers against Stith’s charge of
unconstitutionality, Sidak suggested that constitutional authority for
executive action sufficed to establish an “appropriation by law” and
permit expenditure of treasury funds. 90 Accordingly, while Stith left the
president at the mercy of all congressional funding constraints, Sidak
advocated a wide-ranging “implied power to incur claims against the
treasury to the extent minimally necessary to perform his duties and
exercise his prerogatives under article II.” 91 Sidak, moreover, left it
largely up to the president to judge “minim[al] necess[ity],” 92 and his
analysis suggested that presidents could make even quite substantial

85. Id. at 1351–52.
86. Id. at 1351.
87. Id. at 1383.
88. Id. at 1351, 1362 n.89. Stith did indicate that “where an emergency exists, the President
might decide that principles more fundamental than the Constitution’s appropriations
requirement justify spending,” but she argued that “[t]he constitutional processes for resolving
such situations . . . are political.” Id. at 1351–52. On the key question addressed here, Stith
asserted: “Even where the President believes that Congress has transgressed the Constitution by
failing to provide funds for a particular activity, the President has no constitutional authority to
draw funds from the Treasury to finance the activity.” Id. at 1351.
89. Sidak, supra note 4. Though Sidak’s account was the most comprehensive, several other
contemporaries defended the view of executive power underlying the Reagan Administration’s
defiance of the Boland Amendments. See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, The Constitution and the IranContra Affair: Was Congress the Real Lawbreaker?, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 83 (1988) (arguing that
separation-of-powers principles justified the Administration’s actions). In addition, some earlier
scholarship anticipated these views by asserting broad presidential authority over foreign aid. See
Don Wallace, Jr., The President’s Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970
DUKE L.J. 293; Don Wallace, Jr., The President’s Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers over Foreign
Aid: Part II, 1970 DUKE L.J. 453. For my discussion of this issue, see infra Section IV.E.1.
90. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1168–70, 1191, 1194–95.
91. Id. at 1194.
92. Id. at 1199, 1201.
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military and law enforcement expenditures in defiance of statutory
appropriations limits. 93 Sidak also interpreted the phrase “by Law” in
the Appropriations Clause to include executive authorization, when in
fact the Constitution generally employs this phrase as a term of art for
Acts of Congress. 94
More recently, some general accounts of separation of powers
have briefly analyzed appropriations authority, 95 and Josh Chafetz has
highlighted the potential scope of Congress’s appropriations power. 96
Two leading scholars of foreign relations law have taken opposite views
on conditional appropriations for conduct of diplomacy; 97 an impressive
book addressed fiscal practice in connection with the Cold War national
security state; 98 and several articles have addressed questions
surrounding denial of appropriations for enforcing particular laws or
regulations. 99 Commentators have also analyzed many specific
examples addressed here. 100 Yet the scope of congressional authority to
93. See id. at 1188 (“[A] President who acts to discharge his article II duties when Congress
has failed or refused to provide him appropriations for that purpose does not violate the
appropriations clause.”); id. at 1197–99 (discussing national defense and law enforcement
examples and concluding that the choice of spending level “must be a matter of political discretion
left to the President in the first instance and non-reviewable by the Judiciary”).
94. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 167 (advancing this view and identifying
other “flaws” in Sidak’s theory). The Supremacy Clause’s reference to “the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance [to the Constitution],” U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2, has been
understood to include administrative action, but such action occurs pursuant to statutory
authorization, not in defiance of it. For a general discussion of administrative action’s preemptive
effect under the Supremacy Clause, see David S. Rubenstein, The Paradox of Administrative
Preemption, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 268–69 (2015).
95. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 59, at 240–45; HENKIN, supra note 82, at 113–15, 119–21;
KOH, supra note 59, at 129–31; HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 77–83 (2005); David J.
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief Power at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 733–34, 738–40 (2008).
96. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 45–78.
97. Compare MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 108–14,
417 n.61 (2007) (arguing such conditions are generally permissible), with POWELL, supra note 8,
at 141–44 (arguing they may violate separation of powers).
98. See BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 160–61 (discussing constitutionality of
appropriations restrictions in the national security context).
99. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 34; Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the Use of
Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 457 (1992); MacDonald, supra note 35. Some other recent works have called attention to the
importance of budgetary constraints in administrative law. See Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and
the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1729–35 (2016) (discussing
appropriations law and implementation of the Affordable Care Act); Eloise Pasachoff, The
President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016) (addressing
mechanisms of agency policy control through the White House budget process); Sohoni, supra note
21 (analyzing risks associated with agency-initiated spending).
100. See, e.g., Celidon Pitt, Note, Fair Trade: The President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S.
Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837
(2015) (addressing prisoner exchanges); Kevin Sholette, Note, The American Czars, 20 CORNELL
J.L & PUB. POL’Y 219 (2010) (exploring increasing use of administrative “czars”); Marshall
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condition executive appropriations has awaited systematic
reexamination, even as the bipartisan executive practice of
disregarding such funding constraints has gathered strength and our
increasingly polarized and erratic politics have given the question new
urgency.
II. FRAMING THE SOLUTION: WHY FUNDING IS DISCRETIONARY
A better account of when and whether funding constraints are
permissible must recognize that even if Congress holds no affirmative
duty to provide funds in the first place, separation-of-powers principles
may limit Congress’s authority to provide funds with strings attached.
For reasons addressed in Parts III and IV, the scope of any irreducible
executive discretion over spending must vary by context. Some powers
are resource-independent and thus matters of plenary presidential
discretion, while others are resource-dependent, giving the president
far narrower scope to defy statutory appropriations limits. Even
resource-independent powers, moreover, are subject to important
limiting principles that prior accounts have failed to articulate.
Correctly framing the analysis, however, requires first
eliminating one possible means of reconciling the appropriations power
with executive authority: the theory (suggested by Stith) that Congress
holds some affirmative duty to fund executive functions at adequate
levels. 101 While this view was debated early in the country’s history and
has resurfaced from time to time since then, the great weight of
historical practice contradicts it. As a matter of deeply embedded
constitutional practice, then, the view that Congress holds some legal
duty to fund the president’s priorities—let alone a judicially enforceable
legal duty to do so—is off the table. The problem as it arises today is
instead one of unconstitutional conditions: whether Congress’s power to
provide no funds at all entails power to provide funding with strings—
and relatedly when, if ever, the president may take the money but cut
the strings for separation-of-powers reasons.
In the early Republic, leading figures in fact argued to the
contrary that Congress held an affirmative obligation to fund executive
initiatives (whether it approved of them or not). In particular, in
Silverberg, The Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA’s Covert Operations, 68 TEX. L. REV.
575 (1990) (discussing oversight of the CIA); L. Anthony Sutin, Check, Please: Constitutional
Dimensions of Halting the Pay of Public Officials, 26 J. LEGIS. 221 (2000) (analyzing congressional
appropriations power over compensation for executive branch officials); Adrian Vermeule, The
Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 501 (2002) (analyzing
separation-of-powers issues regarding compensation for public officials).
101. See Stith, supra note 4, at 1350–51.
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debates over whether to appropriate funds to implement the
controversial “Jay Treaty” with Great Britain negotiated by the
Washington Administration, some members of Congress insisted that
the House was duty-bound to back the agreement, while others argued
that the House’s constitutional role in passing appropriations
legislation gave it independent authority to question the treaty’s
merits, even after the president and Senate approved it. 102 As one
example, Representative Murray (who was quoted earlier 103) deduced
an obligation to fund the treaty from the fixed character of executive
authorities under our Constitution. Unlike in England, he observed,
“[h]ere, an appropriation is less a grant of money than an act of duty, to
which the Constitution, that is the will of the nation, obliges us.” 104 In
private correspondence, Alexander Hamilton likewise maintained that
while the House might properly debate “the mode of raising and
appropriating the money,” the House “cannot deliberate whether they
will appropriate and pay the money” in the first place. 105 Even decades
later, leading Federalist attorney William Rawle asserted in his
treatise that “[i]t is incumbent on congress to furnish” “all pecuniary
supplies required to support the exercise of the treaty making power.” 106
The House, however, ultimately approved resolutions rejecting
any such notion of constitutional duty. First, in the so-called Livingston
Resolution, the House requested documents and correspondence from
the executive branch regarding the treaty negotiations. Insofar as this
demand for information presumed a right to exercise independent
judgment over the merits of implementing the treaty, the resolution’s
approval by a wide margin properly “suggest[s] that a substantial
majority agreed that the House had discretion in implementing the

102. For general accounts of this controversy and resulting constitutional debates in Congress,
see, for example, GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1789–1815, at 197–99 (2009); and DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801, at 211–17 (1997).
103. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
104. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 699 (1796) (statement of Rep. William Vans Murray). Other members
of Congress pressed the same view. See, e.g., id. at 1017 (statement of Rep. Zephaniah Swift)
(“Notwithstanding the power given to the Legislature to make all appropriations of money; yet, in
all cases where the national faith is plighted, a contract is made, or a debt contracted, it becomes
an absolute duty to make the necessary appropriation to carry it into effect . . . .”).
105. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Loughton Smith (Mar. 10, 1796), in 20 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 72 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1974). President Washington’s refusal
to provide documents to the House regarding treaty negotiations implied the same view, as he
asserted no legitimate role for the House in considering the treaty’s merits.
106. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 73
(William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 2003) (2d ed. 1829). Rawle acknowledged that “there is no express
direction to this effect” in the Constitution, but argued that “common sense” supported inferring
this congressional duty. Id. at 74.
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treaty.” 107 What is more, after President Washington claimed a
privilege not to produce the documents—and even though the House
ultimately voted on the merits to implement the treaty—the House
passed another resolution asserting:
when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution
to the power of Congress, it must depend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a
law or laws to be passed by Congress. And it is the Constitutional right and duty of the
House of Representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency or
inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in
their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good. 108

The House’s votes thus reflected the view, expressed forcefully
by President Jefferson’s future Treasury Secretary Albert Gallatin
among others, that “the specific Legislative powers delegated to
Congress were limitations on the undefined power of making Treaties
vested in the President and Senate,” and “the general power of granting
money, also vested in Congress, would at all events be used, if
necessary, as a check upon, and as controlling the exercise of, the
powers claimed by the President and Senate.” 109 In correspondence with
Hamilton, even the future Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall
advocated “admit[ting] the discretionary power of the representative on
the subject of appropriations,” notwithstanding the binding contractual
character of the treaty itself. 110
This debate resurfaced during at least one other key juncture in
American history. During the waning days of Reconstruction, President
Rutherford Hayes argued in a series of veto messages that effecting
substantive legal changes through appropriations bills violated the
separation of powers. 111 Hayes acknowledged that such riders had
already become a “common practice” employed by “[a]ll parties when in
107. CURRIE, supra note 102, at 214.
108. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. at 771–72; see also id. at 781–84 (recording vote).
109. Id. at 466 (statement by Rep. Gallatin); see also CURRIE, supra note 102, at 215–16
(endorsing this view).
110. Letter from John Marshall to Alexander Hamilton (Apr. 25, 1796), in 20 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 137–38.
111. See, e.g., President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), in 10
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4475, 4484 (arguing that including provisions in funding bill
to repeal certain unrelated statutes was “a dangerous violation of the spirit and meaning of the
Constitution”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (May 29, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION
MPP, supra note 55, at 4488, 4489 (reiterating constitutional objection “to the practice of tacking
general legislation to appropriation bills, especially when the object is to deprive a coordinate
branch of the Government of its right to the free exercise of its own discretion and judgment
touching such general legislation”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (May 4, 1880),
in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4543, 4544 (objecting again to “the questionable and . . .
the dangerous practice of tacking upon appropriation bills general and permanent legislation,” in
part because this practice “invites attacks upon the independence and constitutional powers of the
Executive by providing an easy and effective way of constraining Executive discretion”).
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power.” 112 He nevertheless decried the practice for giving the House of
Representatives, which alone may originate revenue bills, undue
authority “to withhold appropriations upon which the existence of the
Government may depend unless the Senate and the President shall give
their assent to any legislation which the House may see fit to attach to
appropriation bills.” 113 “To say,” Hayes wrote, “that a majority of either
or both of the Houses of Congress may insist upon the approval of a bill
under the penalty of stopping all of the operations of the Government
for want of the necessary supplies is to deny to the Executive that share
of the legislative power which is plainly conferred by” Article II’s veto
provisions. 114 Accordingly, in Hayes’s view, “[t]he enactment of this bill
into a law will establish a precedent which will tend to destroy the equal
independence of the several branches of the Government,” thus
“plac[ing] not merely the Senate and the Executive, but the judiciary
also, under the coercive dictation of the House.” 115
In decrying use of appropriations leverage to alter substantive
policy, Hayes presumed some congressional obligation to fund executive
and judicial operations at necessary levels in the first place. Yet even
Hayes acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority to deny funding if
it wished. Some appropriations in fact lapsed on two occasions during
his administration, as they nearly did during that of his predecessor,
Ulysses Grant. 116 Though both presidents urged Congress to provide
needed funds without delay, both also acknowledged that Congress’s
failure to provide funds could halt government operations. 117
112. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (Apr. 29, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP,
supra note 55, at 4475, 4480.
113. Id. at 4482. As discussed below in Section IV.D.2, Hayes also objected to provisions
denying funds to enforce federal laws that remained on the books.
114. Id. at 4483. Hayes concludes this sentence by referring to the “share of the legislative
power which is plainly conferred by the second section of the seventh article of the Constitution.”
Since Article VII has no second section and addresses ratification rather than legislative authority,
it seems likely he meant to refer to the veto provisions in the second clause of section seven of
Article I.
115. Id. For general background on these debates, see ARI HOOGENBOOM, RUTHERFORD B.
HAYES: WARRIOR AND PRESIDENT 392–413 (1995); and BROOKS D. SIMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION
PRESIDENTS 220–23 (1998).
116. See CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 68 (discussing lapse in funding for federal marshals
during Hayes Administration); HOOGENBOOM, supra note 115, at 352, 402 (discussing separate
lapses in funding for the army and the marshals during the Hayes Administration); President
Ulysses Grant, Special Message (June 17, 1876), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322
(urging Congress to avoid funding lapse); Act of June 30, 1876, ch. 157, 19 Stat. 65 (providing
temporarily for government expenditures).
117. See infra Section IV.D.2; see also President Rutherford B. Hayes, Third Annual Message
(Dec. 1, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4509, 4525 (noting that while some
federal marshals had “continued the performance of their duties without compensation from the
Government” following an appropriations lapse, in some instances “the proper execution of the
process of the United States failed by reason of the absence of the requisite appropriation”);
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One of Hayes’s and Grant’s key allies in Congress, future
President James Garfield, expressly articulated this balance. Despite
arguing that Congress had the “duty” to fund executive enforcement of
statutes, he nevertheless acknowledged Congress’s “power” to deny
such appropriations:
Now you have the power to withhold appropriations, but have you the right? Your power
and your duty put together constitute your right in the best sense of the word. Of course
you are your own judges of duty. But we are all here, Mr. Chairman, under the solemn
obligation of an oath. We are all sworn before the Searcher of all hearts that we will well
and faithfully perform the duties of Representatives under the Constitution. And the
Constitution makes it our duty to appropriate the necessary means to enforce the
laws. . . . I hold that to appropriate the money required by the law is my duty, and my
vote shall be for the appropriation under the laws as they are, and not coupled with acts
which nullify or obstruct the laws. 118

Today, at any rate, whether characterized as a constitutional
“right” or merely a “power,” presumed congressional discretion over
funding underlies not only the Anti-Deficiency Act (“ADA”), but also
routine congressional debates over funding levels for a variety of
executive initiatives. Congress in fact passed the ADA (and tightened it
over time) to eliminate the previously routine practice of “coercive
deficiencies.” 119 Before the ADA, executive agencies regularly overspent
their appropriations so as to impose a moral obligation on Congress to
make whole hapless constituents who acted in reliance on expected
government remuneration. 120 By criminalizing this practice, Congress
firmly asserted its view that public expenditure requires advance
legislative authorization, which Congress may or may not provide in its

President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Message (June 30, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra
note 55, at 4474, 4475 (“Under the laws prohibiting public officers from involving the Government
in contract liabilities beyond actual appropriations, it is apparent that the means at the disposal
of the executive department for executing the laws through the regular ministerial officers will
after to-day be left inadequate.”); President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Session Message (Mar.
19, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4472 (calling special session because of
Congress’s failure to make appropriations); Grant, Special Message (June 17, 1879), in 10
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322, 4323 (observing that without extension of
appropriations, government departments would be “[p]recluded from expending money not
appropriated” and “would have to suspend the service so far as the appropriations for it should
have failed to be made”).
118. 9 CONG. REC. 1894–95 (1879).
119. For a general history of the ADA and Congress’s long battle with the problem of coercive
deficiencies, see LUCIUS WILMERDING, JR., THE SPENDING POWER: A HISTORY OF THE EFFORTS OF
CONGRESS TO CONTROL EXPENDITURES 144–47 (1943). Both the Comptroller General and the
Justice Department have understood preventing this practice to be the ADA’s central purpose. See,
e.g., Project Stormfury—Australia—Indemnification for Damages, 59 Comp. Gen. 369–72 (1980);
Employment of Retired Army Officer as Superintendent of Indian School, 30 Op. Att’y Gen. 51
(1913).
120. See WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 137–53.
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discretion. 121 For that matter, even before the ADA, most seem to have
assumed that the coercion effected by coercive deficiencies was moral
and political rather than legal—that Congress, in other words, could
decline if it wished to appropriate funds that executive officials
promised. 122
More generally, Congress today routinely declines to fund
initiatives and agencies at levels presidents request, even in areas of
arguable executive prerogative such as foreign affairs. As just one
example, in keeping with the post–Jay Treaty Livingston Resolution,
Congress in recent years has often declined to fund treaty commitments
such as dues obligations to international organizations. 123 Such
shortfalls may cause presidents (and the nation at large) great
embarrassment, but few seriously contend that Congress lacks
authority to make this choice. 124
As appropriations battles during the Obama and Clinton
Administrations grew more heated and lapses in appropriations more
common, some faulted Congress for failing to “do its job” and fund the
government. 125 Such objections resonate with historic arguments by
Hamilton, Rawle, and Hayes that Congress holds some constitutionally
grounded obligation to exercise its appropriations power in a manner
that respects other branches’ prerogatives. It might even be said that
failing to fund the government for partisan gain violates a “convention”
121. For an illustration of the contemporary understanding, see Colonel Richard D. Rosen,
Funding “Non-Traditional” Military Operations: The Alluring Myth of a Presidential Power of the
Purse, 155 MIL. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1988), which describes the need for a specific funding source for
government operations.
122. See, e.g., Support of the Army, 15 Op. O.L.C. 209, 211 (1877) (noting that notionally
voluntary contribution of supplies for the military would place the government “under the
strongest moral obligation to use every proper and reasonable effort that the donors or lenders
should be reimbursed by Congress”).
123. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 82, at 121 (discussing failure to fund U.S. obligations to the
United Nations).
124. Among leading modern scholars, Louis Henkin, like Stith, embraced Hamilton’s view that
Congress has a duty to fund some executive policies. Rather like Garfield, however, neither Stith
nor Henkin appeared to believe a congressional failure to appropriate is justiciable or otherwise
constitutionally enforceable. Id.; Stith, supra note 4, at 1351. More recently, as this Article was
entering final edits, Gillian Metzger has argued that the president’s duty of faithful execution
establishes an obligation on Congress’s part to provide sufficient resources for administrative
functions, but she too indicates that this congressional duty “is unlikely to be judicially
enforceable.” Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 87–90 (2017). For a response to Metzger based on the argument developed
here, see Zachary Price, Against Cutting the President’s Purse Strings, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE &
COMMENT BLOG (Jan. 6, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/against-cutting-the-presidents-pursestrings-by-zach-price/ [https://perma.cc/RS66-LKTE].
125. Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W. Peters, Government Shuts Down in Budget Impasse,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/politics/congress-shutdowndebate.html [http://perma.cc/H7R2-MJ3E] (reporting President Obama’s comment that “[y]ou
don’t get to extract a ransom for doing your job”).
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of government, in the sense (discussed in recent scholarship) of a
practice followed out of a sense of obligation despite absence of any real
legal imperative. 126 Yet even if Congress by convention normally seeks
to avert shutdowns, by the same token recent appropriations shortfalls
demonstrate general acceptance of Congress’s ultimate discretionary
control over appropriations. 127 In Garfield’s formulation, denial of
appropriations is thus a clear congressional power, even if not also a
right.
To sum up, then, as a formal constitutional matter, Congress
could, if it wished, “reduce the president’s staff to one secretary for
answering social correspondence, and . . . put the White House up at
auction.” 128 Likewise, with respect to the judiciary, “Congress could
presumably eliminate the salaries of judicial clerks and secretaries or
even (most cruelly of all) cut the Supreme Court’s air conditioning
budget.” 129
This presumed overall discretion over funding provides essential
context for debates over congressional authority to provide funding
subject to conditions. In combination with the practice of annual
appropriations, Congress’s ultimate discretion over funding gives
Congress vital ongoing leverage over the executive branch. Yet it also
explains the particular form in which separation-of-powers questions
about Congress’s appropriations power arise: as disputes over whether
Congress’s notionally greater power to deny funding altogether entails
the supposedly lesser power to regulate in fine detail how funds it
provides may be used. We can now turn, finally, to answering that
question.

126. For discussion of “conventions” and their relevance to separation of powers, see David E.
Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 27–35 (2014); and Adrian
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1181–94 (2013).
127. For executive acknowledgment of this point, see, for example, Unconstitutional
Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __
(2011) (ms. at 10) (recognizing that “Congress may restrict the implementation of previously
negotiated agreements”); Mutual Security Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector
General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) (observing that under the
Appropriations Clause, “Congress could refuse to appropriate any funds at all to implement
legislation, however essential the appropriation might be for the country’s welfare,” but “[t]he
remedy in such a case would be political”).
128. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15 (1974); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 66 (endorsing Black’s
view).
129. CHAFETZ, supra note 22, at 66; see also Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 303, 331 (2007) (“Congress probably has the power to cut the federal courts’ budget for paying
law clerks and secretaries.”); Vermeule, supra note 100, at 531 (observing that Congress could
“curtail the judiciary’s physical facilities and fringe benefits as it pleases”).
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III. RESOURCE-INDEPENDENT EXECUTIVE POWERS
To what extent can Congress control the executive branch
through restricted or conditional appropriations? Since at least 1860,
executive branch lawyers have claimed some authority to disregard
funding limits. 130 But their reasoning has been loose, leaving the outer
bounds of this claimed authority undefined.
This Part explores and (partially) defends the executive branch
view with respect to key executive authorities identified here as
resource-independent. Certain constitutional executive authorities—
including most importantly the powers to veto legislation, grant
clemency, appoint and remove officers, and issue lawful commands to
the military—exist either as checks on other branches or as means of
supervisory control over the executive branch that the president leads.
These same powers, moreover, are at least theoretically costless:
presidents in principle could exercise them personally without
assistance, keeping no counsel and using only their own salary or other
personal resources. Accordingly, as a matter of basic constitutional
structure, presidents are not dependent on congressional resources to
exercise these powers, and in consequence neither are they properly
beholden to congressional judgments about how those powers should be
exercised.
Accepting this structural logic nevertheless does not require
giving it expansive scope. In particular, contrary to some presidents’
claims, presidential authority to disregard some direct funding
conditions does not necessarily entail authority to call on the
government’s full resources for advice and assistance, nor does it mean
that executive branch interpretations of ambiguous executive
authorities should always prevail. Here, after first defining the category
of resource-independent powers and addressing the structural
invalidity of direct restraints and conditions on such powers, I turn to
questions regarding selective support and Article II’s ambiguity.
A. Defining the Category
The key examples of executive powers I classify as resourceindependent are the veto, clemency, appointment, removal, and
supervisory military command. Other examples include the authority
to demand written opinions from department heads, the power to
130. See Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860) (indicating that
“Congress could not, if it would, take away from the President, or in anywise diminish the
authority conferred upon him by the Constitution” and that an appropriations condition
attempting to do so would therefore be “void” and “have no effect whatever”).
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convene or adjourn Congress in some circumstances, and the authority
to recommend legislation. (For a rough taxonomy of executive powers
that anticipates further analysis in Part IV, see Figure 1 below.) At
least three characteristics generally define these powers as resourceindependent.
The first, and most important, characteristic is that these
powers—in theory, at least—are costless. That is to say, the resourceindependent powers are powers that the president, in principle, could
exercise personally, using only his salary and perhaps access to a
computer and office supplies. In a celebrated essay on the presidential
veto, Charles Black asked, “To what state could Congress, without
violating the Constitution, reduce the President?” 131 Black answered:
I arrived at a picture of a man living in a modest apartment, with perhaps one secretary
to answer the mail; that is where one appropriation bill could put him, at the beginning
of a new term. I saw this man as negotiating closely with the Senate, and from a position
of weakness, on every appointment, and as conducting diplomatic relations with those
countries where Congress would pay for an embassy. But he was still vetoing bills. 132

Black’s observations capture the veto’s fundamental
independence from public resources provided for its support. Yet a
humbled president such as Black imagined would be doing other things
too. From his desk, with no more than pen and paper, or perhaps laptop
and cell phone, he could issue pardons and commutations, send
nominees to the Senate (however weak the prospects of confirmation),
sign commissions for appointees, fire executive officers who displeased
him, and even issue otherwise lawful orders to military officers in the
field. For that matter, such a president could demand opinions from
cabinet secretaries, peruse the responses, order Congress adjourned or
convened, and try her hand at drafting proposed legislation. As a
practical matter, then, these are powers Congress cannot take away by
stripping appropriations—for the simple reason that their exercise
requires no appropriations.
This insight makes sense of Alexander Hamilton’s expectation
in the Federalist that salary protection alone would guarantee the
president’s institutional independence. In the minimal formal sense
reflected by these powers’ costlessness, Hamilton was correct. Of
course, under modern conditions, how well or even competently the
president could exercise these powers without advice and assistance is
a serious question. What is more, Hamilton’s account overlooks the
president’s political vulnerability to funding denials that obstruct
131. Charles L. Black, Jr., Some Thoughts on the Veto, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 89
(1976).
132. Id.
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asserted presidential priorities, whether or not the denials directly
impact the president’s constitutional functions. For both these reasons,
these powers’ costlessness is likely to be fictional in practice—a problem
to which I will return shortly. Nevertheless, it is at least formally true
that these powers require no public support beyond the president’s
salary, and this characteristic distinguishes them fundamentally from
other authorities, such as war powers and law enforcement, that the
president cannot even theoretically perform on his own.
A second, related feature of resource-independent powers is that
the president need not rely entirely on public appropriations to obtain
advice and assistance in exercising them. Presidents have long claimed
authority to seek counsel from anyone they choose, whether within the
government or outside of it. 133 Congress’s authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to structure the government may well
permit statutory restrictions on any formal private staff to assist the
president with official functions. 134 The Constitution’s Appointments
Clause, moreover, would preclude assignment to private parties of
ongoing actual authority to make decisions or take actions in the
government’s name. 135 Within those bounds, however, the separation of
powers likely supports some presidential authority to seek and obtain
private guidance. Indeed, even apart from any such Article II authority,
citizens’ First Amendment right to petition the government should
enable them to offer the president their views on proper discharge of
those authorities he may exercise personally.
133. See, e.g., Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3
(asserting presidential “prerogative to obtain advice that will assist him in carrying out his
constitutional responsibilities”); EDWARD S. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS 74 (Richard Loss ed., 1976) (discussing examples from Presidents Theodore
Roosevelt and Herbert Hoover); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466
(1989) (noting “formidable constitutional difficulties” that would arise from limiting the president’s
access to outside advice on nominations); id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (indicating that
applying disclosure requirements to outside group providing advice on judicial nominees would
constitute “a direct and real interference with the President’s exclusive responsibility to nominate
federal judges”); In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 728 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“In making decisions
on personnel and policy, and in formulating legislative proposals, the President must be free to
seek confidential information from many sources, both inside the government and outside.”).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. Applying this logic, OLC recently explained that under
statutes governing White House appointments:
A President wanting a relative’s advice on governmental matters . . . has a choice: to
seek that advice on an unofficial, ad hoc basis without conferring the status and
imposing the responsibilities that accompany formal White House positions; or to
appoint his relative to the White House under title 3 and subject him to substantial
restrictions against conflicts of interest.
Application of the Anti-Nepotism Statute to a Presidential Appointment in the White House
Office, 41 O.L.C. __ (2017) (ms. at 14).
135. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (interpreting the Appointments Clause to
cover “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”).
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A final important feature of the powers I classify as resourceindependent relates to their structural function within the
constitutional scheme. Although a completely tidy account of these
powers’ purposes may well be impossible (and would go beyond the
scope of this Article), the powers identified above as resourceindependent generally may be understood either as checks on the
legislative branch or as guarantees of presidential control over the
executive branch. As examples of checks, the president’s veto and
clemency powers seem intended at least in part to counterbalance
Congress’s authority to enact new laws and establish new federal
crimes. Allowing Congress to eliminate or control these authorities
would thus elide essential limits on Congress’s own authority,
rendering the president subservient to Congress in exercising powers
designed to check Congress itself.
Other resource-independent powers instead guarantee a
specified degree of presidential control over subordinate executive
officials. The president may demand opinions in writing from executive
officers, serves as “Commander in Chief” of the military, and (subject to
Senate advice and consent) appoints ambassadors and other officers of
the United States, including not only executive officials but also judges.
To the extent the Constitution mandates these features of government
organization, Congress’s own legislative authority cannot validly
override them. They are conditions the Constitution imposes on any
executive apparatus Congress creates.
While it may be only a happy coincidence that resourceindependent powers serve such checking and control purposes, it is
nonetheless striking that all the powers identified above as resourceindependent advance one or the other of these goals to some degree. In
addition to the president’s veto and pardon powers, the power to
convene and adjourn Congress (within parameters prescribed in Article
II) is in some sense a check on Congress’s ability to do as it wishes. With
respect to executive officers, the president’s appointment power
provides a key means of supervisory control over the executive branch.
With respect to judges and other nonexecutive officers, it might better
be considered a check on Congress, but in any event it constitutes a
clear, textually assigned prerogative of the president under Article II.
To the extent Article II gives the president an implied constitutional
authority to remove executive officers, this power, too, constitutes a
means of supervisory control over the executive branch. The one outlier
may be the authority to recommend legislation, which does not directly
check any power of Congress or enable supervisory control. But even
this power provides a check of sorts on Congress’s authority to set its
own agenda (and indeed seems to have been included in the
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Constitution to preclude arguments that such impositions on Congress
are improper 136).
Because these powers may be exercised personally by the
president, because he is not dependent on public resources for their
exercise, and because they exist to check Congress itself or limit the
executive branch’s institutional design, legislative efforts to control
these authorities through appropriations restrictions present a problem
of unconstitutional conditions. Much like legislation requiring waiver of
free speech rights as a condition of public assistance, or federal
legislation requiring state legislation as a condition of federal support,
conditional support for resource-independent executive powers raises
the question whether Congress’s power to provide no resources at all
entails the power to provide resources with strings attached. The proper
answer to this question, however, depends on the nature of the funding
condition and its impact on executive authority.
FIGURE 1: TAXONOMY OF EXECUTIVE POWERS
Resource-Independent
Checking Powers
Veto
Pardon
Convene/Adjourn
Recommend Laws

Resource-Dependent
Supervisory Powers
Appointment
Removal
Demand Opinions
Military Command
(superintendence)

Foreign Relations Powers
Recognition of foreign sovereigns
Reception of foreign diplomats

Clear Examples
Military Command (use
of force)
Law Enforcement
Contested Example
Conduct of Diplomacy
- making treaties
- negotiating generally

B. Direct Restrictions
We can begin with the easiest case: funding conditions or
restraints that directly limit the president’s exercise of resourceindependent powers are per se invalid and may properly be disregarded
by the executive branch (and courts).

136. Application of the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (2016) (ms. at 4–5)
(discussing the Clause’s drafting history).
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1. Direct Restrictions’ Structural Invalidity
This category of direct restrictions includes two types of laws: (1)
riders placed in appropriations bills that limit executive constitutional
authorities, and (2) provisions conditioning the availability of
appropriations on particular executive action. Both types of provisions
effectively condition the availability of funds on acceptance of statutory
constraints on the president’s constitutional authority. Such provisions
have been rare historically with respect to resource-independent
powers—itself, perhaps, an indication of their invalidity. But there are
at least a few examples. During the troubled administration of
President Andrew Johnson, for instance, Congress passed an
appropriations rider requiring that all military commands be issued
through “the General of the Army” (who was Ulysses Grant) and that
this General could not be removed or assigned to other duties “without
previous approval of the Senate”—limitations President Johnson (like
many scholars since then) considered clearly unconstitutional. 137 More
recently, during President Carter’s administration, Congress blocked
funding to effectuate certain pardons for Vietnam-era selective-service
violators. 138 And in a recurrent provision, made permanent in 2007,
Congress has conditioned funding for recess appointees’ salaries on the
president not selecting an appointee who was previously nominated for
the position but rejected by the Senate. 139
137. Army Appropriations Act, ch. 170, § 2, 14 Stat. 485, 486–87 (1867); Barron & Lederman,
supra note 55, at 984–86. Although most scholars appear to agree with President Johnson that
these provisions were unconstitutional, see, e.g., Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 986–88,
substantial authority supports allowing Congress to vest particular responsibilities in particular
offices, at least in the civil context. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705 (2007) (discussing this principle
with respect to administrative law). Holding aside the limitations on presidential removal
authority, it is not entirely clear to me why Congress’s general authority over offices could not
justify requiring issuance of all military commands through the army’s top general (whoever that
happened to be at a given time).
138. MAY, supra note 58, at 111–12.
139. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. D, tit. VII, § 709, 121
Stat. 1844, 2021 (2007), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. pt. III.D., ch. 55 note; see also President George
W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development,
the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act 2006, 41
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1800 (Nov. 30, 2005) (“The executive branch shall construe [a similar
provision in an earlier bill] in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to
make recess appointments.”). Insofar as this provision conditions executive funding on the
president not selecting an otherwise-eligible individual for a recess appointment, it directly
infringes the president’s recess appointment power. This provision, which directly targets the
choice of appointee, might be distinguished from more general salary statutes through which
Congress has asserted its views on the Recess Appointment Clause’s proper overall scope. See
generally Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not Justify Departing from the
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 925–30,
944–49, 956–57 (2015) (discussing such statutes and their history).
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Why are such restrictions and conditions unconstitutional? For
the simple reason that honoring them would create a governmental
structure different from the one the Constitution prescribes. As noted
earlier, to the extent the Constitution requires direct presidential
command of the military, or presidential authority to issue pardons
with certain effects, giving effect to funding conditions that bring about
different results cannot be consistent with the Constitution. The
starkest example would involve the veto: Congress surely could not
grant executive funding on condition that the president not exercise the
veto, for this funding condition would eliminate a central, prescribed
constraint on Congress’s legislative power itself. To be sure, Congress
(or particular congressional leaders) may be able to extract and enforce
informal political bargains with these same effects. I will return to that
issue below. But as a formal legal matter, direct funding conditions of
this type cannot be binding, because it would defy the basic logic of
separation of powers—the very reasons for separating executive and
legislative authority—if Congress could abrogate these limits on its own
authority as a condition of funding executive operations.
A judicial analogy may help illustrate this point. Whatever else
it entails, the “judicial power” vested in the Supreme Court by Article
III seems at a minimum to include authority to decide discrete cases
within the Court’s jurisdiction according to the Justices’ best view of the
law. 140 In principle, this power, like resource-independent executive
authorities, is personal and costless; just as presidents could issue
pardons, nominations, or military commands without help from
Congress, judges in theory could decide cases using only the personal
salary guaranteed to them by the Constitution. But precisely because
the Constitution defines the Justices’ office as entailing this resourceindependent authority, conditioning other judicial resources—funds
for, say, law clerks, court buildings, and staff—on the Justices ruling or
not ruling in a particular way should equally offend separation of
powers. Insofar as such conditions actually influence the Justices, they
jeopardize the very institutional autonomy that the Constitution aims
to provide by separating judicial from legislative power. On the other
hand, even if the conditions fail to actually influence the Court’s
decisions, the conditions nonetheless place the Justices in a Catch 22
that degrades their institutional independence: either the Justices rule
as Congress desired and compromise their own perceived autonomy and

140. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016) (“Congress could
not enact a statute directing that, in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins.’ ”); Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 439 (1992) (analyzing whether a statute violated Article III because
it “failed to supply new law, but directed results under old law”).
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legitimacy, or they rule against Congress’s wishes and compromise
their own branch’s funding.
Precisely the same logic applies to resource-independent
presidential powers. Like the judicial power to decide cases according
to judges’ best view of the law, constitutional powers that the president
may exercise personally, without need for appropriated resources and
as a check or constraint on Congress’s own authority, are powers that
call for independent personal judgment. Allowing Congress to restrict
or condition funding with respect to these powers would thus
compromise the very institutional autonomy the Constitution aims to
provide by vesting those powers in the president in the first place. For
that reason, moreover, loss of funding cannot be justified as simply a
cost Congress may impose on exercising the president’s power in a
particular way. As in the judicial example, putting a president to this
choice would itself compromise the autonomy of her office by forcing her
to choose between degrading her own perceived independence and
compromising the capacity of her own branch of government.
Accordingly, presidential autonomy of judgment in exercising resourceindependent powers is, no less than judicial autonomy of judgment with
respect to legal cases, a condition the Constitution imposes on any funds
Congress provides, not a power Congress may control through funding
conditions of its own.
This view, at any rate, has long been asserted by the executive
branch itself in explaining its objections to certain funding constraints.
In 1860, for example, in the very first executive branch legal opinion
addressing such conditions, Attorney General Jeremiah Black
concluded that Congress could not condition military funding on a
requirement that particular duties be performed by a particular
military officer. 141 Whether or not the opinion’s view of the Commanderin-Chief power was correct, 142 Black employed structural separation-ofpowers logic to explain the condition’s incompatibility with Article II.
As his opinion explained, because “Congress could not, if it would, take
away from the President, or in anywise diminish the authority
conferred upon him by the Constitution,” an appropriations condition
attempting to do so would be “void” and “have no effect whatever.” 143
Attorney General William Mitchell employed the same
structural logic in a 1933 opinion. “Congress,” he wrote,

141. Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 468–69 (1860).
142. Again, it is not clear to me that Congress lacks authority to vest particular duties in
particular military officers. See supra note 137.
143. 9 Op. Att’y Gen. at 468–69.
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holds the purse strings, and it may grant or withhold appropriations as it chooses, and
when making an appropriation may direct the purposes to which the appropriation shall
be devoted and impose conditions in respect to its use, provided always that the conditions
do not require operation of the Government in a way forbidden by the Constitution. 144

Mitchell went on:
Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a discharge of the
functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the Constitution. If such practice
were permissible, Congress could subvert the Constitution. It might make appropriations
on condition that the executive department abrogate its functions. 145

Mitchell thus asserted that a legislative veto provision in
proposed funding legislation would be “void” if enacted. 146 By Mitchell’s
logic, if the Constitution precludes vesting such authority in a House of
Congress, then it likewise prevents Congress from achieving that result
through conditional appropriations. Whatever bargains Congress may
force on the executive branch through appropriations, it cannot compel
the executive branch to give up its own constitutionally prescribed
power to check Congress or control government operations. Such
authorities are not the president’s to bargain away even if he wishes, so
even if a president signs legislation imposing such limits, the conditions
cannot be binding.
By this logic, furthermore, it should again make no difference
whether the conditions are in fact effective—that is, whether the sums
at stake are sufficient to actually coerce the president’s judgment. It is
144. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61
(1933) (emphasis added); see also Mutual Security Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of
Inspector General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 507, 526 (1960) (“[I]t seems . . . plain that
Congress may not use its power over appropriations to attain indirectly an object which it could
not have accomplished directly.”).
145. 37 Op. Att’y Gen. at 61; see also, e.g., Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and FullYear Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 6) (“Congress may
not . . . ‘use the appropriations power to control a Presidential power that is beyond its direct
control.’ ”); Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act,
33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009) (ms. at 10) (indicating that Congress may not accomplish unconstitutional
ends with the spending power); Presidential Certification Regarding the Provision of Documents
to the House of Representatives Under the Mexican Debt Disclosure Act of 1995, 20 Op. O.L.C.
253, 266 (1996) (“Broad as the spending power of the legislative branch undoubtedly is, it is clear
that Congress may not deploy it to accomplish unconstitutional ends. Thus, . . . Congress may not
use the spending power to infringe on the President’s constitutional authority.”); Authority for the
Continuance of Government Functions During a Temporary Lapse in Appropriations, 5 Op. O.L.C.
1, 5–6 (1981) (“Manifestly, Congress could not deprive the President of [the pardon] power by
purporting to deny him the minimum obligational authority sufficient to carry this power into
effect.”); Authority of Congressional Committees to Disapprove Action of Executive Branch, 41 Op.
Att’y Gen. 230, 233 (1955) (“[Congress] may . . . impose conditions with respect to the use of [an]
appropriation, provided always that the conditions do not require operation of the Government in
a way forbidden by the Constitution.”).
146. 37 Op. Att’y Gen. at 66. Half a century later, the Supreme Court deemed legislative veto
provisions invalid in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956–58 (1983).
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true that in some other contexts, most notably federal conditions on
funding grants to states, the Supreme Court has required such a
showing before deeming the condition invalid. 147 But such analogies are
inapposite here. Conditioning even a dollar of funding on some
prescribed exercise of a resource-independent executive authority
violates separation of powers, because Congress lacks authority to
create an executive apparatus in which such funding conditions are
operative. The violation, in other words, is a matter of structure rather
than effect. To employ a helpful distinction Mitchell Berman has drawn,
the condition here is coercive in the sense of being wrongful rather than
overbearing: the point is not that we may “excuse the coercee [here the
president] for doing the thing the coercer [Congress] demanded,” but
rather that we may “levy blame upon the coercer” for acting on an
unconstitutional design. 148 In short, because direct funding conditions
on resource-independent executive powers make the presidency into a
different office from the one the Constitution defines, they are
inconsistent with separation of powers and may be disregarded without
consideration of their actual likely effect in practice.
Key Supreme Court decisions reinforce this view. In United
States v. Lovett, the Court held that Congress could not impose an
unconstitutional bill of attainder by means of an appropriations statute,
any more than it could do so through ordinary legislation. 149 The statute
in question denied appropriations for named federal employees’
salaries, thus effectively barring them from future federal
employment—an action the Court viewed as punishment without trial
in violation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. 150 As the Court explained,
“[t]he fact that the punishment is inflicted through the instrumentality
of an Act specifically cutting the pay of certain named individuals found
guilty of disloyalty, makes it no less galling or effective than if it had
been done by an Act which designated the conduct as criminal.” 151
Likewise, in the important (if famously opaque) Reconstructionera decision United States v. Klein, the Court disregarded a condition
on appropriations for certain judgments because the Court understood
the condition to deny effect to presidential pardons. 152 As the Court
147. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012) (“Congress
may use its spending power to create incentives for States to act in accordance with federal policies.
But when ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ the legislation runs contrary to our system of
federalism.”).
148. Berman, supra note 79, at 41.
149. 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 316.
152. 80 U.S. 128, 147–48 (1871).
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explained, “it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of
such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law. Yet this
is attempted by the provision under consideration.” 153 Whatever else it
means, Klein thus indicates that an unconstitutional limitation on the
pardon power is no less invalid by virtue of being imposed as a funding
constraint.
Even some key individual rights decisions follow the same logic.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held that Congress could
not condition funding for indigent legal services on the funded lawyers’
refusal to advance certain legal arguments. 154 In the Court’s view, the
condition infringed both the First Amendment and separation of powers
by imposing a “serious and fundamental restriction on advocacy of
attorneys and the functioning of the judiciary.” 155 In terms of the
structural logic developed here, the condition in Velazquez attempted to
create attorneys who were not attorneys (because they could not fully
represent their clients’ interests), and courts that were not courts
(because their decisionmaking was artificially impaired by limitations
on arguments presented to them). 156 As such, the condition violated
structural limits on Congress’s appropriations power, much as the
conditions in Lovett and Klein did in the separation-of-powers context.
Federalism coercion cases do not contradict these principles
because they address a fundamentally different problem. The Supreme
Court in fact said as much in Metropolitan Washington Airports
Authority v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc. (“MWAA”),
a 1991 decision addressing whether Congress could conditionally
exercise its authority to dispose of federal property so as to create an
entity that defied separation-of-powers requirements. 157 As the Court
explained there, the federalism decisions reflect the premise “that,
absent coercion, a sovereign State has both the incentive and the ability
to protect its own rights and powers, and therefore may cede such rights

153. Id. at 148.
154. 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001).
155. Id. at 544.
156. Id. at 544–46. Velazquez is notoriously hard to square with Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991), which upheld funding constraints limiting government-funded doctors’ advice about
abortions. See id. at 193 (“The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively
fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at
the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another
way.”). Whether or not the cases are ultimately reconcilable, Velazquez appears more relevant here
insofar as the Court there understood legal services not merely as a form of private speech activity,
but rather as a constitutional function with implications for the judiciary’s performance of its own
constitutional role. See 531 U.S. at 546 (“The restriction imposed by the statute here threatens
severe impairment of the judicial function.”).
157. 501 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1991).
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and powers.” 158 In contrast, separation-of-powers limits of the sort
addressed here—powers designed to check or limit Congress’s own
authority—aim “to protect not the states but ‘the whole people from
improvident laws.’ ” 159
These observations highlight a key difference between
separation of powers and federalism. Separation-of-powers limits,
MWAA appears to suggest, involve an affirmative allocation of power
within the federal government, such that allowing Congress to override
the allocation through funding constraints would give Congress power
to alter the prescribed constitutional structure. Spending-related
federalism cases instead focus on preserving a meaningful residuum of
state authority beyond the limited enumerated powers delegated to
Congress. Given that federal and state authority often overlap,
moreover, allowing states to accept noncoercive conditional federal
funding grants may well advance rather than inhibit federalism
values—particularly if the likely alternative is a direct federal spending
program that cuts out state authority altogether. For all these reasons,
federalism cases inevitably involve questions of degree—judging how
far is too far—rather than any hard structural limit on federal power.
Of course, one might quibble with the Court’s coercion inquiry
in the federalism context, and it is certainly possible that some
federalism limits have the same hard-edged character as the resourceindependent presidential authorities I address here. (It seems doubtful,
for example, that Congress could condition federal funding to any
degree on state authorities that themselves check or control federal
authority, most notably state authority to select federal presidential
electors 160 or send two Senators to Congress. 161) Whatever the correct
federalism analysis, the key point here is that direct funding
constraints on other branches’ resource-independent authorities violate
the constitutional separation of powers. Congress could not condition
judicial funding on resolution of particular cases in a particular
manner; such direct legislative manipulation of judicial decisionmaking
would violate both due process and separation of powers. 162 By the same
token, Congress cannot impose direct funding conditions on executive
constitutional powers that do not require congressional resources for
their exercise and that the Constitution assigns to the president as a
constraint on Congress itself. As the executive branch has long
158. Id. at 271.
159. Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
161. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII.
162. Cf. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 n.17 (2016) (“Congress could not
enact a statute directing that, in ‘Smith v. Jones,’ ‘Smith wins.’ ”).
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maintained, such funding conditions violate the basic structural logic of
separation of powers and are per se invalid.
2. Why Explicit Legislation Differs from Informal Bargains
While this formal structural logic suffices to support executive
disregard for direct constraints on resource-independent powers, some
additional functional considerations reinforce this conclusion.
Unconstitutional conditions problems always present the puzzle
why the power to provide no funds at all fails to include the power to
provide funds with strings attached. Though sometimes framed as a
question about whether the greater power to deny funds includes the
lesser power to provide funds conditionally, here, at least, this framing
seems flawed: manipulating a coequal branch with appropriations
conditions may well be the greater power, as compared to providing no
funds at all (and bearing the political costs of doing so).
At any rate, the puzzle in this context takes a particular form.
Given Congress’s discretionary control over appropriations, Congress
(or particular congressional leaders) may assert considerable leverage
over presidents by threatening spending to which they are politically
committed. Modern presidents are in fact highly vulnerable to this form
of leverage. In the public mind and the judgment of history, presidential
success or failure today turns primarily on achievement of a policy
agenda. 163 Yet congressional funding decisions may powerfully shape
presidential capacity to deliver on policy promises. A cash-strapped
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) may have little capacity to
address climate change; nor could a barebones enforcement operation
deliver a promised immigration dragnet or narcotics crackdown.
Competitive, politically motivated presidents are thus vulnerable to
congressional funding decisions that impact their ability to deliver
promises, secure preferred policies, and achieve desired legacy
objectives. 164 Even worse, insofar as the president’s priorities are not
Congress’s own, congressional leaders may themselves incur no
political cost for failing to support the president’s agenda. As a result of
these dynamics, presidents might well choose not to veto particular
legislation, to appoint (or not appoint) a particular department head, or
163. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 956–57 (2005) (“[M]odern presidents face a set of constituency-driven political incentives
that require activist governance. . . . With Congress largely absent from the scene and media
coverage fixated on presidential personality, the public’s opinion of the President, in turn, is closely
tied to the perceived successes and failures of government generally.”).
164. Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 136 (“Broadly speaking, . . . it is fair to say that most
presidents have put great emphasis on their legacies and, in particular, on being regarded in the
eyes of history as strong and effective leaders.”).
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to grant (or deny) a particular clemency request as part of an informal
political bargain to secure funding for other presidential priorities.
Even if that is true, however, there are important functional
reasons to treat enacted legislative conditions differently from such
informal political bargains. For one thing, such explicit conditions are
amenable to legal analysis and remediation in a way that informal
political bargains are not. Much as a court would do in a comparable
case, the executive branch can assess the condition’s validity on its face
and then perform a severance analysis to determine whether Congress
would still have chosen to provide the funds had it known the condition
would be disregarded. Remedying the violation thus requires no
commandeering of unappropriated funds—a far graver violation of
Congress’s appropriations power. 165 The president need only judge that
he may spend money Congress has appropriated without regard to the
invalid condition.
In addition, in the case of an explicit funding condition, as
opposed to an implicit political bargain, Congress’s unconstitutional
objective of controlling executive judgments is plain on the face of the
statute. No inference from legislative history, no weighing of competing
and overlapping legislative goals, is required; the legislation speaks for
itself. As David Pozen has observed, courts have often been reluctant to
define operative separation-of-powers doctrines in terms of subjective
motivation, even if charges of constitutional “bad faith” are a pervasive
feature of the Constitution’s political enforcement. 166 But here the
legislation is sufficiently plain that Congress’s bad intent, such as it is,
is objectively ascertainable from the face of the law. 167
At any rate, and more importantly, allowing presidents to
disregard conditions on resource-independent powers ultimately places
the political burden of undermining executive independence where it
belongs—on Congress, the branch seeking to usurp a rival branch’s
powers. Were presidents bound by all funding conditions, they could
defend their independence of judgment only by vetoing all
appropriations bills with conditions targeting their constitutional
authorities. But a veto likely heightens the risk that the public will
blame the president rather than Congress for any hardship resulting
165. Cf. Dorf, supra note 129 (discussing issues surrounding judicially mandated spending).
166. Pozen, supra note 126, at 886–87. I have argued that looking beyond the face of a policy
to presidential statements is generally improper in evaluating an administrative policy’s legality.
See Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1615
(2016).
167. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 523, 543 (2016) (discussing possibility that “a statute exhibits an unconstitutional intent or
purpose on its face”).
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from a shutdown—a risk the president may be unwilling to take if
nothing beyond an abstract presidential prerogative is at stake.
The modern practice of omnibus, kitchen-sink appropriations
compounds this problem. 168 Even if the president’s constitutional
position is sound, vetoing multibillion-dollar legislation tangibly
affecting millions of Americans to preserve an abstract executive
authority would require a “stern virtue” indeed—or perhaps an
obtuseness wholly inappropriate to the presidency. 169 Of course, the
president alternatively could accept the legislation but nonetheless
trigger a denial of funds by exercising his authority in the proscribed
manner. But then the same problem of clouded accountability would
reappear in different guise. Triggering the funding condition would risk
centering blame on the president rather than Congress for any
resulting funding cutoff. The president, after all, could have preserved
the funds, and thus forestalled any resulting hardship to the public,
simply by exercising the constitutional authority as Congress desired.
Allowing the president to disregard funding conditions shifts
these political costs (such as they are) back onto Congress. If the
president may rightfully disregard conditions on resource-independent
powers, then Congress can control those powers only by engaging in
political bargaining with the president. In other words, to extract a
commitment to exercise such powers in some particular way, or for that
matter to retaliate against a particular exercise of them, congressional
leaders must threaten to withhold funding for important executive
priorities altogether (whether or not Congress shares those priorities),
even at the risk of prompting a presidential veto and a resulting
government shutdown. Making good on such threats may then require
Congress, rather than the president, to bear responsibility for any
resulting hardship to the public. Accordingly, notwithstanding
Congress’s ultimate discretion over executive-branch funding,
compelling Congress to exercise that authority in a generalized rather
than targeted fashion may leverage the political costs of funding denials
to protect, rather than undermine, the president’s independence of
judgment with respect to resource-independent executive authorities.
In sum, for functional as well as formal reasons, the nowentrenched executive practice of disregarding direct funding conditions
on resource-independent powers is sound. Of course, this analysis
presumes good faith: if presidents disregard funding conditions based
on self-serving and unsupportable constitutional positions, then the
168. For data and analysis on the rise of omnibus legislating, see GLEN S. KRUTZ, HITCHING A
RIDE: OMNIBUS LEGISLATING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2001).
169. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 40 (Alexander Hamilton).
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practice could become extraordinarily dangerous—a problem discussed
below in Section III.D. Before turning to that question, however, we
should first address distinct problems raised by Congress’s adoption of
indirect restrictions—restrictions that do not directly target executive
authorities, but instead seek to influence their exercise by supporting
them selectively.
C. Indirect Restrictions
Funding restraints that target executive authorities indirectly
rather than directly require a distinct and considerably more difficult
analysis. The recent proviso denying funds for a White House “Climate
Change Czar” (among other positions) is a key example in this
category. 170 Through this condition, Congress imposed no direct
constraint on the president’s exercise of any constitutional or statutory
authority. Yet the provision was not pointless. By selectively denying
funds for this position (and certain others), Congress presumably aimed
to create friction with respect to presidential supervision of certain
areas of executive policy that would not exist with respect to other
areas. Another more common type of provision in this category
interferes with the president’s authority to recommend to Congress
“such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” 171
Appropriations legislation has often conditioned resources for
particular agencies on the agency preparing (or not preparing)
legislative recommendations with particular features. 172 Presumably,
again, Congress’s goal in doing so is to shape the proposals the
administration as a whole ultimately presents to Congress.
The executive branch has claimed authority to disregard such
indirect funding restraints on executive authority, no less than direct
ones. 173 Executive statements and legal opinions, however, have often
170. See supra Section I.B.2.
171. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Though framed as an obligation (the president “shall from time
to time . . . recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration such Measures”), the executive branch has
interpreted the Recommendations Clause to provide affirmative authority to recommend
legislation (and indeed to recommend only legislation the president supports). See Application of
the Recommendations Clause to Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (2016) (ms. at 3).
172. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, § 8010(b),
120 Stat. 1257, 1274 (2006); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food & Drug Administration, &
Related Agencies Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-387, § 730, 114 Stat. 1549, 1581 (2000); Department
of Agriculture & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1967, Pub. L. No. 89-556, tit. I, 80 Stat.
689, 690 (1966).
173. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Statement, supra note 70, at 386–87; President
George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2007, 2
PUB. PAPERS 1733 (Sept. 29, 2006); President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the
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failed to grapple with key differences between direct and indirect
funding restraints: the executive branch has simply presumed that
restraints on support and advice from within the executive branch are
no different from restraints on the president himself. 174 Yet the two
types of laws are not equivalent. Direct restraints on executive
authority present the question whether Congress may control the
president’s own action through its appropriations power. Provisions like
the Climate Change Czar rider and legislation-drafting bans present
the distinct question whether Congress may indirectly shape the
exercise of resource-independent powers through selective or
conditional support for those powers’ exercise. Even if Congress (as I
have argued) cannot directly condition funds on the president not
supervising executive officers with particular goals, or not
recommending certain legislation, Congress might nonetheless hold
authority to influence those powers’ exercise by funding advice and
support with respect to some goals but not others—for a climate change
czar, say, but not an energy-independence adviser, or for recommending
legislation to cut taxes but not increase them.
Given Congress’s general authority to structure the executive
branch, any constitutional limit on such indirect restraints must be
exceedingly narrow. While direct restraints (as argued earlier) violate
the Constitution’s basic structural requirements, indirect restraints
instead involve balancing rival centers of power—the president’s choice
over how to exercise his own powers, on the one hand, and Congress’s
choice over whether to empower the president or reduce him to Charles
Black’s enfeebled apartment-dweller, on the other.
Here, then, in contrast to the direct conditions addressed earlier,
the Supreme Court’s federalism cases do provide a rough analogy: the
analysis necessarily turns not on straightforward application of
structural principles, but instead on judging when legislative action
goes too far in manipulating executive judgments. Here, however, in
contrast to the unsatisfactory “gun to the head” coercion standard
articulated in federalism cases, 175 structural principles informed by
past practice support a somewhat harder-edged antimanipulation
principle for policing when Congress has gone too far in seeking

Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2001, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2359, 2361 (Oct. 28, 2000); President Lyndon B. Johnson,
Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies
Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 980, 981 (Sept. 8, 1966).
174. See Application of the Recommendations Clause, 40 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 6) (discussing
examples without drawing this distinction).
175. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 577–78 (2012).
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influence over resource-independent executive powers. 176 I elaborate
this point here by first explaining how indirect conditions may shape
executive conduct and then addressing, in turn, limitations on close
White House advisers and limitations on other executive branch
personnel.
1. Why Indirect Conditions Have Bite
A first step in coming to grips with indirect conditions is to
consider more carefully why and how selective support for executive
functions could influence presidential decisionmaking. This question
brings us back to American constitutionalism’s general inattention to
resources. Much as individual liberties in principle exist independent of
resources available for their exercise, so too are the powers I have
identified as resource-independent theoretically costless—they could be
exercised personally by the president without any resources beyond the
president’s own salary. The resource-independence, moreover, helps
define their character as built-in features of the office that Congress
cannot abrogate. Nevertheless, just as individual resources may
powerfully shape expressive opportunities, so too, under modern
conditions, at least, Congress’s control over executive resources may
give it considerable leverage over even resource-independent powers.
To take the simplest example, the president in principle could
read each bill Congress passes and decide on his own whether to sign it
or return it to Congress. In that formal sense, as noted earlier, even
Charles Black’s hamstrung president would retain his full veto power.
In reality, however, given the manifold demands on a modern
president’s time, just reading the hundred- or thousand-page bills that
Congress routinely passes is probably beyond even the most capable
president’s capacity. Furthermore, even if the president did read every
bill personally, he would likely have trouble making much sense of them
without expert guidance on the legal and policy context in which the
new law would operate. In practice, forming an intelligent judgment
176. In the federalism context, courts have further required that any condition be “germane”
to the purposes for which spending is provided. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208
(1987). No such requirement is appropriate in the separation-of-powers context. On the one hand,
for reasons addressed earlier, direct conditions on resource-independent authorities will always be
invalid, even if the funding is germane. On the other hand, Congress is free to impose even
nongermane conditions on the resource-dependent powers discussed below: if the only way to stop
a war or halt an oppressive law enforcement campaign is to shut down the government entirely
(including unrelated agencies), Congress’s authority to exercise such leverage is a necessary
consequence of its near-total discretion over military and law enforcement resources. As to the
category of conditions discussed here—indirect conditions on resource-independent powers—the
conditions at issue will always be germane because their potentially coercive impact relates to
their impact on the precise executive authorities at issue.
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about the political and policy implications of new legislation requires
access to trusted advice and support.
The veto is hardly unique in this respect. These same problems
apply equally to other executive powers. Surely, as Justice White once
observed, Congress could not defeat the pardon power by denying the
president pen and paper for its exercise. 177 The per se invalidity of direct
funding restraints assures that result. But the president requires more
than pen and paper to wield his clemency powers effectively—he
requires help and support from trusted advisers who can vet
applications and identify worthy individuals. The same is true for
supervisory control over the executive branch by virtue of presidential
removal authority, or issuance of lawful military orders as Commander
in Chief. 178 All these examples thus raise the question, presented
squarely by the climate change and legislation-drafting riders, of what
right the president holds to demand assistance from either White House
staff or other executive branch personnel in performing resourceindependent functions.
2. Constraints on White House Personnel
Notwithstanding their potential significance, any presidential
authority to disregard indirect funding restraints must be narrow. After
all, even apart from its appropriations power, Congress generally holds
authority to create particular offices and vest them with particular
powers (though key positions are then presumptively subject to Senate
advice and consent under the Appointments Clause). 179 Congress also
may enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.” 180
Given these authorities, most congressional limits on White
House personnel will likely be proper, as will congressional decisions to
set aggregate funding levels for particular broadly defined functions. To
draw another judicial analogy, just as Congress could provide funds for
177. Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990) (White, J., concurring)
(questioning whether “Congress could impair the President’s pardon power by denying him
appropriations for pen and paper”).
178. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The President himself must
make decisions relying substantially, if not entirely, on the information and analysis supplied by
advisers.”).
179. See Strauss, supra note 137, at 696–97 (arguing that the president often only has
authority “to oversee the agencies’ decision processes,” not to directly exercise those agencies’
authorities).
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.

Price_Galley (Do Not Delete)

408

3/7/2018 9:38 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:357

one, four, or fifteen law clerks to support each judge, Congress might
provide a substantial budget for internal White House advisers or no
budget at all. Likewise, much as it might offer judges greater support
for death penalty cases or complex litigation than for run-of-the-mill
civil suits, Congress could provide more lavish funding for the White
House National Security Staff than for White House communications
personnel, or for pardon vetting as opposed to social visits.
For that matter, virtually any affirmative provision of support,
however narrowly focused, would likely be valid. By way of illustration,
suppose that Congress, instead of banning any specific climate change
position for President Obama, provided specific funding for a climate
change adviser to whisper sea-level statistics in President Trump’s ear.
Congress presumably could not force the President to hear advice he
does not wish to receive, but, by the same token, making extra resources
available for advice on particular subjects should not prevent the
President from consulting with others or making up his own mind based
on different advice. 181 As further examples, suppose that Congress
provided resources earmarked for vetting pardon applications for
nonviolent drug offenders, or specifically to assist in drafting tax-cut
legislation. To the extent these funding priorities aligned with the
president’s, they would serve only to enhance his resource-independent
powers to pardon and recommend legislation. To the extent the
president’s priorities were different, the president could still make up
his mind independently, spurning this staff’s advice and leaving them
to scribble ineffectually in their offices or hobnob by the water cooler.
Precisely because resource-independent powers are resourceindependent, and thus capable of performance by the president on his
own using whatever guidance he can find, affording him advice and
support he does not desire should never be considered
unconstitutionally constraining.
Funding restraints on White House personnel could conceivably
cross a constitutional line only if they have the opposite effect—the
effect not of enhancing some presidential capacities relative to others,
but instead of materially obstructing the president from making a
judgment he would otherwise choose to make. What sort of law might
have such manipulative effect? The only realistic example would likely
be an appropriation that provided general funding for close personal
advisers but nonetheless precluded their use to achieve specific narrow
outcomes desired by the president. Suppose, for example, that Congress
provided White House appropriations that denied any use of immediate
presidential staff to approve certain types of cases for clemency,
181. See supra Section III.A.
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recommend legislation with certain goals, or coordinate administrative
actions advancing some specific policy (such as climate change
mitigation). Such limitations could materially obstruct the president’s
preferred course of action, and might well also obscure whether the
president or Congress was responsible for the decision in question.
Another case analogy may be helpful. In Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez, recall, the Supreme Court struck down on First Amendment
grounds a provision barring publicly funded counsel from advancing
certain legal arguments. 182 Much as that restriction amounted to
funding lawyers who were not true lawyers (and by extension courts
that were not true courts), 183 imposing narrow exclusions on general
support for presidential functions could amount to providing advisers
who are not really advisers. Just as the client in Velazquez might still
go elsewhere for help with the restricted arguments, the president could
still go elsewhere for help with the restricted activities. But both
conditions are manipulative in the sense that they cut off the most
natural source of help, given Congress’s baseline decision to fund
lawyers or advisers in the first place. 184 Placing such targeted obstacles
in the way of specific presidential goals could thus offend separation of
powers—much as it could offend judicial independence, to offer yet
another analogy, to provide general funding for judicial law clerks but
bar them from helping with opinions narrowing or overturning Roe v.
Wade or Citizens United (or whatever case Congress wished to
entrench). 185
Congress, to my knowledge, has never attempted a restriction
on White House funding that transgressed this particular boundary,
though it arguably came close in the climate change rider. In his signing
statement on the climate change provision, President Obama objected
182. 531 U.S. 533, 536–37 (2001).
183. Id.
184. Cf. id. at 546:
It is no answer to say the restriction on speech is harmless because . . . [the governmentfunded] attorneys can withdraw. This misses the point. The statute is an attempt to
draw lines around the . . . program to exclude from litigation those arguments and
theories Congress finds unacceptable but which by their nature are within the province
of the courts to consider.
185. Cf. Dorf, supra note 129, at 331 (“Congress probably has the power to cut the federal
courts’ budget for paying law clerks and secretaries, but a serious constitutional question (whether
or not justiciable) would be raised were Congress to cut such funding in retaliation for an
unpopular judicial decision.”). The boundary between affirmative support and negative restraint
may of course be difficult to draw at the margins. Earmarking support for numerous functions
might amount in the aggregate to providing general support with narrow exceptions. The
distinction nonetheless seems helpful if we presume, as seems likely, that Congress will continue
to provide general authority for presidents to place trusted close advisers on the public payroll.
See 3 U.S.C. § 105 (2012).
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to the provision insofar as it would “significantly impede the President’s
ability to exercise his supervisory and coordinating authorities or to
obtain the views of the appropriate senior advisers.” Such impediments,
President Obama asserted, would “violate the separation of powers by
undermining the President’s ability to exercise his constitutional
responsibilities and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” 186
President Obama nevertheless complied with the provision, 187 and he
was correct to do so. Far from materially obstructing the president’s
exercise of supervisory powers over the executive branch, the rider left
the president free to employ other advisers to accomplish the same
goals. The president, moreover, appeared to have no trouble at all
pursuing desired objectives. After all, President Obama’s EPA
promulgated ambitious regulations aimed at curbing climate change,
and the President himself claimed political credit for doing so. 188
In any future fights over similar provisions, executive branch
lawyers, courts, and commentators should look to Obama’s actual
practice—his deeds rather than words—in assessing the legality of
defiance. As President Obama implicitly recognized, separation of
powers gives presidents no license to disregard funding limits that
create at most some additional administrative friction in coordinating
executive policies that the president nonetheless retains ample means
to pursue.
3. Constraints on Other Executive Branch Personnel
A last question to consider here involves access to personnel
located outside the White House in particular executive agencies. Can
presidents repurpose such personnel to assist with their resourceindependent functions? In other words, could the president treat the
entire administrative apparatus of the government as available for
assistance with such tasks, without regard to purposes for which those
funds were originally provided? As we shall see, the question is
important in part because presidents have claimed precisely this

186. President Barack Obama, Statement, supra note 70, at 387. President Trump later
objected to the same provision (carried forward in an omnibus continuing resolution) in similar
terms, though it seems unlikely he would have wanted to employ the proscribed positions in any
event. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3.
187. See supra Section I.B.2.
188. See Adam Firestone, Don’t Throw Dirt on Its Grave Just yet: The Clean Power Plan, GEO.
ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 15, 2017), https://gelr.org/2017/02/15/dont-throw-dirt-on-its-gravejust-yet-the-clean-power-plan/
[https://perma.cc/46QU-CR5G]
(discussing
the
Obama
Administration’s Clean Power Plan).
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authority with respect to conduct of diplomacy. 189 Yet presidents have
claimed the same authority to employ personnel as they see fit in other
areas too; the Recommendations Clause objections mentioned earlier
are one common example. 190
On this issue, the Constitution in fact provides some specific
guidance. Under Article II’s Opinions Clause, the president “may
require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their
respective Offices.” 191 This provision, like other resource-independent
powers addressed earlier, properly constitutes a structural feature of
separation of powers that Congress cannot override through conditional
appropriations. Just as Congress cannot condition executive funding on
abrogation of the veto or appointment power, so too can it not bar use
of appropriated funds to provide advice to the president in accordance
with the Opinions Clause. Any such condition would “require operation
of the Government in a way forbidden by the Constitution,” 192
something Congress cannot do under the structural logic of separation
of powers developed earlier. 193
Nevertheless, the Opinions Clause does not fully resolve the
issue. In effect, protecting access to advice from department heads only
replicates at a lower level of the bureaucracy the same question of staff
support that arises with respect to White House personnel. Even if it
cannot deny the president the personal guidance of department heads
on matters relating to their duties, Congress might nonetheless deny
those heads any support from their own staff. But can it do so even if
the staff are effectively assisting the president with a veto decision,
pardon request, or legislative recommendation?
Once again, given Congress’s substantial authority to structure
the executive branch and assign particular duties to particular offices,
any constitutional limit on such funding restraints must be exceedingly
narrow. Nevertheless, the antimanipulation principle identified above
with respect to White House advisers might suggest a related limit
here. Despite Congress’s broad authority to limit use of resources by
particular government offices, Congress might nonetheless infringe
189. Presidents have sought such advice from government personnel in other areas, too. One
important historical example is President Franklin Roosevelt’s formation of an informal “Negro
Cabinet” of inferior officers within the government who could advise him on race relations. REUEL
SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS: RACE, CLASS, LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF POSTWAR LIBERALISM 37
(2015). Presidents today routinely form interagency working groups by executive order.
190. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text.
191. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
192. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61
(1933) (emphasis added) (objecting to congressional committee veto).
193. See supra Section III.B.
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upon presidential authority if funding constraints barred the president
from seeking even de minimis assistance from officials within the
executive bureaucracy who are best positioned, by virtue of their other
responsibilities, to provide advice on a particular narrow matter.
Denying any use of Justice Department resources to advise the
president on pardon requests, for example, might impermissibly impair
the president’s resource-independent pardon authority if it meant the
president could not seek guidance from prosecutors best positioned to
provide perspective on a particular applicant’s case. It might also, once
again, cloud public accountability with respect to whether Congress or
the president bears primary responsibility for the president’s ultimate
action (or inaction).
Here, furthermore, analogous principles regarding appointment
of officers could help demarcate the bounds of proper presidential
defiance of funding constraints. In the Appointments Clause context,
long-standing doctrine holds that while Congress may add duties to an
existing office, any such additional duties must be germane to the
office’s existing functions and cannot fundamentally alter the office’s
character. 194 Under this interpretation, adding nongermane or
exceptionally significant duties violates the Appointment Clause
because it deprives the president or his department heads of their
constitutional authority to appoint individuals performing such duties.
Instead, by adding the duties to the existing office, Congress in effect
appoints the individual who performs them.
A parallel doctrine should limit presidential addition of duties to
existing offices. Insofar as presidents hold preclusive authority to
exercise particular resource-independent powers and gain advice
regarding their performance, they should likewise hold preclusive
authority to assign responsibility for advice regarding those powers to
subordinate personnel within the executive branch. But this
presidential assignment power must be limited, just as Congress’s
power of office-alteration is limited. If Congress cannot fundamentally
alter the character of offices without infringing on presidential
appointment powers, then by the same token the president cannot
fundamentally alter the character of official responsibilities without

194. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893) (holding that no new
appointment is required when a statute confers “additional duties, germane to the offices already
held by [the officers]”); see also Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 196 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“ ‘[G]ermaneness’ is relevant whenever Congress gives power to
confer new duties to anyone other than the few potential recipients of the appointment power
specified in the Appointments Clause—i.e., the President, the Courts of Law, and Heads of
Departments.”); The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20
Op. O.L.C. 124, 157–59 (1996) (elaborating on the Shoemaker germaneness analysis).

Price_Galley(Do Not Delete)

2018]

3/7/2018 9:38 AM

FUNDING RESTRICTIONS

413

infringing on Congress’s power to define offices and structure the
executive branch. Presidents, then, may seek guidance regarding their
resource-independent functions from subordinate executive branch
personnel, but only insofar as the assistance the president requests is
either de minimis or germane to the office’s existing functions and,
further, does not fundamentally alter the office or impair its functions.
This understanding could make sense of the executive branch’s
otherwise-perplexing Recommendations Clause objections. Presidents,
as noted, have routinely raised Recommendations Clause objections to
provisions restricting particular agencies’ formulation of legislative
proposals. 195 Such objections are mistaken insofar as they equate
agency resources with the president’s own authorities. Yet the
executive view might nonetheless be justified insofar as the restrictions
in question effectively deprived the president of access to the personnel
best positioned, by virtue of their other responsibilities, to advise the
president about legislative recommendations on some particular topic.
On this theory, for example, a provision forbidding use of any EPA
resources to help formulate legislative proposals to strengthen EPAenforced environmental laws, or still worse to help formulate EPA’s own
budget recommendations, might impermissibly obstruct the president’s
authority to recommend such legislation as he considers appropriate.
The problem with such appropriations restrictions is not that they
directly impair any resource-independent authority of the president,
but rather that they could materially alter the president’s own
independent judgment about what legislation (if any) to recommend.
So understood, executive objections to such provisions need not
imply that presidents hold preclusive authority to call on the entire
capacity of the executive branch to assist them with whatever
presidential functions they deem appropriate. Given Congress’s broad
authority to structure the executive branch and allocate resources
within it, any such view would be untenable.
D. The Problem of Article II’s Ambiguity
Presidents, then, may ignore direct funding constraints on their
resource-independent powers, and they may further disregard some
selective funding arrangements that risk manipulating their judgments
and clouding proper accountability for particular exercises of resourceindependent presidential powers. In elaborating this framework so far,
however, my analysis has begged an important question: How do we

195. See supra note 173.

Price_Galley (Do Not Delete)

414

3/7/2018 9:38 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2:357

determine whether the president’s claimed power is valid—and can we
trust the executive branch to make such determinations credibly?
While the executive authorities I have emphasized so far (the
veto, appointment, and clemency) are relatively unambiguous in at
least their core applications, Article II in general is notoriously unclear.
To list just a few important examples: the Constitution fails to address
explicitly the scope of presidential removal authority over executive
officers; it leaves the precise boundary between the president’s
authority as Commander in Chief and Congress’s power to “declare
war” to political contestation; and it assigns certain diplomatic
authorities to the president without specifying the full extent of
presidential authority over foreign policy. These ambiguities open the
door for even conscientious presidents to adopt self-serving, expansive
views of their own powers—views that may then support disregarding
funding constraints imposed by Congress to control those powers.
Indeed, scholars and judges have worried that, given the president’s
superior power of initiative and Congress’s collective-action problems
in responding, such expansive presidential positions may tend to
prevail in practice over competing interpretations. 196
Resolving all disputes about the content of Article II powers
would go well beyond this Article’s scope; my aim here is only to provide
a framework for assessing when otherwise valid claims of executive
authority may justify disregarding funding constraints. 197 Ultimately,
no system of separated powers can survive if the executive branch—the
branch of government with guns and handcuffs—fails to value legal
compliance and incurs no political cost for adopting legally indefensible
positions. Nevertheless, in this particular context, at least three
constraints should help discipline overbroad assertions of executive
authority as a basis for disregarding funding constraints.
First, as emphasized at the outset, Congress holds ultimate
discretion over whether to provide funds at all for executive functions
and priorities. This ultimate control over public resources gives

196. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2605 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In
any controversy between the political branches over a separation-of-powers question, staking out
a position and defending it over time is far easier for the Executive Branch than for the Legislative
Branch.”); Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 145 (discussing structural incentives for presidents to
“behave imperialistically”). For an argument that congressional silence in the face of executive
action should carry little weight in constitutional interpretation, see Alan B. Morrison, The Sounds
of Silence: The Irrelevance of Congressional Inaction in Separation of Powers Litigation, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1211, 1212 (2013).
197. For some noteworthy recent attempts to sort out the proper bounds of executive power in
general, see, for example, KRENT, supra note 95; SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL
FROM THE BEGINNING: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015); and McConnell,
supra note 12.
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Congress powerful leverage to discipline executive action—if Congress
chooses to exercise it. To be sure, allowing presidents to disregard
funding constraints heightens the political burden on Congress in
resisting executive action. Indeed, as I argued earlier, shifting political
costs in this manner helps protect separation of powers when executive
claims are valid. 198 Yet history suggests Congress nonetheless has the
wherewithal to resist when the executive branch oversteps proper
bounds. In several examples addressed already—including the recent
Climate Change Czar rider and the requirement that President
Johnson’s orders go through General Grant—presidents ultimately
complied with appropriations restrictions despite voicing constitutional
objections. 199 I will highlight other such examples below. At the same
time, moreover, the vice of overbroad assertion may run the other way
too. At least when the executive branch has given clear indication of its
intent to disregard a funding limitation on constitutional grounds,
Congress’s choice nonetheless to enact the provision cannot always be
taken at face value. It could amount to mere grandstanding in support
of positions it knows would be unpopular if implemented, but for which
it knows the president will spare it accountability.
Given this risk of overclaiming on both sides, assessments of
practice in this context should generally focus on outcomes—what the
government ultimately did—rather than self-serving initial assertions
by either branch. 200 With that focus, however, historic examples suggest
that Congress’s power of the purse can be effective in shaping executive
behavior, notwithstanding the executive branch’s superior institutional
capacity to articulate and defend broad views of its power. 201
In addition to Congress, courts may provide a second key
constraint on executive action. Appropriations restrictions on executive
198. See supra Section III.B.2.
199. For Obama’s compliance on climate change, see supra Section I.B.2. On Johnson’s
compliance with the army appropriations rider, see MAY, supra note 58, at 91.
200. Curtis Bradley has recently discussed how “differing justifications for [relying on practice
in constitutional interpretation] yield potentially different answers” to whether “the only relevant
consideration is [governmental institutions’] actual behavior.” Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84
U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 70 (2017). Bradley argues that a justification rooted in “Burkean
consequentialism” could support this view, while other possible justifications may not. Id. at 70–
72. While full consideration of this important point goes beyond the scope of this Article, Burkean
aversion to disruption of entrenched practical understandings is likely the most compelling
justification for reliance on practice here. In any event, my point is simply that focusing on
outcomes rather than assertions may discipline reliance on practice in contexts, like those
considered here, where the two political branches hold divergent asserted views and Congress’s
leverage over appropriations may enable it to impose its preferences, despite contrary executive
assertions.
201. For discussion of some examples, see HOWELL, supra note 27, at 120–26; and Kristina
Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 518
(2013).
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authority may sometimes present nonjusticiable controversies. But that
will not always be true. In Lovett, for example, government employees
deprived of their salaries could sue to challenge the funding constraint
imposing this deprivation. 202 Similarly, in a recent decision, United
States v. McIntosh, the Ninth Circuit held that individual defendants
could invoke current appropriations limits on marijuana enforcement
as a defense to federal prosecution. 203 Rejecting arguments that the
appropriations rider’s meaning and implications were nonjusticiable,
the court held: “When Congress has enacted a legislative restriction like
[this rider] that expressly prohibits [the Justice Department] from
spending funds on certain actions, federal criminal defendants may
seek to enjoin the expenditure of those funds.” 204
As McIntosh illustrates, legislative appropriations restrictions
may sometimes enable courts to enforce otherwise nonjusticiable limits
on executive power. For institutional reasons, courts have been
reluctant to police some limits on executive authority. War powers is
the paradigm case. Whatever limits the Constitution places on
presidential use of military force, courts have often treated those limits
as nonjusticiable “political questions” or held that litigants lacked
standing to enforce them. 205 I have argued that analogous institutional
considerations explain courts’ general reluctance to intrude on
executive enforcement policies. 206 Lacking principled guideposts for
assessing executive conduct, and fearful of assuming responsibility for
weighty matters of personal or national security, courts have largely
left enforcement of limits on these authorities to the political process.
McIntosh demonstrates, however, that articulating specific
funding constraints in appropriations legislation may resolve this
institutional difficulty and enable a broader judicial role. Under the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, defendants in future enforcement suits
should likewise hold standing to enforce congressional limits on

202. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1950).
203. 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).
204. Id. at 1172–73.
205. See, e.g., Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[A]
question is ‘political’ and thus nonjusticiable when its adjudication would inject the courts into a
controversy which is best suited for resolution by the political branches.”); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus.
Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is not the role of judges to secondguess, with the benefit of hindsight, another branch’s determination that the interests of the
United States call for military action.”); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46–52 (D.D.C.
2010) (“Because decision-making in the realm of military and foreign affairs is textually committed
to the political branches, and because courts are functionally ill-equipped to make the[se] types of
complex policy judgments . . . the Court finds that the political question doctrine bars resolution
of this case.”).
206. Price, supra note 166.
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available enforcement resources. 207 By the same token, individual
service personnel, if not also other parties, might seek to enjoin
spending in pursuit of military objectives or activities that Congress has
specifically banned. 208 For that matter, courts might litigate defiance of
congressional funding limits in the context of a future prosecution for
violating the Anti-Deficiency Act. 209 In all these contexts, courts would
not confront general questions about ultimate limits on executive
power. Instead, they could consider the more focused and manageable
question whether the executive branch defied specific limits for which
Congress, rather than the courts, would ultimately be politically
accountable.
These examples bring us to a final important constraint. The
analysis developed so far applies only to resource-independent
powers—powers that could in theory be exercised personally by the
president. Those powers may be consequential, particularly when
magnified by the support of advisers and assistants within the White
House and beyond. Yet they do not entail direct application of the
government’s coercive and destructive capacities. It is one thing for a
president to claim authority to appoint a particular White House
adviser or grant a particular pardon despite statutory funding
constraints on doing so. It would be quite another thing for a president
to order military strikes or arrests in violation of specific limits on
available public resources. These forms of executive action, to which I
now turn, require an entirely different analysis, one that should
preclude almost any assertion of authority to defy appropriations limits.
IV. RESOURCE-DEPENDENT EXECUTIVE POWERS
Moving beyond powers I have identified so far as resourceindependent, we arrive finally at the big-ticket items in the executive
toolkit: war powers, law enforcement, and foreign policy. Funding
conditions are most common, and most consequential, in these areas,
and by the same token any executive practice of disregarding such
conditions is most worrisome. Yet how the power of the purse relates to
207. 833 F.3d at 1179.
208. See, e.g., Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring)
(addressing the possibility that “military personnel might be able to challenge a President’s
arguably unlawful use of force”); id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring) (disputing the assertion that war’s
legality would be nonjusticiable if raised by party with standing); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (entertaining challenge to authorization for Vietnam War by service personnel
but dismissing suit as political question).
209. See Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap
Within an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 54 (2001) (canvassing judicial case law and concluding
that the ADA forbids exceeding any specified funding limitation in agency appropriations).
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these executive authorities has remained undertheorized. The
groundwork laid so far exposes why these executive authorities require
a distinct analysis.
A. Defining the Category
While resource-independent powers, rather like judicial
decisionmaking, entail an exercise of judgment that is at least
theoretically costless, the same is not true of war powers, law
enforcement, or diplomacy. In principle, the president could ride out on
horseback, machine gun or handcuffs in hand, to defend the nation or
enforce its laws. He might use his own cell phone or private jet to engage
in personal diplomacy. But such efforts would not get far. Effective
warmaking requires weapons and armies; law enforcement requires
police and prosecutors; and diplomacy requires, well, diplomats. These
are powers, then, where congressional control over resources should
have real bite, as a simple matter of text and structure.
What is more, as compared to resource-independent powers like
the veto, clemency, and appointments, the normative case for an
appropriations constraint on executive action here is far stronger.
Whereas powers addressed earlier serve functionally to check
congressional authority or guarantee institutional control over the
executive branch, establishing a separate branch with authority to
pursue legal violations, deploy military force, and engage in diplomatic
negotiation might serve principally to enable more effective
achievement of congressional policy objectives, and not to impose an
independent constraint on Congress’s own powers. At any rate, unlike
resource-independent powers, which involve an isolated exercise of
personal judgment by the president, these powers involve outward
projection of affirmative government power. As such, these powers
themselves may require some external congressional check,
particularly under modern conditions of pervasive delegation and
substantial standing government capacity. 210 After all, these
authorities determine who is killed or maimed by the U.S. military,
which suspects are arrested and imprisoned by the U.S. government,
and what positions the United States takes in diplomatic exchanges.
Even apart from textual and structural reasons to recognize greater
congressional appropriations control, such important matters of
national destiny should require congressional as well as executive buyin.

210. See supra Section I.A.
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Here, then, a different framework is required. The question
ultimately is what irreducible degree of discretion the Constitution
guarantees the executive in deploying resources provided by Congress.
With respect to war powers and law enforcement, this irreducible
discretion should be exiguous. Insofar as enabling adaptation of general
policies to particular circumstances is a key functional reason for
separating legislative and executive power, presuming some irreducible
executive authority to address unforeseen exigencies with available
resources may be a natural entailment of separation of powers. On the
other hand, however, the normative and historical case for preserving
a congressional check on executive use of these powers—the means of
governmental coercion and destruction—is exceptionally powerful.
Accordingly, congressional authority to curtail executive discretion
with respect to use of military force and law enforcement through
funding conditions should be near total.
To continue elaborating unconstitutional-conditions analogies,
the executive role with respect to these powers more closely resembles
government speech than either an impermissible condition on private
freedom or a coercive condition on federal funding for states. 211 Like an
employee speaking for the government, the core executive function with
respect to war powers and law enforcement is to carry out Congress’s
program using resources Congress has provided. As a result, when
constrained by statutory funding directives, presidents will generally
have no sound basis to complain either about burdens on their rightful
powers or coercion of some independent judgment guaranteed to them
by the Constitution.
Diplomacy then presents a difficult intermediate case.
Presidents have effectively treated diplomacy as a personal, resourceindependent authority, and they have some basis for doing so:
particularly in our era of cell phones, video conferencing, and rapid air
travel, presidents can and do communicate directly with foreign leaders
on behalf of the United States. Yet this personal capacity is even more
illusory than in the case of resource-independent authorities like the
appointment power and veto. Effectively representing the United
States around the world and negotiating agreements to protect our
interests requires resources and staff, and with such resourcedependence should come some congressional control over how such
resources are deployed. Some intermediate framework is therefore
necessary. Drawing off my earlier analysis of selective support for
211. See, e.g., Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245
(2015) (“When government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from determining
the content of what it says.”).
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resource-independent powers, I attempt here to sketch possible limits
on presidential discretion over diplomatic resources, as well as some
hard boundaries to what forms of foreign policy action should fall within
the president’s presumed power over diplomacy in the first place. (For
a chart summarizing these conclusions, see Figure 2 below.)
The analysis below begins by addressing some historic examples
often invoked to support broad executive power of initiative today.
These examples, I argue, reflect an outdated approach to the fiscal
constitution that Congress has validly abolished. With this underbrush
cleared, the analysis proceeds to address war powers, law enforcement,
and diplomacy in turn.
FIGURE 2: TAXONOMY OF FUNDING RESTRICTIONS
Type of Power

Type of
Restriction

Legal
Framework

Case Law
Analogue

ResourceIndependent

Direct

Invalid

Improper entity
(MWAA)

Diplomacy

ResourceDependent

Indirect (selective
support)

Antimanipulation

Restricted or
conditional
support
Valid

Federalism
(Velasquez/
NFIB v. Sebelius)

Gov’t Speech
(Walker)

B. Congressional Repudiation of Presidential Heroism
At a high level of abstraction, presuming discretion in the
exercise of coercive or destructive governmental capacities reflects a
basic functional distinction between legislative and executive power: as
the branch of government that never sleeps, the executive often must
address evolving or unforeseen circumstances using tools provided in
advance by general legislation. With respect to funding questions, this
distinction has led to recurrent debates throughout American history
about the degree of flexibility executive officials should presume in
applying the strict letter of appropriations laws. Alexander Hamilton
argued in 1795, for example, that “[t]he business of administration
requires accommodation to so great a variety of circumstances, that a
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rigid construction would in countless instances arrest the wheels of
Government.” 212 In contrast, President Jefferson and his Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin advocated tighter legislative control. 213 Even
Gallatin acknowledged, however, that “it is impossible for the
Legislature to foresee, in all its details, the necessary application of
moneys, and a reasonable discretion should be allowed to the proper
executive department.” 214 Although a statute now requires specific
construction of appropriations statutes, 215 recent debates over the
Guantanamo prisoner swap, 216 or for that matter spending for subsidies
under the Affordable Care Act, 217 show that this basic problem of
administrative flexibility and statutory construction remains very
much with us.
As concerns the particular focus of this Article, however, the key
historical examples involve presidential actions undertaken without
any supporting appropriation. In fact, such towering figures as
Presidents Washington and Lincoln undertook significant military or
law enforcement operations without any appropriation to support their
activity. But while these examples formed a centerpiece of Sidak’s
argument for broad executive spending authority, 218 they in fact carry
no such implication. On the contrary, in key examples, both presidents
sought (and received) after-the-fact congressional ratification, thus at
least implicitly acknowledging Congress’s ultimate control over
resources for such executive functions. Since their tenure, moreover,
Congress has tightened legislative controls on such anticipatory
expenditures, while at the same time greatly expanding the
212. Alexander Hamilton, Explanation (Nov. 11, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 105, at 405.
213. Gallatin complained in 1796 about the degree of flexibility Hamilton exercised in shifting
funds between different accounts. He wrote: “It deprives the Legislature from any control, not only
over the distribution of the moneys amongst the several heads of service, but even over the total
sum to be expended.” ALBERT GALLATIN, A SKETCH OF THE FINANCES OF THE UNITED STATES
(1796), reprinted in 3 THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN 69, 116–17 (Henry Adams ed.,
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott 1879). President Jefferson’s annual message to Congress in
December 1801 advocated “appropriating specific sums to every specific purpose susceptible of
definition,” and “disallowing all applications of money varying from the appropriation in object, or
transcending it in amount; by reducing the undefined field of contingencies, and thereby
circumscribing discretionary powers over money.” President Thomas Jefferson, First Annual
Message (Dec. 8, 1801), in 1 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 314, 317.
214. GALLATIN, supra note 213, at 117. For a perceptive account of debates over appropriations
flexibility in the early Republic, see CASPER, supra note 43, at 70–96.
215. 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (2012) (“A law may be construed to make an appropriation out of the
Treasury or to authorize making a contract for the payment of money in excess of an appropriation
only if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made or that such a contract may be
made.”).
216. See supra Section I.B.2.
217. See Bagley, supra note 99, at 1729–35.
218. Sidak, supra note 4, at 1177–83, 1189–92.
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government’s standing bureaucratic and military capacity. Under such
conditions, presidents have no basis for presuming the degree of
spending discretion claimed by Washington and Lincoln, much less for
defying specific express funding restrictions imposed by Congress.
President Washington expended funds in arguable violation of
appropriations limits to suppress the so-called Whiskey Rebellion, a tax
revolt in western Pennsylvania that the Washington Administration
perceived as a major challenge to federal authority. 219 Washington
called forth a large militia force to restore law and order, yet at the time
Congress was not in session and no militia appropriation was available;
the Administration instead provisionally diverted funds for the regular
military. 220 After successfully suppressing the rebellion, Washington
sought congressional ratification of his action, 221 which Congress gladly
provided. 222
Gallatin, elected to Congress from a district at the rebellion’s
epicenter, nevertheless excoriated the Administration’s defiance of
appropriations limits. “It might be a defect in the law authorizing the
expense not to have provided the means,” Gallatin wrote in 1796, “but
that defect should have been remedied by the only competent authority,
by convening Congress.” 223 Siding with Washington over Gallatin,
Sidak argued that Washington’s example supports executive authority
to expend funds for law enforcement or national defense without
specific congressional approval. 224 But that view is unpersuasive. Even
Hamilton, President Washington’s Treasury Secretary at the time,
acknowledged that “before money can legally issue from the Treasury
for any purpose, there must be a law authorising an expenditure and
designating the object and the fund.” 225 Hamilton simply argued that
executive officials should treat funding limits flexibly in addressing
219. For a general account of this event, see THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY REBELLION:
FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1986). For my own analysis of President
Washington’s action as an instance of law enforcement authority, see Zachary S. Price,
Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 736–39 (2014).
220. See CASPER, supra note 43, at 87; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and Foreign
Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 16 (1976).
221. See 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 787, 792 (1794) (reprinting message from President Washington
indicating that an “estimate of the necessary appropriations, including expenditures into which
we have been driven by the insurrection, will be submitted to Congress”).
222. CURRIE, supra note 102, at 189.
223. GALLATIN, supra note 213, at 118. For background on Gallatin and his 1796 report on
federal finances, see NICHOLAS DUNGAN, GALLATIN: AMERICA’S SWISS FOUNDING FATHER 58–62
(2010).
224. See Sidak, supra note 4, at 1179–80 (arguing that the Washington Administration
“claimed, in an expansive manner, that the President had the authority to spend public funds even
when Congress had not clearly appropriated money for that purpose beforehand”).
225. Hamilton, supra note 212.
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unforeseen circumstances. 226 What is more, by seeking congressional
ratification and after-the-fact appropriation, Washington implicitly
acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority over public resources.
Far from suggesting wide-ranging inherent executive authority
over resources, Washington’s example thus reflects what Gerhard
Casper called “fiscal heroism”—“mak[ing] the sacrifice of risking one’s
career so that one may act ‘responsibly.’ ” 227 Washington, moreover, was
hardly the only early president to adopt this posture. Even Thomas
Jefferson, despite generally seeking to implement Gallatin’s vision of
strict legislative control, followed Washington’s example on at least one
occasion. In 1807, following a British attack on the U.S. naval vessel
Chesapeake, Jefferson authorized military expenditures in excess of
appropriations, for fear that “await[ing] a previous and special sanction
by law would have lost occasions which might not be retrieved.” 228 “I
trust,” Jefferson implored, “that the Legislature, feeling the same
anxiety for the safety of our country . . . will approve, when done, what
they would have seen so important to be done if then assembled.” 229 In
the name of national security, Jefferson thus took action on his own
initiative to expand the Republic’s arsenal. But like Washington, he
implicitly acknowledged the illegality of his action by seeking after-thefact congressional ratification. 230
Lincoln’s example largely fits the same pattern. Facing an
extensive rebellion with Congress out of session, Lincoln authorized
treasury expenditures for military preparations without any supporting
appropriation. 231 But Lincoln disavowed any notion that his actions
could support executive spending authority under other circumstances.
Lincoln at times advanced a defense of necessity for his actions, arguing
that the necessity of saving the Constitution as a whole justified
violating isolated provisions of it. 232 At times he implied that his
226. See supra text accompanying note 212.
227. CASPER, supra note 43, at 93–95. Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., the leading historian of pre–
World War II funding disputes, similarly argued that early executive officials presumed an
obligation occasionally to “boldly . . . set aside the requirements of the Legislature, trusting to the
good sense of Congress, when all the facts of the case should have been explained, to acquit them
of all blame.” WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 4.
228. President Thomas Jefferson, Seventh Annual Message (Oct. 27, 1807), in 1 COMPILATION
MPP, supra note 55, at 413, 416.
229. Id.
230. For discussion of this example and its ironies, see CASPER, supra note 43, at 93–96; see
also BRUFF, supra note 59, at 75 (discussing Jefferson’s expenditures and Congress’s subsequent
assent); SOFAER, supra note 82, at 172–73 (same).
231. BRUFF, supra note 59, at 132.
232. See President Abraham Lincoln, Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 7
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 3221, 3226 (“[I]t cannot be believed the framers of the
instrument intended, that in every case, the danger should run its course, until Congress could be
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authority might expand under the circumstances to enable him to meet
the rebellion effectively. 233 But as to the appropriations violation, at
least, Lincoln also sought to cure his violation by throwing himself on
the mercy of Congress. 234 Congress obliged. 235
Lincoln did also authorize certain other expenditures that he did
not disclose promptly to Congress. These secret expenditures involved
outfitting certain naval vessels, transporting certain troops and
munitions, and forwarding some $2 million in Treasury funds to
specified individuals for urgent military requisitions. 236 Lincoln
revealed his role in authorizing these expenditures only after Congress
censured his former Secretary of War for participating in them. Even
then, however, as David Barron and Marty Lederman have
emphasized, Lincoln claimed no preclusive executive authority for his
action. 237 On the contrary, as with his other unauthorized expenditures,
Lincoln confessed the expenditures’ illegality, pointed to the exigency of
the circumstances as justification, and took personal responsibility for
his conduct. 238
These key historic examples, then, need not imply wide-ranging
executive authority to meet every perceived emergency without
congressional support. On the contrary, they may well suggest only a
default executive power of initiative—an authority to address
unforeseen circumstances, absent specific congressional approval or
disapproval, subject to ultimate congressional ratification or censure.
From that point of view, moreover, these high-profile cases are
only particular manifestations of a more mundane problem Congress
confronted throughout the nineteenth-century: the so-called “coercive
deficiency.” Even when barred by law from doing so, executive officials
of all sorts often outran their appropriations. They entered contracts or
called together; the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by
the rebellion.”).
233. President Abraham Lincoln, Special Message to Congress (May 26, 1862), in 8
COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 3278, 3279:
There was no time to convene [Congress]. It became necessary for me to choose whether,
using only the existing means, agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I
should let the Government fall at once into ruin or whether, availing myself of the
broader powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an
effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for posterity.
234. See BRUFF, supra note 59, at 132 (noting Lincoln was “counting on later congressional
ratification” and “following the precedent of Jefferson’s reaction to the attack on the Chesapeake”).
235. Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326 (“[A]pprov[ing] and in all respects legaliz[ing]
and ma[king] valid [Lincoln’s prior actions], to the same intent and with the same effect as if they
had been issued and done under the previous express authority of the Congress . . . .”).
236. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1002.
237. Id. at 1003.
238. Id.
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other obligations in the expectation that Congress would choose to
make good on the promise rather than stiff a constituent or harm U.S.
credit. 239 Congressional appropriators railed against this practice. As
early as 1806, Representative John Randolph complained: “You have
fixed limits [in the appropriation], but the expenditure exceeds the
appropriations; and those who disburse the money, are like the saucy
boy who knows that his grandfather will gratify him, and over-runs the
sum allowed him at pleasure.” 240
Yet Congress ultimately brought the coercive deficiency to heel.
In a series of escalating statutes, between 1820 and 1905, Congress
imposed increasingly strict limits on unappropriated expenditures. The
coup de grace came in the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1905, which made
expenditure in excess or violation of appropriations limits not only
illegal but also in some cases criminal. 241 Today, then, actions like
Lincoln’s or Jefferson’s would transgress not only Congress’s
constitutional authority over appropriations, but also more specific
statutory prohibitions through which Congress has sought to buttress
that authority. Executive officials cannot simply act in anticipation of
congressional approval. They must risk criminal sanctions (from a
future administration if not the current one) in defying appropriations
limits—except
insofar
as
those
limits
are
themselves
242
unconstitutional.
At the same time, a second change further heightens the stakes
for appropriations control. As compared to Jefferson’s day or even
Lincoln’s, the federal government today holds vastly increased
bureaucratic and military capacity. As discussed further below, this
feature of modern government (coupled with standing ADA exceptions
for measures to protect lives and property 243) would greatly weaken any
claim that emergency circumstances required expenditure outside of
prescribed limits. 244 This practical context undermines any claim that
239. WILMERDING, supra note 119 (recounting the long history of Congress’s struggle with this
practice).
240. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 1063 (1806).
241. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1484, § 4, 33 Stat. 1214, 1257–58. For discussion of the 1905 Act’s
effect, see WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 144–53.
242. Applicability of the Antideficiency Act to a Violation of a Condition or Internal Cap Within
an Appropriation, 25 Op. O.L.C. 33, 35 (2001).
243. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
244. See infra Section IV.D.2. In his monumental study of historical appropriations practice,
Wilmerding sought to distinguish ordinary coercive deficiencies from the sort of bold military
expenditures undertaken by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln for reasons of national security.
In Wilmerding’s view, although Congress eventually established through legislation the principle
that “executive departments are under an absolute obligation to observe the laws making specific
appropriations of money,” this principle necessarily excludes cases of genuine military or law
enforcement necessity. WILMERDING, supra note 119, at 19. Wilmerding wrote: “The high officers
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the level of interpretive discretion envisioned by Hamilton, as opposed
to Gallatin, should prevail with respect to modern appropriations
statutes. 245 On the contrary, the scale of modern government makes
appropriations control all the more important. To the extent presidents
may ignore appropriations limits, they retain authority to employ a vast
standing apparatus for warmaking, law enforcement, or diplomacy. The
boundary between executive authority and appropriations control may
therefore be more important today than it has ever before been.
In sum, the modern context limits the relevance of historic
examples invoked by Sidak and other proponents of broad executive
power. In the ADA, Congress has shrunk executive power over
resources down to its constitutional minimum, even as it has greatly
expanded the overall capacity of the federal government. This context,
once again, explains why current battles over executive powers of
resource allocation today take the form that they do, as fights over the
constitutional validity of appropriations restrictions. Yet it also
necessitates more careful consideration of the precise nature and extent
of each such form of executive authority—of what irreducible degree of
discretion the Constitution should be understood to preserve.
C. War Powers
The first key resource-dependent executive authority is war
powers. Although modern presidents have claimed substantial power of
initiative with respect to use of military force, the proper scope of
executive discretion to defy specific appropriations limits is properly
quite narrow. Using just her own guaranteed salary, a president might
perhaps ride out, pistol in hand, to personally confront the nation’s
enemies. More realistically, presidents might retain some narrow
residual authority to address genuinely unforeseen exigencies without
regard to congressional funding limits. But presidents should not

of the government, and a fortiori the President, have a right, indeed a duty, to do what they
conceive to be indispensably necessary for the public good, provided always that they submit their
action to Congress to sanction the proceeding.” Id. In light of developments since he wrote in 1943,
Wilmerding’s distinction is unpersuasive. Subsequent developments—including improvements in
communication and transportation as well as the development of a permanent federal law
enforcement apparatus and national security state—greatly weaken any continuing authority to
take significant military or law enforcement action without a supporting appropriation based on
executive officials’ perception of “indispensable necessity.” Id. The irreducible minimum of
discretion with respect to appropriations limits should be far narrower today, and require a far
more severe exigency, than Wilmerding’s analysis suggested.
245. Cf. Bagley, supra note 99, at 1735 (discussing dangers of “embolden[ing] the next
President to further slip the reins of legislative control” through loose interpretation of
appropriations statutes).
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otherwise presume general authority to deploy military forces in
defiance of appropriations restrictions.
1. Text, Structure, and History
Why is congressional control so strong in this area? To begin
with, maintaining legislative control over war finance—preventing
union of “purse and sword,” in the classic phrasing of the time—was a
particular concern of the Framers. 246 Nor did the Framers leave it to
doubt that only public resources could be employed for military
adventures. The very terms of the relevant Article II provision, the
Commander in Chief Clause, presume presidential dependence on
externally provided resources: the president cannot serve as
“Commander in Chief” unless there is something to command, and the
Constitution leaves no doubt about which branch provides those
military resources.
With respect to military expenditure, indeed, the Constitution
buttresses the Appropriations Clause’s general rule of funding control
by specifically assigning to Congress authority over raising armies and
establishing navies. It also specifically bars permanent military
funding by limiting army appropriations to two years. What is more,
although privateers—private ships equipped to raid enemy vessels—
formed an essential component of U.S. naval defense in the early
Republic, the Constitution specifically grants Congress, not the
president, authority to license such private violence on the
government’s behalf. 247 Overall, then, the Constitution’s plain terms
betray considerable anxiety to ensure that the people’s representatives
in Congress retain sole control over the military resources available to
the president as Commander in Chief.
Background historical practice, furthermore, supports
legislative authority to impose quite detailed restrictions on
appropriated funds. Even before the Revolution, colonial legislatures
routinely imposed extraordinarily detailed restrictions on funding for

246. For discussion of this concern’s salience in debates over ratification, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 115–16 (2005), which discusses the Framers’ goal
of maintaining legislative checks on use of military force; and BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra
note 24, at 29–32.
247. Only Congress can grant the “letters of marque and reprisal” that license privateers. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. For discussion of privateering’s importance in the early Republic, see NICHOLAS
R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
1780–1940, at 318–20 (2013); Nicholas Parrillo, The De-Privatization of American Warfare: How
the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth
Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 15–22 (2007).
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military activities. 248 As William Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen
summarize, “[t]he colonial assemblies effectively usurped the
governors’ military powers by specifying the purposes for which
military appropriations could be spent, including the number,
distribution, organization, pay, place and period of service, and supply
of the officers and men to be raised.” 249 In the early Republic, Congress
carried this practice forward by frequently imposing “quite niggling
restrictions on the organization, action, and composition of the armed
forces.” 250
It is true, as these examples themselves illustrate, that the
Framers’ intuitive model of military funding was likely quite different
from our own. Given the widespread fear of standing armies and
general aversion to providing for them, many Framers likely envisioned
the president coming to Congress, as English Kings and colonial
governors had done, to affirmatively request support from the people
for some planned military adventure. To the extent that is true, the
expectation broke down early on. In fact, even the arch-antimonarchist
President Jefferson apparently authorized military action against the
Barbary “pirates” without express legislative approval to do so. 251 In
combination with examples set by Washington and Adams, this early
practice strongly supports an understanding that the executive function
in foreign affairs entails some authority to exercise independent
judgment regarding use of force in response to evolving international
circumstances, at least insofar as Congress has imposed no specific
restriction on doing so and appears likely to ratify the contemplated

248. GREENE, supra note 28, at 189 (“[I]n granting military supplies [colonial assemblies]
prescribed in detail the purposes for which [the supplies] were to be expended, dictating the course
of military operations and the disposition of troops.”); see also PERCY S. FLIPPIN, THE ROYAL
GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 211 (1966) (discussing the House of Burgesses’s control over military
expenditures in colonial Virginia); GREENE, supra note 25, at 297 (discussing how legislatures in
the southern colonies “not only appropriated all military funds specifically but also subjected them
to certain limitations by determining the number of men to be employed, their rate of pay, and
their place and period of service”). Colonial legislatures were following the example of England’s
Parliament, which likewise asserted detailed control over military expenditures. See BREWER,
supra note 24, at 43–44; PAUL EINZIG, THE CONTROL OF THE PURSE: PROGRESS AND DECLINE OF
PARLIAMENT’S FINANCIAL CONTROL 141–48 (1959).
249. BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 21.
250. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 958.
251. Following a military engagement between the U.S. schooner Enterprise and a Tripolitan
vessel, President Jefferson claimed the U.S. ship had acted only defensively and sought legislative
authorization for offensive action. In fact, however, the Administration’s earlier orders had
contemplated offensive action. For discussion of this incident, see, for example, CASPER, supra note
43, at 107–11; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801–
1829, at 123–29 (2001); Montgomery N. Kosma, Our First Real War, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 169 (1999).
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action. 252 At any rate, since World War II if not before, presidents have
routinely presumed such authority, and Congress has by and large
acquiesced. 253
The key point here, however, is that presuming front-end
initiative absent specific restraints precludes neither back-end
congressional authority to terminate an operation by denying funds, nor
even front-end authority to deny resources for possible initiatives
looming on the horizon. In a world of annual appropriations, presumed
presidential initiative, and extensive permanent military capacity, the
proper analogue to the spending initiative claimed by Lincoln,
Washington, and other early presidents is at most an authority to
address genuinely unexpected developments that Congress could not
reasonably have anticipated at the time it imposed particular funding
restraints. The Constitution may protect presidential discretion to
defend national interests when a dangerous world presents novel
exigencies; it does not permit defiance of congressional restrictions
imposed with full awareness of relevant circumstances. 254
Significant, if not entirely uniform, practice reinforces this view.
President Truman asserted authority to disregard funding restrictions
on placing U.S. forces in specified regions, yet he ultimately had no
occasion to act on this view because Congress failed to enact such
constraints. 255 During the Vietnam War, President Nixon bombed
Cambodia in the face of congressional restrictions on expanding the
conflict, but his action apparently complied with the strict letter of thenimposed appropriations limits. 256 Later, Congress helped end the
Vietnam War in part through appropriations restrictions. 257
More recently, President George H.W. Bush reasserted
Truman’s view that presidents hold preclusive authority to determine

93.

252. The argument for this understanding of early practice is in POWELL, supra note 8, at 92–

253. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the
Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 461–68 (2012) (assessing competing interpretations
of war powers practice). For empirical examination of congressional influence over executive
military action, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER:
CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007).
254. Cf. Julian Davis Mortenson, A Theory of Republican Prerogative, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 45,
50 (2014) (defining extremely narrow circumstances in which an extralegal “republican
prerogative” could be consistent with our constitutional tradition).
255. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1060–62.
256. Id. at 1067–70.
257. Id.; see also DAVID J. BARRON, WAGING WAR: THE CLASH BETWEEN PRESIDENTS AND
CONGRESS, 1776 TO ISIS 343–44 (2016) (arguing funding cutoffs relating to Vietnam conflict
“showed just how much control Congress exerted”).
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force levels at overseas locations. 258 Bush, for example, objected to
provisions in annual defense authorization acts barring use of funds to
maintain troop deployments above specified levels in Japan or
European NATO countries. 259 The Bush Administration appears
nevertheless to have complied substantially, if not completely, with
these and other similar limitations in subsequent years. 260 President
258. See Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1086–88 (discussing Bush’s assertion of “a
remarkably strong notion of a substantive Commander in Chief preclusive power” in a series of
signing statements regarding troop deployments).
259. See, e.g., Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991, 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1766, 1767 (Nov. 5, 1990) (asserting that provisions limiting
force levels “might be construed to impinge on the President’s authority as Commander in Chief
and as the head of the executive branch” and that “I shall construe these provisions as necessary
to fulfill my constitutional responsibilities”); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-510, §§ 406, 1455(b), 104 Stat. 1485 (1990) (barring use of authorized
funds to exceed specified force levels in Japan and European NATO countries).
260. For example, one such provision barred use of authorized funds “to support an end
strength level of members of the Armed Forces of the United States assigned to permanent duty
ashore in European member nations of NATO at any level exceeding a permanent ceiling of
261,855.” Pub. L. No. 98-525, § 1002, as amended by Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 406, 104 Stat. at 1546.
The statute, however, allowed the president to maintain a permanent force level of up to 311,855
“if the President determine[d] that the national security interests of the United States require
such authorization” and the president so notified Congress. Id. § 406(b). The same statute
precluded use of authorized funds “to support an end strength level of all personnel of the Armed
Forces of the United States stationed in Japan at any level in excess of 50,000.” Id. § 1455(a).
As of September 30, 1991, the Department of Defense reported maintaining 44,566 active duty
personnel in Japan, well under the statutory limit. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by
Regional Area and by Country (309A), DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Sept. 30, 1991),
https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
[https://perma.cc/857N-U75V].
The
Department reported that 264,903 active duty personnel were based in NATO countries as of that
date, a number exceeding the statutory ceiling though not the limit allowed with a waiver. If
Greenland and Iceland are not counted as “European member nations of NATO,” however, this
total drops below the statutory limit to 261,531. Beginning in fiscal year 1995, the statutory ceiling
in fact expressly excluded troops based in Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores, although of course
this change could suggest the provision was previously understood to include those locations.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 1303(b), 108 Stat.
2663, 2890–91 (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-701, at 762 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (characterizing
this exclusion as “intended to assist the Command in managing its personnel level to the
appropriate fiscal year 1996 level”). In any event, the reported number of active duty forces in all
NATO countries dropped precipitously to 187,378 (well under the statutory limit) the following
fiscal year. Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A), DEF.
MANPOWER DATA CTR. (Sept. 30, 1992), https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp
[https://perma.cc/857N-U75V]. In later years, the Defense Department appears to have complied
with prescribed limits even as Congress lowered the ceiling to “approximately 100,000” in
European NATO-member states. 22 U.S.C. § 1928 note (2012) (Improvements to NATO
Conventional Capability).
President Bush also objected to a provision barring transfer of forces from a base in Spain to a
particular location in Italy, but nonetheless complied by transferring the units in question to a
different air base in Italy. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993,
Pub. L. No 102-190, § 2851, 105 Stat. 1290, 1558 (1991); Statement on Signing the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1769
(Dec. 5, 1991); MARK L. GILLEM, AMERICA TOWN: BUILDING THE OUTPOSTS OF EMPIRE 174–80
(2007).
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Clinton, in contrast, made no objection to several statutes limiting use
of military force abroad. 261 While he did object on constitutional grounds
to a statute barring use of funds for a military deployment in Haiti after
a specified date, 262 Clinton himself had already decided to end this
deployment. 263 In addition, in the Kosovo conflict, President Clinton
exceeded the standing sixty-day time limit for military engagements in
the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”), 264 but ironically he did so with the
support of congressional appropriations rather than in defiance of
them. 265 The Obama Administration likewise adopted a strained
reading of the WPR to justify prolonged use of force in Libya, 266 and the
President later (rather debatably) interpreted prior authorizations for
military force to permit military action against the Islamic State in the
Levant. 267 Again, however, Congress never attempted to deny funds for
these operations.
In short, across the sweep of U.S. history, presidents appear to
have substantially complied with appropriations limits on use or
deployment of military forces, even in cases where they initially raised
objections to legislative restrictions. In fact, in their encyclopedic survey
of presidential responses to legislative restrictions on military force
through 2008, David Barron and Marty Lederman identify only one
clear violation of a specific appropriations restriction. In 1975, during
the Vietnam War’s untidy conclusion, President Ford authorized use of
U.S. forces to aid in rescuing certain U.S. nationals and foreign allies in
Vietnam and Cambodia, notwithstanding strict statutory prohibitions
on use of appropriated funds to involve U.S. forces in “combat activities”

261. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1089–90 (discussing examples).
262. Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 35
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1927, 1928–29 (Oct. 5, 1999) (indicating that the President would
“interpret this provision consistent with my constitutional responsibilities as President and
Commander in Chief”); see also National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-65, § 1232(a), 113 Stat. 512, 788 (1999).
263. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1094.
264. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2012).
265. OLC justified the President’s action on this theory. See Authorization for Continuing
Hostilities in Kosovo, 24 Op. O.L.C. 327 (2000). For a much older instance of analogous reasoning
(albeit long before the WPR’s enactment), see Existence of War with the Seminoles, 3 Op. Att’y
Gen. 307, 307 (1838):
Several appropriations for the same object have been made by law, so that, although no
formal declaration of war has been made, (probably because deemed unnecessary,) the
war, on our part, has been waged by authority of the legislative department, to whom
the power of making war has been given by the constitution.
266. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong.
14 (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, Department of State).
267. See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 285–87 (D.D.C. 2016) (discussing legal
justifications for operation).
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or “hostilities” in Southeast Asia. 268 This example, however, arguably
involved precisely the sort of narrow unforeseen exigency that could
justify limited use of military force notwithstanding a funding ban. By
all accounts, Ford needed to act quickly to save lives of U.S. personnel
and key foreign allies, 269 and it seems doubtful that Congress would
have barred such action altogether had it anticipated it. Indeed, Ford
himself had convened a special session of Congress to amend the
restrictions at issue, and while Congress was still searching for precise
language when he acted unilaterally, it appeared receptive to his
general objectives. 270
2. Governing Principles and Contemporary Applications
a. Negative Restraints
Where, then, do these structural principles, informed by past
practice, leave us today? With respect to negative restraints—
prohibitions on deploying military forces in particular places or for
particular purposes—Congress retains near-plenary authority to
control use of military force through time-limited appropriations
restrictions. As text, structure, and original understanding suggest, and
as subsequent practice largely confirms, Congress may specifically
preclude use of military force in specified contexts or for specified
purposes, even if in the absence of such restrictions the president would
hold broader presumptive power of initiative to address perceived
military threats. By the same token, Congress may also bar deployment
or basing of troops in particular locations, whether within the United
States or overseas, as indeed it has done repeatedly across American
history. 271
268. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1072–73.
269. President Ford claimed, based on legislative history, that applicable funding restrictions
did not apply to rescues of U.S. nationals. Id. at 1073. Some authority, moreover, supports
preclusive presidential authority to protect U.S. lives and property. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 79 (1872); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186);
see generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive
Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
689, 712–23 (2016). No such justification was available, however, for use of military resources to
rescue non-Americans. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1073.
270. Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1073.
271. See supra Section IV.C.1; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1048–51, 1062–
63, 1063 n.497 (discussing pre–World War II restrictions on foreign deployment of draftees and
reservists and later restrictions on closure of military facilities). For historic executive branch
opinions supporting this view, see Appropriations—Marine Corp—Service on Battle Ships, etc., 27
Op. Att’y Gen. 259, 260 (1909):
Inasmuch as Congress has power to create or not to create, as it shall deem expedient,
a marine corps, it has power to create a marine corps, make appropriation for its pay,
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During the Obama Administration, the most significant
appropriations questions in this category involved military detentions.
Congress, as noted, thwarted President Obama’s stated goal of closing
the Guantanamo Bay detention facility by barring use of military funds
to transfer prisoners out of U.S. custody without making prescribed
advance certifications to Congress. In keeping with the framework
developed here, the Administration generally abided by these
restrictions, despite the President’s assertion in signing statements
that “[u]nder certain circumstances” the rider “would violate
constitutional separation of powers principles.” 272
A controversial exception involved releasing five prisoners in
exchange for a U.S. soldier held by the Taliban in Afghanistan. 273 In
this instance, the Administration ignored the certification requirement
for overseas exchanges, offering only a strained (and to many observers
unpersuasive) statutory argument for doing so. 274 Under the
constitutional framework advanced here, this action might have been
justified if it involved a genuine need for urgent action that Congress
could not reasonably have anticipated when it enacted the prohibition.
That argument was implausible, however, given Congress’s evident
awareness that Guantanamo detainees could be traded for foreign
prisoners. Nor could the Administration plausibly claim any avoidance
rationale or other constitutional basis for construing such limitations
narrowly: given the extent of congressional authority over military
resources, even quite specific constraints entail no valid infringement
of executive authority that may justify avoidance. 275 At any rate, even
if Obama’s Guantanamo transfer was valid, this isolated example
should not suggest any broad executive authority to defy appropriations
limits on use of military resources.
Congress’s authority to impose negative restraints on military
resources advances the central normative purpose for congressional
control over appropriations: it gives Congress, the branch with the most
but provide that such appropriation shall not be available unless the marine corps be
employed in some designated way[.];
Brevets’ Pay and Rations, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 223, 232 (1829) (characterizing the “right to designate
posts or stations among which the army should be distributed[ ] as a necessary incident to” the
president’s Commander-in-Chief power, but acknowledging that Congress could “supersede[ ]” this
default authority by “assum[ing] the power”).
272. Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA, supra note 61.
273. For critical discussion of this incident, see GAO Letter on Department of Defense
Compliance, supra note 62.
274. For an account of the arguments, see Pitt, supra note 100, at 2875–77.
275. For thoughtful exploration of when implausible statutory arguments may be preferable
in rule of law terms to preclusive constitutional arguments, see Peter M. Shane, The Presidential
Statutory Stretch and the Rule of Law, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 1231, 1249 (2016).
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distributed representation of the nation at large, ultimate say over the
purposes to which the nation’s blood and treasure are put. What is
more, by requiring ongoing agreement between the president and
Congress to sustain military action—or military deployments likely to
lead to military action—such congressional control over resources
ensures that broader deliberation and societal consensus support any
military action that could put the nation’s safety or position in the world
at risk. Isolated violations of this principle, such as through Ford’s
action in Vietnam or Obama’s Guantanamo transfer, should obscure
neither its centrality to separation of powers nor its deep entrenchment
in the broader pattern of historic practice.
b. Affirmative Requirements
Affirmative funding requirements—mandated expenditures,
deployments, or military actions—present more difficult questions.
With respect to mere expenditures (for specified troop levels or
weapons systems, for example), Article II again provides no sound
justification for defying congressional mandates. Such spending
requirements are laws, like any other appropriations measure, that the
president must faithfully execute. Even if the Commander in Chief
Clause requires presidential superintendence over weapons’ or troops’
use once in place, it provides no authority to adjust the level of resources
provided to the military at the outset; that authority instead lies at the
core of Congress’s resource-allocation authority under the
Appropriations Clause.
Historically, it is true, presidents did claim limited authority to
“impound” funds for weapons or troops they later judged
unnecessary. 276 President Jefferson, for example, returned
appropriated funds to the Treasury when he determined that naval
vessels Congress had authorized were no longer needed. When
President Nixon employed this authority aggressively to cut funding for
domestic programs, however, Congress responded by passing the
Impoundment Control Act. 277 That law now limits executive authority
to cancel either military or domestic spending mandated by Congress. 278
Nixon’s own Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel,
future Chief Justice William Rehnquist, correctly rejected arguments
that Article II gave the president inherent wide-ranging impoundment
276. For discussion of historic impoundment, see Barron & Lederman, supra note 55, at 1062–
63, 1063 nn.495–97.
277. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 621–91 (1974)).
278. 2 U.S.C. §§ 683, 684, 687 (2012).
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authority. 279 Around the same time, the Supreme Court held that
mandated expenditures could bind executive officials. 280 Historic
examples of impoundment should thus be understood to reflect a
repudiated historical gloss on appropriations statutes, not a preclusive
executive prerogative with enduring effect. 281
This same logic should equally support congressional authority
to mandate particular force dispositions through time-barred
appropriations mandates, even if it could not otherwise impose such
requirements as a matter of ordinary legislation. Such mandates, too,
would be laws the president must faithfully execute, and in general they
would operate at the level of overall strategy (a natural legislative
function) rather than battlefield tactics (the natural executive function
in military affairs). As we have seen, congressional control over
resources generally enables legislative allocation of limited resources to
particular priorities: by controlling appropriations levels Congress
assures that scarce public resources are deployed according to a
hierarchy of goals approved on an ongoing basis by the people’s
representatives. From this point of view, mandated troop deployment is
simply a particularly strong assertion of priorities, one the president
may properly be required to accept as a condition of obtaining military

279. See Presidential Authority to Impound Funds Appropriated for Assistance to Federally
Impacted Schools, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 303, 310 (1969) (calling it “extremely difficult to formulate
a constitutional theory to justify a refusal by the President to comply with a congressional directive
to spend”). Rehnquist did indicate that the “situation would be . . . very different” if “a
congressional directive to spend were to interfere with the President’s authority in an area
confided by the Constitution to his substantive direction and control, such as his authority as
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority over foreign affairs . . . .” Id. at 310–
11. Rehnquist did not elaborate in the opinion on what sorts of spending mandates would create
such interference. In later testimony, Rehnquist acknowledged that Congress could prohibit
basing troops in a particular hemisphere but argued that narrow tactical decisions, such as
whether to attack a certain hill or (rather oddly) whether all soldiers in a regiment should wear
“blue uniforms” must remain matters of presidential discretion. See Executive Impoundment of
Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 243–53 (1971). For discussion of Rehnquist’s testimony, see Barron &
Lederman, supra note 55, at 1067–70.
280. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975).
281. Roy Brownell II has argued that practice supports a continuing constitutional authority
of military impoundment, but he identifies only a handful of ambiguous examples (from the Carter
and George H.W. Bush Administrations) of significant military impoundments in arguable
violation of the Impoundment Control Act’s terms. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional
Status of the President’s Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1,
53–55 (2001); see also BANKS & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 24, at 83–85 (discussing one example).
Other surveys have found substantial compliance with the statute. See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note
22, at 65; Alan L. Feld, The Shrunken Power of the Purse, 89 B.U. L. REV. 487, 495 (2009); Charles
Tiefer, Can Congress Make a President Step Up a War?, 71 LA. L. REV. 391, 445–46 (2011); Wm.
Bradford Middlekauff, Note, Twisting the President’s Arm: The Impoundment Control Act as a Tool
for Enforcing the Principle of Appropriation Expenditure, 100 YALE L.J. 209, 218–19, 218 nn.52–
53 (1990).
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resources for other potential purposes. 282 As a matter of practice,
furthermore, although mandated overseas deployment would appear
novel, 283 past presidents’ apparent acceptance of negative deployment
constraints supports Congress’s authority to direct general disposition
of forces. 284 What is more, despite occasional constitutional objections,
past presidents appear to have acquiesced in domestic basing
requirements. 285
As a normative matter, to be sure, Congress here would not be
acting as a check but rather as a spur to action. Even so, the usual
impediments to legislative action would still ensure that adequate
deliberation and consensus underlies the policy. The president, after
all, would retain his usual veto over misguided legislation, and a
presidential obligation to abide by the condition should guarantee
appropriate seriousness on the part of legislators debating it. To be
concrete, then, were the current Congress to mandate consensual
deployment of troops in specified NATO countries or other allied
nations, whether to reinforce treaty commitments or to serve as
tripwires assuring a robust U.S. response to any invasion, the president
would hold no sound constitutional justification for disregarding the
funding condition and failing to locate troops as Congress directed. 286
Mandating actual use of military force, in contrast, would likely
go too far. Here, the problem is not so much that the legislation would
violate limits on congressional appropriations power, but rather that
the president’s own resource-independent power of military command
likely entails some irreducible authority over whether to launch
particular tactical strikes. Even this limit, however, is likely more
apparent than real, as Congress could readily force a reluctant
president’s hand through other actions within its unambiguous powers.
Congress, for example, could declare war, or enact legislation otherwise
282. See supra Section I.A.
283. But cf. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139,
§ 8151(b)(2)(B)(ii), 107 Stat. 1418, 1476–77 (1993) (directing that U.S. forces “should remain
deployed in or around Somalia until such time as all American service personnel missing in action
in Somalia are accounted for, and all American service personnel held prisoner in Somalia are
released”).
284. See supra Section IV.C.1.
285. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 465 (1994) (discussing statutory constraints on
domestic base closures); Statement by the President upon Signing the Military Construction
Authorization Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1008, 1008 (Sept. 12, 1966) (signing bill containing waiting
period for base closures while observing that “my responsibilities as President and Commander in
Chief will require me to seek prompt revision of the restriction if future circumstances prove it to
be inimical to the national interest”); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 54, at 341 (describing
President Johnson’s compliance with mandates to keep certain military facilities open).
286. Deployment without the host country’s consent could present questions of international
law that might override Congress’s mandate.
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placing the nation on a war footing. Such action might well place the
president in a position where failing to act militarily would
irresponsibly endanger the nation’s interests. 287 The very possibility
that Congress could thus effectively force the nation into war reinforces
the inference that, in general, mandating deployments as conditions on
time-limited appropriations may properly fall within Congress’s
authority. 288
In the post-War period, if not before, Congress has largely
preferred to leave the choice of military objectives to the executive
branch, while presidents have been happy to take this responsibility on
themselves. Yet this status quo is not constitutionally required; it
instead reflects longstanding congressional acquiescence to presidential
initiatives and a resulting de facto delegation of presidential discretion.
As the guardian of public resources, with ultimate power over the purse,
Congress holds final responsibility for choosing to enable presidential
adventurism rather than restricting it. Should Congress come to fear or
distrust how presidents will use the power it has conferred, it retains
power to claw back this discretion by imposing specific limits and
conditions on military resources it places at presidential disposal.
D. Law Enforcement
Law enforcement is another area of near-plenary congressional
control through appropriations limits. Here, too, the president’s
personal resources will get him nowhere. Even were he to go door to
door himself making arrests or show up in court to personally conduct
a prosecution, the president could hardly take the smallest bite out of
crime. The president’s authority over law enforcement is thus
profoundly resource-dependent. Just as with war powers, moreover,
compelling textual, structural, historical, and normative considerations
preclude resort to private resources for this purpose, and the president’s
dependence on public resources again properly entails subservience to
any limits or conditions placed on those resources. At least outside of
an extreme exigency unlikely to arise under modern conditions,
presidents hold no constitutional authority to direct enforcement of
federal laws in defiance of specific legislative constraints on public
resources available for that purpose.

287. Indeed, the president might well hold a constitutional obligation to effectively prosecute
a congressionally declared war. PRAKASH, supra note 197, at 160–61.
288. See also Tiefer, supra note 281, at 416–17 (arguing that Congress may mandate general
military programs, but not specific military incursions, through appropriations riders).
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1. The Structural Case for Appropriations Control
Once again, the constitutional structure, by its plain terms,
dictates this conclusion. To be sure, the Constitution obligates the
president to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 289 But
just as the Commander in Chief Clause comes into play only if Congress
provides some military to command, the Take Care Clause’s indirect
formulation—requiring the president to ensure faithful execution, not
to execute the law himself—presumes presidential dependence on
enforcement resources otherwise made available by Congress.
What is more, appropriations limits are themselves laws the
president must execute. As such, funding constraints on law
enforcement must bind the president, even if those constraints limit
enforcement of underlying substantive prohibitions. After all, even
apart from its control over appropriations, Congress holds authority to
create offices, vest them with particular authorities and functions, and
enact laws necessary and proper to carrying out those offices’ functions.
Congress may thus render particular federal laws subject to exclusive
official enforcement, or indeed exclusive enforcement by particular
officers, and it has done so in some instances since the beginning of the
Republic. 290 In fact, on some accounts, Congress has no choice about the
matter, at least with respect to criminal prosecutions, because due
process requires public prosecution. 291 Just as establishing an office
subject to Senate confirmation carries the inevitable consequence that
future Senates will have some control over appointments, limiting
enforcement of particular laws to public officials carries the inevitable
consequence that Congress will have continuing control, through future
appropriations levels, over how those laws are enforced.
Apart from text, structure, and history, normative
considerations reinforce these conclusions. Law enforcement is the
governmental power to arrest, imprison, deport, and execute
individuals based on asserted legal violations. Given this power’s grave
implications, its exercise should be subject to robust ongoing control by
the people’s representatives (as well as judicial due process
constraints), and not just quadrennial electoral accountability through
presidential elections. Indeed, the liberty-protective function of
289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
290. For discussion of historical enforcement arrangements, see Price, supra note 219, at 718–
21, 725–27, 743–45.
291. See, e.g., Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 278 (2010) (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Our entire criminal justice system is premised on the
notion that a criminal prosecution pits the government against the governed, not one private
citizen against another.”).
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separation powers is at its apex in this context: requiring distinct
legislative, executive, and judicial actions (or at least judicial review)
before any punishment may be imposed ensures that multiple veto
gates stand between the individual and punitive loss of freedom. 292 The
president’s veto, however, weakens Congress’s ability to exercise its
step in the process through substantive legislation: given sharp
partisan divides in Congress, presidents bent on enforcement may
generally count on copartisans in Congress to block any override of their
vetoes. This dynamic is all the more troubling today, moreover, due to
long-standing accretion of sporadically enforced laws, such as our
current harsh and retributive immigration code, that likely fail to
conform to current majority preferences. Such laws may persist over
time in part because the very absence of enforcement interrupts
political pressure on Congress to repeal them. 293 By the same token,
however, such laws may enable presidents to pursue enforcement
measures that likely do not enjoy support in either Congress or the
public at large. 294
The appropriations process affords a vital means of interrupting
these troubling dynamics. By rendering the president dependent on
funding choices that Congress makes year after year, one year at a time,
congressional control over appropriations ensures that the president’s
enforcement choices are subject to some ongoing constraint. Much as
the president could veto new substantive legislation of which he
disapproves, Congress may effectively veto enforcement efforts of which
it disapproves by refusing to appropriate any funds to support them.
Appropriations control over enforcement thus maintains a productive
tension between the two political branches over on-the-ground
application of federal laws.
In short, while some have argued that riders barring
enforcement of particular laws “prevent[ ] the President from fulfilling
his or her constitutionally mandated duty to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed,” 295 this view is wrong both formally and

292. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 1014 (2006) (observing that separation of powers “requires not only that the executive and
legislative branches agree to criminalize conduct but also includes the judiciary as a key check on
the political branches”).
293. For my own discussion of these dynamics, see Price, supra note 219, at 745–48.
294. Bill Stuntz famously characterized these political dynamics in criminal law as
“pathological.” William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505 (2001).
295. LeBoeuf, supra note 99, at 475.
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functionally. 296 It overlooks, first of all, that appropriations limits are
themselves part of the law that presidents must execute. In functional
terms, furthermore, this view would remove the most important
ongoing constraint on executive authority to unilaterally determine
existing federal law’s on-the-ground impact. As David Barron and Todd
Rakoff have observed, “[t]he modern world is thick with federal
statutes,” 297 and in practice accreted prohibitions and delegations may
add up to immense executive authority over how the law applies in
practice. 298 In such an environment, if not also in others we might
imagine, the ultimate purposes of separation of powers—protecting
liberty and ensuring responsive government—are best served by
maintaining a congressional check on executive policy through
legislative control over law enforcement resources.
2. Lessons from History
In fact, even apart from modern conditions, the deep structure
of
separation-of-powers
practice
powerfully
confirms
this
understanding. Even were it not textually compelled, congressional
control over law enforcement resources is now every bit as entrenched
in our lived constitutional structure as is the bedrock presumption of
congressional funding discretion discussed earlier. 299
At some points in the past, it is true, presidents asserted a
preclusive authority to enforce laws without regard to appropriations
constraints. In 1851, for example, President Millard Fillmore asserted
that statutory limits on use of the militia “probably” could not prevent
its use to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, because the president’s “duty
to see the laws faithfully executed is general and positive.” 300 Likewise,
in 1879, as part of the same battle with Congress addressed earlier, 301
President Rutherford Hayes vetoed legislation that would have left
certain disputed election laws in place while rendering them a “dead
letter” during the fiscal year by preventing any expenditure for their
296. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 34, at 472–73 (characterizing this theory as “based on the
remarkable and unfounded proposition that article II provides the Executive plenary power to
shape the implementation of substantive legislative authorizations”).
297. David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 294
(2013).
298. See Moe & Howell, supra note 27, at 143 (“[I]t is crucial to recognize that the president is
greatly empowered by the sheer proliferation of statutes over time.”).
299. See supra Part II.
300. President Millard Fillmore, Message to the Senate (Feb. 19, 1851), in 6 COMPILATION
MPP, supra note 55, at 2637, 2641. Fillmore’s statement appeared in the context of a request to
relax statutory restrictions on the militia. Congress did not oblige. See Barron & Lederman, supra
note 55, at 990–91 (discussing congressional response).
301. See supra Part II.
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enforcement. 302 Approving this bill, Hayes asserted, would have
required him to “participate[ ] in the curtailment of his means of seeing
that the law is faithfully executed, while the obligation of the law and
of his constitutional duty remain[ed] unimpaired.” 303 In Hayes’s view,
“[t]here are two lawful ways to overturn legislative enactments. One is
their repeal; the other is the decision of a competent tribunal against
their validity.” 304 Hayes felt compelled to veto the bill at issue because
its “effect . . . is to deprive the executive department of the means to
execute laws which are not repealed, which have not been declared
invalid, and which it is therefore the duty of the executive and of every
other department of Government to obey and to enforce.” 305
These assertions may well reflect a stronger notion of executive
enforcement obligation than is commonplace today. As Hayes’s
statement reflects, the present-day assumption of heavily discretionary
enforcement, calibrated in accordance with available resources, may be
best understood as a function of legislative developments over time, and
not as a function of underlying separation-of-powers imperatives. 306
Indeed, I have argued that even today presidents retain an important
structural obligation to enforce federal laws even when they disagree
with the policy those laws reflect. 307 Yet enforcement obligation does
not imply resource-independence. Because appropriations limits are
themselves laws the president must execute, funding constraints
necessarily limit the scale, intensity, and focus of law enforcement
efforts. Even in the nineteenth century, key authorities recognized this
principle. As an 1843 Attorney General opinion observed,
notwithstanding the president’s constitutional obligation to ensure
faithful execution of the laws, “Congress may . . . indirectly limit the
exercise of this power by refusing appropriations to sustain it, and thus
paralyze a function which it is not competent to destroy.” 308

302. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Veto Message (June 23, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP,
supra note 55, at 4488, 4495.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 4496.
305. Id.
306. For my elaboration of this historical argument, see Price, supra note 219, at 716–48.
307. Id. at 748–68.
308. Executive Power of Appointment, 4 Op. Att’y Gen. 248, 248 (1843). In this opinion, the
Attorney General concluded that the president could appoint agents or commissioners to
investigate legal violations but could not pay them without an appropriation. Id. at 248–49; see
also, e.g., Power of the President in Executing the Laws, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 519 (1860) (“If . . .
an act of Congress declares that a certain thing shall be done by a particular officer, it cannot be
done by a different officer. The agency which the law furnishes for its own execution must be used
to the exclusion of all others.”); Transfer of Specific Appropriations of House of Representatives to
Contingent Fund, 3 Op. Att’y Gen. 442, 443 (1839) (“[N]o assumption of power could be more
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As further evidence of this view, it is striking that President
Hayes, despite asserting independent enforcement responsibility,
ultimately accepted Congress’s general authority to calibrate
enforcement capacity through funding levels. When Congress failed to
appropriate funds following his veto, Hayes complained that “the means
at the disposal of the executive department for executing the laws
through the regular ministerial officers will after to-day be left
inadequate.” 309 Likewise, although Hayes observed that “[t]he
suspension of these necessary functions in the orderly administration
of the first duties of government is inconsistent with the public
interests, and at any moment may prove inconsistent with public
safety,” he nonetheless acknowledged the “necessity of making
immediate appropriations” to remedy these dangers. 310 In short, despite
repeatedly vetoing legislation that he felt violated his own
constitutional enforcement obligations, Hayes accepted that a shortfall
in appropriations could impair actual discharge of that obligation. 311
dangerous than that of expending more money upon an object than Congress had appropriated for
it . . . .”).
309. President Rutherford B. Hayes, Special Message (June 30, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION
MPP, supra note 55, at 4474, 4475.
310. Id. Reflecting the same assumptions, Hayes had earlier called on Congress “to make
adequate appropriations to enable the executive department to enforce the laws.” President
Rutherford B. Hayes, Second Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1878), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note
55, at 4444, 4446. In the same message, calling attention to timber theft on public lands, he urged
that “[t]he Department of Interior should . . . be enabled by sufficient appropriations to enforce the
laws in that respect.” Id. at 4456. In an earlier appropriations battle with Congress, President
Ulysses Grant similarly recognized that a lapse in appropriations would cause federal
departments to “suspend” their functions. President Ulysses Grant, Special Message (June 17,
1876), in 10 COMPILATION MPP, supra note 55, at 4322–23.
When Congress adjourned in March 1877 without appropriating army funds for the fiscal year
beginning after June 30, Attorney General Charles Devens understood governing statutes to
permit continued contracting for necessary supplies. He nevertheless deemed it impermissible to
expend treasury funds to pay such contractual obligations, and he further advised against
obtaining “voluntary contributions” to make up the shortfall. “The transaction,” he observed,
“would be subject to criticism as an attempt to do indirectly that which Congress should have
provided for by positive appropriation. . . . In the absence of such appropriations, I do not think
that funds should be sought elsewhere.” Support of the Army, 15 Op. Att’y Gen. 209, 211 (1877).
311. See HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, AND
POLITICS IN THE POST–CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, at 158 (2001) (characterizing congressional
Democrats’ actions in 1879 as “forcing [Hayes] either to veto appropriations bills or bow to their
will”). Hayes did note later that, despite a lapse in appropriations for federal marshals, some had
“continued the performance of their duties without compensation from the Government, taking
upon themselves the necessary incidental outlays, as well as rendering their own services.”
President Rutherford B. Hayes, Third Annual Message (Dec. 1, 1879), in 10 COMPILATION MPP,
supra note 55, at 4509, 4525. Hayes indicated, however, that in some cases “the proper execution
of the process of the United States failed by reason of the absence of the requisite appropriation.”
Id. Hayes also emphasized that the Attorney General had advised the marshals that “they would
necessarily have to rely for their compensation upon the prospect of future legislation by
Congress,” and he urged Congress to make “sufficient” appropriations for election-related
enforcement activities by the marshals in the coming year. Id. at 4525–26.
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Indeed, resource shortfalls addled civil rights enforcement throughout
Reconstruction. As Brooks Simpson observes, “[t]he Justice
Department did not possess sufficient personnel or budgetary resources
to prosecute the law effectively, and many military officers cared little
to serve as federal police.” 312
In any event, as Nicholas Parrillo has recently documented, the
advent of salaried compensation in the late nineteenth century
accelerated development of heavily discretionary forms of official
enforcement. Assertions of preclusive executive enforcement authority
have surfaced occasionally since then. Nevertheless, with one
ambiguous exception, 313 I am aware of no significant example in which
any president defied an enforcement funding restriction on this
theory. 314 Today, Congress routinely charges executive agencies with
312. SIMPSON, supra note 115, at 182. Simpson concludes that Hayes’s successful defense of
executive prerogatives through his vetoes was ultimately pyrrhic for this reason. He writes, “It
was unclear how Hayes’s stand on the riders issue had done anything to halt the erosion of black
rights or of southern Republicanism, but at least he had resisted efforts to wipe off the books laws
intended to protect black rights.” Id. at 226. For further background on this interbranch conflict
and a more favorable assessment of Hayes, see HOOGENBOOM, supra note 115, at 392–413, 537–
38.
313. Based on the dubious assumption that “[d]ecisions on deployment and redeployment of
law enforcement officers in the execution of the laws are a part of the executive power vested in
the President by Article II of the Constitution,” President George W. Bush objected in two signing
statements to appropriations provisions requiring relocation of the “tactical [border enforcement]
checkpoints” in the Tucson area “at least once every seven days.” Statement on Signing the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1563, 1563 (Oct. 18,
2005); Statement on Signing the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, 3
PUB. PAPERS 2575, 2575–76 (Oct. 18, 2004). GAO later found that the Administration failed to
fully comply with these provisions, though border officials did often “shut down [immovable
checkpoints] for a ‘short period in an endeavor to satisfy the [statutory] provision.’ ” U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, B-308603, Presidential Signing Statements Accompanying Fiscal Year 2006
Appropriations Acts 35 (June 18, 2007). This instance of defiance (if it can even be characterized
as such) seems not only doubtful on the merits but also irrelevant to the broader question here of
congressional authority over substantive law enforcement. The rider to which Bush objected in
this example did not involve any restriction on enforcement of substantive prohibitions, but
instead a picayune and apparently impracticable micromanagement of enforcement tactics.
314. Presidents and executive branch lawyers have periodically resurrected the
Hayes/Fillmore view, but in examples I have identified they did not act on their assertions.
President Woodrow Wilson, for example, objected in 1913 to an appropriations rider that barred
use of a particular Justice Department fund to prosecute labor unions, workers, or farmers, yet
Wilson noted that the proviso limited only the use of this particular fund and not other available
resources. President Woodrow Wilson, Statement on Signing the Sundry Civil Bill (June 23, 1913),
in 27 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 56, at 558. Although the Justice Department
did pursue several such cases in 1914, Christopher May found “no evidence that the Wilson
administration spent any of the restricted funds for this purpose.” MAY, supra note 58, at 88.
In his 1957 opinion regarding enforcement of desegregation decrees in Little Rock, Arkansas,
Attorney General Herbert Brownell observed in passing, without support or analysis, that “there
are . . . grave doubts as to the authority of the Congress to limit the constitutional powers of the
President to enforce the laws and preserve the peace under circumstances which he deems
appropriate.” President’s Power to Use Federal Troops to Suppress Resistance to Enforcement of
Federal Court Orders—Little Rock, Arkansas, 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 313, 331 (1957). Brownell
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implementing broad mandates with limited budgets, making extensive
enforcement discretion a practical necessity. Key Supreme Court
decisions have thus linked enforcement discretion to resource
allocation, without even questioning whether Congress holds authority
to moderate enforcement by limiting resources. 315 In effect, an
expectation of discretion is today baked into the substantive structure
of the laws; Congress legislates against a background expectation of
discretion calibrated by resource constraints. However undesirable
emphasized that this “consideration was not reached because of the express congressional
authority for the action taken” by the federal government in Little Rock. Id.
President Lyndon Johnson objected (though apparently on policy rather than constitutional
grounds) to an appropriations provision barring enforcement of certain export controls, yet his
administration nevertheless complied with the provision. See Statement by the President
Expressing Disapproval of Appropriations Act Provision Relating to Export Control of Hides,
Skins, and Leather, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1351, 1351 (Nov. 8, 1966); CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 54, at
340–41.
President Carter complained in a 1977 signing statement that an appropriations rider barring
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare from seeking certain busing remedies for civil
rights violations “may raise new and vexing constitutional questions.” Labor-HEW Continuing
Appropriations Bill, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2087, 2088 (Dec. 9, 1977). Carter’s statement, however, did not
specify whether those questions related to faithful execution or equal protection (or something
else), id., and in any event his administration not only abided by the restriction but also
successfully defended it in court. See Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221, 1227–29, 1228 n.42 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); MAY, supra note 58, at 91.
In a 1989 opinion, OLC relied in part on the president’s Take Care Clause duty to justify
interpreting certain statutory restrictions on military law enforcement as applicable only in
domestic contexts. The Office explained:
On foreign soil or the high seas—unlike in the domestic situation—military personnel
may constitute the only means at the executive branch’s command to execute the laws.
Giving extraterritorial effect to the Posse Comitatus Act thus could, in many
circumstances, deprive the executive branch of any effective means to fulfill this
constitutional duty.
Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 Op. O.L.C. 321, 334 (1989). The Office,
however, ultimately concluded only that any such statutory argument would raise “serious
questions of constitutionality,” and it based its interpretation primarily on other considerations
and acknowledged that “valid statutory constraints” could limit means available for law
enforcement. Id. at 332–34.
Several years earlier, President Reagan objected in a signing statement to an appropriations
provision that, by denying funds to pursue antitrust enforcement against municipalities,
“attempted to prevent the Federal Trade Commission from carrying out the constitutional duty of
executing the substantive antitrust laws.” Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1210, 1210–11 (Aug. 30, 1984). Yet during the fiscal year covered by this rider, the Commission
dropped two such complaints it had earlier filed (albeit for the stated reason that the defendant
municipalities had resolved the issue) and it reported pursuing no other complaints within the
meaning of the rider. 1985 FTC ANN. REP. 71 (indicating that two complaints filed against
municipal defendants during fiscal year 1984 were withdrawn in fiscal year 1985 after both
defendants enacted legal changes that resolved the Commission’s concerns).
315. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that “an agency decision
not to enforce often involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors,” including not only
“whether a violation has occurred” but also “whether agency resources are best spent on this
violation or another”).
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such legal structures may be as a normative matter—and I have
elsewhere criticized them 316—this background understanding,
entrenched in long-standing practice, undercuts any claimed executive
duty to faithfully execute the laws beyond congressional appropriations
for doing so.
A president might be on stronger ground if enforcement were
necessary to defend basic operations of the government against
threatened calamity. As we have seen, both Washington and Lincoln
undertook law enforcement operations to address such perceived
exigencies without any specific appropriation to support doing so. Much
as with war powers, however, Congress’s subsequent establishment of
a permanent enforcement bureaucracy weakens any such claim of
inherent presidential authority to act outside of it today, let alone to
defy specific appropriations restrictions on particular activities.
Washington and Lincoln faced perceived law enforcement exigencies
without available means to confront them. As we have seen, however,
even they claimed no authority to command resources independently of
Congress; on the contrary, they acknowledged the illegality of their
action by seeking congressional forgiveness and ratification. Today, the
Anti-Deficiency Act generally criminalizes anticipatory spending while
expressly allowing obligation of funds to protect lives and property. 317
This statutory exemption, combined with the scale of the standing
enforcement bureaucracy, makes it highly unlikely that a president
could claim a genuine exigency of the sort that prompted Washington
and Lincoln to muster increased enforcement resources on their own
initiative.
3. Governing Principles and Contemporary Applications
a. Negative Restraints
How far, then, could Congress go in dictating executive
enforcement priorities? Based on the principles elaborated so far,
almost any negative constraint on enforcement resources should bind
executive officials. By cutting off funding for particular enforcement
options—whether with respect to entire statutes or regulations or with
respect to more narrowly defined categories of offenders—Congress
exercises the authority guaranteed by the Appropriations Clause to
316. Price, supra note 219, at 746.
317. 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). The Justice Department has construed this exception broadly to
include such law enforcement activities as legal investigations by the FBI and safety inspections
by administrative agencies. See, e.g., Maintaining Essential Services in the District of Columbia
in the Event Appropriations Cease, 12 Op. O.L.C. 290, 292–93 (1988).
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impose ongoing constraints on application of existing substantive laws
to particular violators. Importantly, such an appropriations cutoff does
not change the underlying substantive law itself, so violators may
generally remain subject to potential future enforcement. 318 Even so,
congressional authority to deny funds in this fashion provides a crucial
check on executive activities, one that is all the more important given
the power of initiative that presidents have acquired through the
ongoing accretion of delegated authorities and substantive statutory
prohibitions.
Indeed, Congress’s control over enforcement resources might
even entail power to restrict executive actions that it could not control
through general legislation. Evan Zoldan, for instance, has argued that
congressional legislation must carry some degree of generality. 319
Congress, on this view, might hold legislative authority only to enact
general prospective prohibitions, which the executive branch then
enforces against particular violators based on its own independent
judgment of who is guilty or innocent. To the extent that is true,
Congress might well lack power to adopt general prohibitions while
exempting particular named or specified individuals. On the account
developed here, however, Congress nevertheless retains authority to
cut off annual appropriations to support particular prosecutions or
enforcement actions based on its own time-bound judgment that no
such enforcement is warranted. Congress thus could deny funds, say, to
investigate or prosecute a former presidential candidate for specific
suspected violations, or to pursue other narrow categories of offenders
if it so chose. If the appropriations power is an independent check on
executive enforcement capacity, above and beyond the limits imposed
by congressional authority to define offenses in the first place, then this
check might properly extend even to such fine-grained judgments about
what ongoing enforcement actions should be barred.
b. Affirmative Requirements
As with war powers, affirmative funding conditions—mandated
enforcement priorities or prosecutions—present more difficult
questions. I have argued elsewhere that while Congress generally may
restrict prosecutorial discretion, the executive branch holds an
irreducible constitutional authority to decline prosecution in particular
cases when the executive branch concludes that enforcement is

318. Zachary S. Price, Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 1014 (2017).
319. Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 689–90 (2014).
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factually unjustified. 320 To the extent that understanding of Article II
is correct, the appropriations power provides no way around it. On the
contrary, just as, in Lovett, imposing punishment through legislation
was an invalid bill of attainder though accomplished through an
appropriations rider, 321 so too here a case-specific prosecution mandate
should violate separation of powers even if imposed as a condition on
executive funding. Such a mandate would effectively collapse the
executive function into the legislative, removing a key liberty-protective
constraint on government action. It would be distinguishable,
moreover, from a narrowly targeted funding denial precisely because it
eliminates a constitutionally required constraint on prosecution, rather
than simply restraining a previously conferred executive enforcement
power.
More general enforcement mandates, in contrast, should bind
executive officials. When an appropriations statute mandates that
particular classes of violations be prioritized (as indeed statutes have
done on occasion), or that a particular sum be expended investigating
and prosecuting a particular type of violation, Congress has simply
exercised its authority under the Appropriations Clause to determine
general resource-allocation priorities and establish appropriate levels
of public support for different government activities. Congress in fact
routinely performs this function by setting overall budget levels for
different agencies with responsibility for enforcing different statutes: it
may fund, for example, the Food and Drug Administration more
lavishly than the Environmental Protection Agency, or the Labor
Department’s Wage and Hour Division more generously than its Mine
Safety and Health Administration.
To be sure, insofar as it mandates enforcement activity instead
of curtailing it, such legislation does not directly advance the libertyprotective purposes of maintaining a legislative check on executive
enforcement choices. Yet it may in fact serve those purposes indirectly:
by channeling resources toward one area of enforcement, Congress may
effectively limit enforcement in others. In any event, such legislative
authority is equally essential to maintaining congressional control over
general government spending levels. Even if one doubted that Congress
could establish such general priorities through ordinary legislation, the
Constitution should give Congress authority to do so through timebarred appropriations limits on the executive branch.

320. Price, supra note 219, at 711–12.
321. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1950).
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c. Recent Controversies
This framework permits straightforward resolution of several
recent disputes. To begin with, the recent marijuana appropriations
riders easily fall within congressional authority. Because the executive
branch holds no freestanding inherent authority to enforce any
particular federal statute, Congress holds clear authority to prevent
enforcement of a given law, either across the board or in particular
circumstances, by cutting off resources to enable such enforcement.
President Trump’s signing statement suggesting otherwise was
mistaken. 322 By the same token, were President Trump to undertake
the immigration dragnet he has threatened, Congress would hold clear
authority to halt such action or impose different priorities through
appropriations limits. Less dramatically but no less consequentially,
Congress’s periodic denial of resources to enforce disfavored
administrative regulations are also valid. Insofar as they block
implementation of a particular understanding of the law or set of
regulatory obligations, such riders fall squarely within Congress’s
authority to control executive enforcement by limiting executive
resources.
Again, none of these funding cutoffs (whether for marijuana,
immigration, or regulatory action) change the underlying substantive
law itself. As a general matter, the executive branch may remain free
to resume enforcement, even with respect to past conduct, when
funding is restored. 323 Even so, Congress’s authority to deny funds in
this fashion provides a crucial check on executive activities, a check
that, once again, is all the more important today given the power of
initiative that presidents have acquired through the ongoing accretion
of delegated authorities and substantive statutory prohibitions. 324
Funding restrictions preventing transfer of Guantanamo
prisoners during the Obama years presented only slightly more difficult
questions. In asserting in signing statements that “[u]nder certain
circumstances” a provision barring detainee transfer to the United
States “would violate constitutional separation of powers principles,”
President Obama stated:
The executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees who
remain, to determine when and where to prosecute them, based on the facts and

322. Trump Statement on 2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act, supra note 3.
323. For my own further discussion of this question and an argument that regulated parties
should hold a reliance defense against future enforcement in some circumstances, see Price, supra
note 318, at 1010–15.
324. See supra Section I.A.
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circumstances of each case and our national security interests, and when and where to
transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane treatment policy. 325

While it might refer only to policy considerations, this statement
could suggest that presidents hold an inherent, preclusive authority to
bring criminals to justice in federal court. To the extent that is what
President Obama meant, he was wrong. Congress’s broad authority
over enforcement resources entails power to deny funding for particular
enforcement efforts or prosecutions. In this case, of course, doing so had
the perverse effect of keeping suspects in military detention. As
discussed earlier, moreover, separate (and equally valid) funding
constraints prevented transfer of those prisoners out of military
custody. 326 But the peculiar posture of the Guantanamo example should
not obscure the essential character of the authority Congress exercised.
In general, congressional control over enforcement resources is libertyprotective. It provides a check on overzealous law enforcement. In
extremis, it could prevent an unhinged president’s henchmen from
taking unwarranted action. Asserting presidential authority to override
such limits based on a presumed inherent executive authority to enforce
the laws would be truly dangerous. President Obama’s Attorney
General was correct to repudiate this view. 327
E. Diplomacy
Funding restrictions on the president’s diplomatic powers
present the most challenging questions. The trouble stems partly from
uncertainty about the proper content of the president’s constitutional
foreign affairs powers. Although presidents from the beginning have
claimed particular responsibility for foreign affairs, 328 the
Constitution’s text scatters different elements of foreign relations
power in different places while leaving two of the most important—
recognition of foreign sovereigns and control of diplomatic
communication—without any unambiguous textual home. 329 Edward
325. Obama Statement on Signing 2015 NDAA, supra note 61.
326. See supra Section IV.C.2.a.
327. Julian Hattem, Lynch: No Gitmo Transfers to US Without Change in Law, HILL (Mar. 9,
2016, 10:31 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/272351-attorney-general-lynch-nogitmo-transfers-to-us-without-change-in [https://perma.cc/79CE-NVZ6] (reporting testimony
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that “[t]he law currently prohibits a transfer to U.S. soil,
and the president would have to work with Congress”).
328. POWELL, supra note 8, at 36.
329. For recent thoughtful efforts to reconstruct the Framers’ understanding, see PRAKASH,
supra note 197, at 110–41; RAMSEY, supra note 97; and McConnell, supra note 12. On some
accounts, the Vesting Clause assigns certain historic foreign affairs powers to the president as a
component of the “executive Power” vested in the president. See, e.g., PRAKASH, supra note 197, at
110–11; RAMSEY, supra note 97, at 73.
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Corwin thus famously described the constitutional text as “an
invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy.” 330 At any rate, on the particular question addressed here—
congressional appropriations control over executive action—political
struggle has yielded widely divergent congressional and executive
views. While Congress routinely conditions appropriations on
particular diplomatic constraints, the executive branch just as routinely
claims authority to disregard those conditions. 331
The framework developed throughout this Article can help chart
a principled path through this thicket. Without attempting here to
answer every substantive question regarding the proper content of
executive authorities, we can nonetheless make progress on the
question of appropriations control by considering the proper
relationship to resources of foreign affairs powers that presidents have
claimed authority to exercise. Doing so, however, requires further
disaggregating those powers. In terms of the framework developed here,
some powers, most notably the president’s claimed authority to
recognize foreign sovereigns and personally receive their diplomats, are
resource-independent. Like other such powers discussed earlier, these
authorities may be exercised personally by presidents, and in
consequence Congress lacks authority to directly control their exercise
through appropriations limitations. At the other extreme, affirmative
provision of foreign aid properly remains subject to plenary
congressional control. In the middle, as a difficult intermediate case,
falls actual conduct of diplomacy, meaning communication of official
positions to foreign sovereigns on behalf of the United States. For
reasons addressed below, an intermediate solution, modeled on
principles developed earlier for indirect funding constraints on
executive power, should govern further struggles over control of
diplomacy.
1. Disaggregating Foreign Affairs Powers
To clear the ground for consideration of diplomacy per se, we can
begin with some easier aspects of executive foreign relations authority.
Too often, both courts and presidents have sloppily lumped foreign
affairs powers together, presuming general presidential authority to act
as the country’s “sole organ” overseas, without regard to limits imposed

330. CORWIN, supra note 11, at 201.
331. See supra Section I.B.2.
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by Congress. 332 Even accepting a broad view of executive authority over
foreign relations, however, different aspects of that authority should
relate differently to Congress’s power of appropriation.
Within the framework developed here, at least two key aspects
of foreign relations, reception of diplomats and recognition of foreign
sovereigns, may be classified as resource-independent presidential
authorities. By its plain terms, the Constitution provides that the
president “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” 333
The president thus holds clear textual authority to meet
representatives of foreign sovereigns on behalf of the United States. In
addition, based in part on this clause (among other considerations), the
Supreme Court recently held in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry
that the president holds exclusive authority to recognize foreign
governments. 334 Still further, under Zivotofsky, this power apparently
extends not only to recognition of a particular government or sovereign
state, but also to determining whether particular territory (such as the
city of Jerusalem in Zivotofsky) falls within a particular foreign state’s
borders. 335
To the extent these exclusive presidential authorities are
themselves valid (a question beyond the scope of this Article), 336 they
are most naturally classified as resource-independent. Both are
authorities the president may exercise personally, by choosing to meet
with particular foreign representatives or recognize a particular foreign
government. Admittedly, unlike other powers located in this category
earlier, neither of these authorities clearly serves to check
congressional authority or ensure institutional control over the
executive branch. Yet both might be functionally justified by an
analogous concern to avoid congressional delay and obfuscation with
respect to key foreign relations choices that often require swift and
decisive action by some accountable official. 337 At any rate, like the
powers of clemency, veto, and appointment addressed earlier, these are
332. The classic example is United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–
20 (1936).
333. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
334. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2087 (2015).
335. Id. (“The President’s exclusive recognition power encompasses the authority to
acknowledge, in a formal sense, the legitimacy of other states and governments, including their
territorial bounds. . . . The formal act of recognition is an executive power that Congress may not
qualify.”).
336. For one critique of Zivotofsky, see Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the
Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112 (2015).
337. Cf. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087 (“If the President is to be effective in negotiations over
a formal recognition determination, it must be evident to his counterparts abroad that he speaks
for the Nation on that precise question.”).
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authorities that even Charles Black’s enfeebled apartment-dwelling
president, stripped of government-provided comforts and privileges,
could continue to exercise on his own.
To be sure, the notion that presidents could realistically exercise
these powers on their own may once again be somewhat fictional. The
lavish ceremonies of international diplomacy, the state dinners and
twenty-gun salutes, have always required resources beyond most
presidents’ personal bank accounts. (Query, for example, how effective
our hypothetical president would be engaging with the Chinese Premier
or British Prime Minister over TV dinners around a kitchen table.) Nor
in all likelihood could the president make informed and intelligent
recognition decisions without guidance and support. As we saw earlier,
however, these same problems attend other resource-independent
authorities, even if the problem is particularly acute in this context.
With respect to these aspects of diplomacy, as with other resourceindependent authorities, the president is at least formally independent
from Congress, and this formal independence should again preclude
Congress from leveraging its control over other resources to dictate
directly how the president exercises these powers.
This inference, indeed, may help explain (and limit) otherwise
puzzling features of existing practice and precedent. In Zivotofsky, for
example, the Court indicated that “[t]he President . . . could not build
an American Embassy abroad without congressional appropriation of
the necessary funds.” 338 Nevertheless, the Court gave no indication that
the law at issue—a provision allowing individuals born in Jerusalem to
list “Israel” as their place of birth on U.S. passports—would have been
any more valid had it been passed as a condition of State Department
appropriations, 339 as indeed it was in at least one other iteration. 340 The
recognition power’s resource-independence helps explain why. Because
the president can exercise the recognition power on his own, Congress
may not condition the government’s operation on that power being
exercised in a particular way, any more than it could block
implementation of President Carter’s or President Andrew Johnson’s
controversial pardons through funding restrictions. In all these
examples, as in others addressed earlier, giving effect to the funding
constraints would “require operation of the Government in a way
forbidden by the Constitution.” 341
338. Id.
339. Id. at 2087–88.
340. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 404, 118 Stat. 86, 86.
341. Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37 Op. Att’y Gen. 56, 61
(1933) (objecting to provision for congressional committee veto); see also, e.g., Mutual Security
Program—Cutoff of Funds from Office of Inspector General and Comptroller, 41 Op. Att’y Gen.
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By the same token, this theory might justify on narrower
grounds long-standing executive objections to embassy funding
conditions that could effectively dictate recognition decisions. For
example, while multiple administrations have asserted that requiring
relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem
would infringe upon presidential authority over diplomacy, 342 these
objections might be better justified as asserting authority to disregard
funding constraints that would directly override a presidential
recognition decision. 343
In any event, the formal resource-independence of the
president’s reception and recognition powers distinguishes it starkly
from other foreign relations authorities. At the other extreme, the
president cannot claim any valid authority to provide affirmative
support to international bodies, foreign governments, or even
achievement of concrete policy goals. Such spending in service of
national foreign policy goals falls squarely within the ultimate
authority over public resource allocation that the Appropriations
Clause guarantees to Congress. 344
This boundary, indeed, is one core lesson of the Iran-Contra
scandal. Whether or not presidents have been correct to claim
preclusive authority over actual diplomatic communication, Congress’s
fierce repudiation of Iran-Contra remains significant in drawing the
line at actual provision of public resources. 345 In the spending
component of the scandal, President Reagan’s staff did not simply
encourage support for the Contras by foreign governments and private
individuals through talk. They themselves established and operated an
507, 526 (1960) (“[I]t seems . . . plain that Congress may not use its power over appropriations to
attain indirectly an object which it could not have accomplished directly.”).
342. See, e.g., Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op.
O.L.C. 123, 125–26 (1995) (objecting to such a requirement and identifying past objections).
343. See, e.g., Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 Op. O.L.C. 189, 193
(1996) (characterizing conditions on diplomatic relations with Vietnam as violation of recognition
power); 19 Op. O.L.C. at 124–25 (asserting that relocating U.S. embassy in Israel would infringe
upon president’s recognition power).
344. See supra Section I.A. Although he did not justify the distinction in the same terms
employed here, Louis Henkin similarly noted in his classic treatise that presidents “have
reluctantly accepted . . . [that] Congress can designate the recipients of U.S. largesse and impose
other conditions upon it.” HENKIN, supra note 82, at 120–21. Henkin also argued, much as I do
below, that Congress held authority to structure the overall foreign affairs establishment, id. at
121–23, but not to direct diplomatic officials to pursue particular policies, id. at 119. Like Stith,
however, Henkin believed that Congress was legally obliged to fund international commitments,
even if this obligation was often respected in the breach. Id. at 121.
345. See S. REP. NO. 100-216, H.R. REP. NO. 100-433, at 413 (1987) (“The Constitutional plan
did not prohibit the President from urging other countries to give money directly to the Contras.
But the Constitution does prohibit receipt and expenditure of such funds by this Government
absent an appropriation.” (footnote omitted)).
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ostensibly private (but effectively public) entity for channeling such
funds to a foreign armed group, in defiance of clear statutory
prohibitions on use of public funds to advance this policy. 346 As Philipp
Bobbitt and others amply demonstrated at the time, such action
violates crucial limits on executive authority. 347 Iran-Contra’s
repudiation, moreover, appears to fit a broader pattern in executive
practice. Although presidents have occasionally asserted authority to
disregard spending restrictions on foreign aid, they appear to have
backed down from such claims in practice. 348
Attending to the formal relationship between powers and
resources, then, may help identify some clear cases and thus prevent
creeping expansion of presidential discretion over all aspects of foreign
affairs. Nevertheless, the central aspect of foreign relations—conduct of
diplomacy—defies easy categorization, for reasons I now address.
2. How to Characterize Diplomacy?
While the textual basis for this authority is debatable,
presidents going back to George Washington have more or less
successfully claimed exclusive authority over actual conduct of
diplomacy—the official positions the United States takes in
communication with foreign sovereigns. 349 What is more, on this
346. Id. (describing creation and use of “nominally private” entity). The Iran-Contra scandal
also involved other arguable legal violations, including indirect arms sales to Iran in violation of
applicable statutes. BRUFF, supra note 59, at 370–71.
347. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 64–82 (1991); see also, e.g.,
BRUFF, supra note 59, at 372 (“The Iran-Contra operation created secret national policies that
were supported by funds that had not been appropriated by Congress.”).
348. For example, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower claimed authority in signing
statements to disregard provisions mandating assistance to specified foreign countries, yet they
ultimately complied with these requirements. MAY, supra note 58, at 93–95; see also HENKIN,
supra note 82, at 120–21 (concluding that “Presidents have reluctantly accepted” Congress’s
authority over foreign aid spending). President Obama caused controversy by providing funds to a
United Nations body in arguable violation of a standing prohibition on funding any UN agency or
affiliate that “grants full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have
the internationally recognized attributes of statehood” (as the Palestinian Authority, the group in
question, evidently does not). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995,
Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 410, 108 Stat. 382 (1994). To the extent the statute could not fairly be
construed to allow the expenditure, the Constitution provides no justification for disregarding this
restriction. For discussion of this controversy and criticism of the Administration’s view, see Two
Recent Examples of Executive Undermining of Congress’s Spending and Foreign Commerce Powers:
Hearing Before the Exec. Overreach Task Force of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 28–
31 (2016) (statement of Eugene Kontorovich, Professor, Northwestern University School of Law).
349. Writing in 1957, Corwin observed that “there is no more securely established principle of
constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in
its dealings with other nations.” CORWIN, supra note 11, at 214 (emphasis omitted). For more
recent executive branch opinions asserting this view, see, for example, Unconstitutional
Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(a) of the
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question, presidents have put their money where their mouth is by
openly defying congressional limits—even when those limits took the
form of appropriations restrictions. 350 The executive branch has even
gone so far as to claim preclusive authority to employ whomever it
wants, whether inside or outside the government, to relay particular
diplomatic messages. 351
In practice, then, presidents have treated diplomacy as a
resource-independent power—a power that Congress cannot directly
control, even through conditions it imposes on resources for the State
Department or other diplomatic functions. As a matter of first
principles, this view is difficult to justify. To be sure, as with other
resource-independent powers like the veto, clemency, and
appointments, diplomacy is an authority the president can (and does)
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __
(2011); and Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act,
33 Op. O.L.C. __ (2009). For a discussion of early practice supporting this authority, see PRAKASH,
supra note 197, at 120–22.
350. For examples of such defiance, see, for instance, Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d
648, 650 (9th Cir. 1993) (addressing claims that executive officials “did not initiate treaty
negotiations with foreign governments to protect sea turtles, as required by [statute]”); 33 Op.
O.L.C. __ (ms. at 1, 10–11) (noting plans to violate funding restriction); Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy,
International
S&T
Cooperation,
WHITE
HOUSE
PRESIDENT
BARACK
OBAMA,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/eop/ostp/sciencediplomacy (last visited Jan.
5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LV8J-N868] (describing diplomatic contacts by OSTP with China despite
funding restriction on such activities); HENKIN, supra note 82, at 88, 118–19 (characterizing a 1913
appropriations rider barring unauthorized participation in international conferences as “a known
dead letter” and observing that presidents have “often disregarded” diplomatic limitations); MAY,
supra note 58, at 109–10 (discussing President Eisenhower’s completion of an executive agreement
in defiance of a statutory restriction); Eli E. Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional
Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 145, 154–56 (1953)
(discussing examples of defiance from 1913, 1916, 1921, and 1924).
The executive branch, of course, does not uniformly disregard such conditions. In a careful
study of congressional instructions to U.S. representatives at the World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas
found that, as of 2013, “[i]n Republican and Democratic administrations and during periods of both
unified and divided government, the executive branch has voted consistently with Congress’s
instructions.” Daugirdas, supra note 201, at 518–20. As Daugirdas observes, this finding
highlights the potential importance of Congress’s appropriations power in controlling executive
action, even in areas of formal executive authority. Id. at 533–34. She acknowledges, however, that
“[t]he desire for funding matters.” Id. at 541. Because presidential administrations during the
period she covers favored strong support for the bank, they may have held stronger incentives to
comply than in cases of interbranch policy conflict. Id. at 540–41.
351. One notorious historical example of this practice was President Woodrow Wilson’s heavy
reliance on a private emissary to communicate with European leaders. See BRUFF, supra note 59,
at 209, 213. For a classic discussion of historical examples and defense of this practice, see Henry
M. Wriston, American Participation in International Conferences, 20 AM. J. INT’L L. 33, 39 (1926)
(“Congress may partially cripple a power which it is not competent to destroy by refusing
appropriations. But Congress has no power whatever to limit the President in his choice of
negotiators.”); see also HENRY M. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
(1929) (similar). For other examples and a more recent critique, see Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc
Diplomats (Marquette Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper No. 17-08, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
2926010 [https://perma.cc/FJN8-TQ2Q].
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exercise personally. Presidents may themselves communicate with
foreign leaders or travel abroad to meet with them; they may even
personally engage in negotiations, like Woodrow Wilson at Versailles or
Franklin Roosevelt at Yalta. If it is true that the president holds
preclusive authority to speak for the nation, then Congress surely could
not restrict what the president says personally in such settings.
On a normative level, furthermore, congressional control seems
less imperative than with respect to war powers and law enforcement.
Diplomacy, after all, is only talk, and as Winston Churchill supposedly
said, “better to jaw-jaw than to war-war.” 352 Because diplomacy lacks
the coercive or destructive character of war powers and law
enforcement, an ongoing constraint on executive action through
conditional appropriations may be less important to the nation’s wellbeing and survival. In addition, under established practices, even if we
no longer treat all binding international agreements as treaties
requiring Senate ratification, giving binding legal effect (or at least
domestic implementation) to an international agreement generally
requires some form of either ex ante or ex post congressional
approval. 353 In principle, then, Congress’s legislative authority may
impose an ongoing constraint on diplomatic outcomes, even without use
of conditional appropriations.
Nevertheless, for important formal and functional reasons,
diplomacy might more naturally be characterized as resourcedependent. Support for other resource-independent powers typically
takes the form of advice and assistance flowing in towards the president
to facilitate a particular executive judgment (a judgment, for example,
about whether to veto a particular bill, issue a particular pardon,
appoint a particular officer, or even recognize a particular foreign
government). In contrast, diplomacy, more like law enforcement and
war powers, involves projecting power outward. Diplomatic resources
thus magnify presidential authority more concretely than do resources
for mere advice and assistance with respect to other presidential
powers.
What is more, the notion that the president could personally
conduct all necessary U.S. diplomacy is even more fictional than in the
352. W.H. Lawrence, Churchill Urges Patience in Coping with Red Dangers; Tells
Congressional Group It Is ‘Better to Jaw-Jaw than to War-War,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1954, at 1.
353. See generally Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The
Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1713 (2017) (discussing
different pathways to forming international agreements and concluding that the “clearest line” is
that “the executive branch can enter into international commitments on its own but needs some
kind of preexisting or subsequent action from the Senate or Congress in order for the terms of
these commitments to be implemented through domestic law”).
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case of other resource-independent powers. Isolated historical examples
notwithstanding, the president’s many other responsibilities surely
preclude personal engagement in the protracted negotiations often
required for effective diplomacy. In practice, such activity must be
conducted through other official representatives of the United States,
and official representatives require official resources—salaries and
embassies, or at the very least dinners and hotel rooms. 354
Finally, notwithstanding Congress’s ultimate authority over
formation and implementation of binding legal commitments, recent
presidents have demonstrated in dramatic fashion just how
consequential mere diplomatic communication, without more, may be.
Simply by failing to reiterate the U.S. commitment to mutual-defense
assurances in the NATO treaty, President Trump may have
permanently altered U.S. security arrangements. For his part,
President Obama demonstrated in rather dramatic fashion how much
power diplomatic talk by itself may carry, at least under modern
conditions, in shaping the international legal terrain. In two significant
and controversial agreements, one regarding Iran’s nuclear program
and another involving climate change (from which President Trump has
announced the United States will withdraw 355), President Obama
exercised preexisting domestic legal authorities over air pollution and
sanctions
waivers
to
establish
significant
international
commitments. 356 In each case, Congress could have undone or blocked
the deal by stripping the domestic legal authorities that made it
possible, yet doing so would have required legislation that the President
could have vetoed. These examples illustrate how, as with war powers
and law enforcement, presidential initiative may create facts on the
ground that Congress has limited practical capacity to undo—except
through its own power of initiative with respect to appropriations.
354. For discussion of the importance of diplomatic appointments in an era of premodern
communications, see McConnell, supra note 12.
355. Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal From the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 373 (June 1,
2017).
356. For a thorough discussion of legal questions presented by such agreements, see Galbraith,
supra note 353. For some other analyses, see, for example, Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character
of the Paris Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142 (2016); Jack Goldsmith & Marty
Lederman, The Case for the President’s Unilateral Authority to Conclude the Impending Iran Deal
Is Easy Because It Will (Likely) Be a Nonbinding Agreement Under International Law, JUST
SECURITY (Mar. 11, 2015, 8:15 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/20963/case-presidentsunilateral-authority-conclude-impending-iran-deal-easy-likely-nonbinding-agreementinternational-law/ [https://perma.cc/WU2K-NZBW]; and Michael Ramsey, Is the Iran Deal
Unconstitutional?,
ORIGINALISM
BLOG
(July
15,
2015,
6:02
AM),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2015/07/is-the-iran-dealunconstitutionalmichael-ramsey.html [https://perma.cc/Z862-WPAP].
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To the extent diplomacy is best characterized as a resourcedependent authority, principles developed earlier would suggest that
congressional authority under the Appropriations Clause to set general
resource-allocation priorities and modulate the government’s overall
bureaucratic capacity should entail power to control the diplomatic
purposes to which the resources it provides are put. 357 As noted,
however, with respect to diplomacy, in contrast to war powers and law
enforcement, presidents have repeatedly claimed an effective authority
to disregard congressional funding constraints. 358 In effect, then,
despite the compelling structural reasons to view diplomacy as
resource-dependent, presidents may well have moved diplomacy into
the resource-independent column.
Even if that is true, however, this claimed presidential authority
over diplomacy should not properly imply limitless authority to call on
the federal government’s bureaucratic resources for diplomatic
purposes, nor even unrestricted access to support from diplomatic
advisers. On the contrary, as we have seen, resource constraints may
impose some check on even resource-independent powers. Here, insofar
as an antimanipulation principle properly governs indirect constraints
on paradigmatic resource-independent powers like the veto and
clemency, the same principle might likewise govern the validity of
funding limits on conduct of diplomacy.
3. An Antimanipulation Framework
If conduct of diplomacy is a resource-independent power, as
presidents have effectively claimed it to be, then the president must
retain ultimate independent discretion over the choice of diplomatic
goals, just as he must retain ultimate independent discretion over
vetoes or pardons. By the same token, however, principles developed
above with respect to indirect conditions on resource-independent
powers may help make sense of when funding constraints on diplomacy
do, and do not, cross a constitutional line. As with conditions on advice
and assistance for vetoes, pardons, and appointments, appropriations
conditions on diplomacy are invalid if they appear likely to manipulate
independent presidential judgments about particular narrow
diplomatic objectives. At the same time, however, funding conditions
that set overall levels of support for broader categories of diplomatic
activity should be valid and enforceable.
357. Michael Ramsey advocates this view as a matter of plain text and original understanding.
RAMSEY, supra note 97, at 112, 417 n.61.
358. See supra notes 349–350 and accompanying text.
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The easiest case for invalidity under this framework involves
conditions that seek to control the specific viewpoint expressed by the
diplomatic officer most naturally positioned to engage in the relevant
diplomacy. If Congress, for example, provides funds for a special envoy
to negotiate a particular treaty, or for that matter for the Ambassador
or senior State Department official with general responsibility for the
country in question, while precluding the envoy or ambassador or
official from taking particular positions in those negotiations, the
condition may be disregarded as an unconstitutional infringement on
the president’s presumed Article II authority over conduct of diplomacy.
Much as in other examples addressed earlier, such a condition is not
coercive in the strict sense that it altogether bars the president from
asserting a contrary view. The president could always call the foreign
leader in question himself, or he might employ a different official or
relay his views through a private emissary. Yet the restriction may
nevertheless materially obstruct the president’s chosen diplomatic
goals, and it may, once again, do so in a way that obscures whether
responsibility for the resulting policy properly lies with Congress or the
president. To be blunt, if the president cannot employ the personnel and
resources most directly suited to accomplishing the diplomatic goal at
hand, then his pursuit of that goal will likely be far less effective.
Foreign leaders may well perceive use of incongruous substitute
personnel as signaling lack of commitment, and in any event key
contacts and expertise within the U.S. government will be closed off to
advancing the president’s objectives. For all these reasons, such
limitations seem likely to impose a substantial practical impediment to
the president’s asserted exclusive control over conduct of diplomacy.
This view at least holds a long and distinguished pedigree. In
one important early debate on diplomatic funding, Daniel Webster
argued on the House floor that while Congress could deny funds for a
planned delegation to an international convention, it could not provide
funds subject to conditions dictating what the delegates would say. 359
“[W]e must make the appropriation without conditions,” Webster
argued, “or refuse it.” 360 More recently, Louis Henkin (among others)
has advocated a similar principle. 361
Among recent controversies, furthermore, the Obama
Administration’s disregard of the OSTP riders might also be understood
359. 9 ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 94 (New York: D.
Appleton & Co. 1858).
360. Id. at 95. For discussion of this and other historic debates, see Nobleman, supra note 350.
361. HENKIN, supra note 82, at 119 (“[S]hould Congress provide that appropriated funds shall
not be used to pay the salaries of State Department officials who promote a particular policy or
treaty, the President would no doubt feel free to disregard the limitation.”).
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in these terms, although the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal
Counsel (“OLC”) instead justified its view on the broader theory (rooted
in past OLC opinions) that the president holds unfettered choice of
diplomatic agents. 362 While the director of this particular White House
office might seem an odd choice for diplomatic engagement, existing
cooperation agreements (negotiated before any such rider was in place)
designated this officer as the point of contact with China for purposes
of negotiating further technology-related agreements. 363 In that
context, the office’s director might at least arguably constitute the most
natural vehicle for conducting diplomacy on this particular narrow topic
with China, with the consequence that stripping the director of this
authority constitutes an unduly manipulative condition on
congressional funding of the executive branch.
As a second type of invalid restriction, conditions precluding any
communication at all with particular foreign governments or
international bodies may likewise be invalid. To be effective, the
president’s asserted power over diplomacy must entail authority to
obtain assistance from someone somewhere within the federal
bureaucracy to relay the president’s diplomatic positions to foreign
counterparts. Without such authority, the president would be limited
to personal communications of his own or perhaps communications
relayed through private intermediaries. As compared to communication
through official channels with the benefit of relevant expertise within
the government, such means of diplomacy are again likely to be so far
less effective as to make restrictions on their use unduly manipulative
with respect to pursuit of the president’s goals. Accordingly, to take
another
recent
example,
President
Obama
(like
earlier
administrations) stood on solid ground in disregarding funding
conditions that barred sending any State Department representative to
particular United Nations bodies. 364 Such conditions were invalid
because they impermissibly denied the president any appropriate
official means of engaging diplomatically with foreign bodies whose
decisions may materially affect the president’s chosen diplomatic
goals. 365
362. See Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy in Section 1340(a) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. __ (2011) (ms. at 5).
363. Id. (ms. at 2) (describing designation of OSTP as the United States’ Executive Agent).
364. Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33
Op. O.L.C. __ (2009).
365. See id. Strictly speaking, the condition in question did not preclude sending
representatives from other government departments (to the extent appropriations for that purpose
were otherwise available), but OLC noted that delegations to UN bodies were normally led by
State Department officials. Id. (ms. at 10).
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On the other hand, Congress should hold authority to structure
the overall diplomatic apparatus at a higher level of generality.
Congress may fund certain embassies or other components within the
State Department (the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, say) more
generously than others. 366 While such choices may channel diplomatic
initiative in particular directions, they do not carry the same direct
impact on the president’s choice of objectives that could render more
narrowly focused restraints unduly manipulative. By the same token,
although this power has been historically contested, Congress should
hold authority to initiate diplomacy by requiring opening of particular
embassies or consulates against the president’s wishes, so long as
Congress does not exercise a de facto recognition power or prescribe the
particular diplomatic communications in which the government will
engage. 367 As in other areas of executive authority, general funding
limits and mandates fall within Congress’s overall authority over
resource allocation within the federal government. Such constraints
should raise constitutional questions only if targeted far more narrowly
at particular presidential diplomatic initiatives and objectives.
Finally, for much the same reason, Congress should also hold
broad authority to limit use of nondiplomatic government personnel for
diplomatic purposes. The executive branch has at times characterized
the president’s choice of diplomatic agents as entirely plenary. 368 As a
default matter, such freedom of choice might well be justified. The
president’s presumed authority over foreign affairs might well support
a default rule that presidents may employ whichever agents within the
federal government they deem best for advancing their chosen
366. For another defense of this view, see HENKIN, supra note 82, at 121–23.
367. For discussion of contrasting examples from President Ulysses Grant (who complied with
such a restriction despite raising constitutional objections) and President Carter (who complied
only partially), see MAY, supra note 58, at 93, 114–15. In another more recent example, President
Reagan objected on constitutional grounds to provisions mandating reopening of foreign
consulates, Statement on Signing a Bill Authorizing Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983 Appropriations
for Certain Federal Agencies, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1072, 1072 (Aug. 24, 1983), but he nevertheless
promptly complied with these mandates, with the one exception (later excused by Congress) where
the host country apparently objected to reopening the U.S. consulate. Compare Department of
State Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-241, § 103, 96 Stat. 273 (1982) (conditioning Fiscal Year
1982–1983 funds for opening any new consulates on reopening of consulates in seven listed cities),
with 1 GALE RESEARCH CO., COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR LEADERS YEARBOOK 1984, at
172, 174, 177–78, 188 (1984) (listing as open U.S. consulates in all required cities save Mandalay,
Burma), and Department of State Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-164, § 137, 97 Stat. 1017, 1030
(1983) (amending statute to impose condition only “to the extent such reopening is authorized by
the foreign government involved”), and H.R. REP. NO. 98-563, at 65 (1983) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining
that this amendment “clarified the authority of the Secretary of State to open new consulates,
notwithstanding that the consulate in Mandalay, Burma has not been reopened”).
368. See, e.g., 33 Op. O.L.C. __ (ms. at 5) (indicating that Congress “may not . . . place limits
on the President’s use of his preferred agents to engage in a category of important diplomatic
relations”).
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objectives. As with advising more generally, moreover, presidents must
remain free to draw guidance from anyone within the government they
choose, so long as the requested advice is either a de minimis imposition
or germane to the office’s functions and not unduly distracting. 369
Within those parameters, however, if Congress provides resources for
particular government functions—law enforcement or nuclear security,
for example—it must hold authority under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, if not also the Appropriations Clause, to reserve personnel for
those purposes and not for distracting diplomatic undertakings that the
president chooses to pursue.
To summarize, then, the constitutional structure, at least as
refracted through the lens of current practice, may well grant the
president authority to disregard funding conditions that materially
disrupt specific diplomatic initiatives. Yet Congress remains free to
dictate more general funding levels for diplomatic activities, and by the
same token it retains complete control over actual provision of resources
to foreign governments and other beneficiaries of federal largesse.
Executive disregard for funding restraints on diplomacy, furthermore,
provides no support for developing a similar practice with respect to
war powers and law enforcement. Because those powers implicate
different formal and functional considerations, Congress’s power of the
purse must continue to afford broad control over how the coercive and
destructive aspects of government power are exercised.
CONCLUSION
While the constitutional separation of powers limits
congressional authority to condition executive appropriations,
accurately identifying these limits requires disaggregating executive
powers and considering the proper relationship between authority and
resources in each context. Certain executive powers—the veto,
clemency, and appointment authorities being key examples—are
resource-independent. Congress lacks power to control their exercise,
whether through restricted appropriations or by other means, because
the president may exercise these powers personally, and because these
powers generally exist either to check Congress or to ensure
presidential control over a distinct branch of government (or both). In
contrast, Congress holds near-plenary authority to restrict use of
military or law enforcement resources. While presidents have claimed
substantial discretion over the deployment of such resources in the
absence of specific restraints, Congress nonetheless retains broad
369. See supra Section III.C.3.
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power to impose such restraints if it chooses. Hard cases arise between
these two poles, mainly with respect to presidential advisers and staff
and the conduct of diplomacy. In both those areas, substantial practice,
if not also more primary considerations, support some executive
authority to defy congressional funding conditions, but this authority
should properly be limited to circumstances in which the funding
constraint in question appears likely to unduly manipulate a particular
narrow judgment properly belonging to the president alone.
Throughout, I have attempted to defend this framework
primarily with formal textual and structural arguments, buttressed by
appeals to functional considerations and historic practice. Yet the
framework’s underlying normative appeal bears reiteration in closing.
Separation of powers necessarily limits Congress’s authority to control
either the judiciary or the executive branch, whether through
appropriations or by other means. Both those branches have specific
constitutionally assigned functions that exist in part to check and
restrain Congress. Yet the framework elaborated here preserves a vital
legislative check on executive governance in contexts where it most
matters. Congress retains substantial control over the structure and
availability of resources for various purposes within the government, as
well as ultimate control over actual national policy in nearly every key
area, save perhaps actual conduct of diplomacy with foreign
governments. Even more important, through congressional control of
military and law enforcement resources, ultimate responsibility for the
federal government’s coercive and destructive capacities remains in the
hands of the people’s representatives in Congress, and not solely in
those of the president. Even beyond these specific authorities,
moreover, ultimate power to cut off funding altogether and shut down
the government, though much maligned for its abuse in recent years,
remains a last safeguard against unwarranted presidential action.
These limits provide guideposts for legal decisionmakers,
whether in the executive branch, Congress, or the courts. Yet the
framework should also inform public debates over when presidents
have transgressed proper legal bounds. The unmistakable trend in
separation-of-powers dynamics over recent decades has been towards
increasing executive governance. These facts on the ground, however,
need not—and should not—be understood to reflect constitutional
imperatives. Here, as in other areas, they may better be understood as
reflecting an accretion of implicit legislative delegations. 370 Much of the
power the executive branch exercises, even in areas of perceived core
executive responsibility such as war powers and law enforcement, is a
370. See Price, supra note 219, at 742–48.
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function of legislative choices over time rather than constitutional
necessities. Legislative choices, unlike constitutional prerogatives, can
be legislatively undone—if the legislature has the will to do so.
Though a source of frustration and obstruction for presidents in
everyday political battles, Congress’s power of the purse provides an
essential ongoing political check on presidential action, as well as a
potential failsafe against catastrophe. We cannot afford further erosion
of this key remaining limit on executive power.

